How does wording become a ruling in a case that the founder did not spell out?
Its link to the blog’s introductory texts: The Introduction prepares the ground for its question in §§3, 9 and 11, and the Framework uses it in the second step of §7.1 and in the decision domains that the question of change brings together.
1. From the Founder’s Wording to the Decision
To explain how a waqf works, it is not enough to know that the stipulation of the founder (wāqif) is recognised; we need to know how its meaning is determined, by what ruling it binds, and who has the power to give it effect in the case at hand. Two parties to a dispute may agree on the wording of the waqf deed and then disagree over who holds the right or how far the power of the nāẓir (waqf administrator) extends. Or they may agree on the meaning and disagree over the validity of the stipulation itself. The ways of dealing with a disagreement over meaning, with the voidness of a stipulation and with the modification of a valid one are not the same: interpreting the wording determines what it requires; ruling a stipulation void excludes what it requires once its meaning is known; and modifying a valid stipulation changes what was in legal effect, for a reason that needs a basis.
If the founder writes “nāẓir” alongside “mutawallī” (another name for the waqf administrator), has he made the nāẓir an observer who keeps himself informed, a partner in disposition, or the holder of a right to prevent leasing? And if he writes “the nearest, then the next nearest” (al-aqrab fa-l-aqrab), is it enough for people to be equal in degree of lineage for them to be entitled together, or does nearness also take in differences in the strength of the tie? The names of posts and categories do not by themselves answer these questions. The outcome depends on the conventions of the speech, its context, the admissible contextual indications (qarāʾin), and what the juristic or statutory rule adds to the document.
The chapter examines two carefully worked-out questions: the supervisor (mushrif) and the mutawallī in Ibn ʿĀbidīn, and “the nearest” in a fatwā (juristic opinion) by Muḥammad ʿAbduh. In the first, the interpretation results in a restriction on the power to lease; in the second, it determines who takes part in sharing the yield (rīʿ). Each has a rival explanation whose point of divergence can be identified, so we do not stop at showing that language matters to waqf. We then place the two questions within the distinction between signification, validity and change, and set the requirement to respect the founder’s will against a specific contemporary text.
The order of inquiry — interpreting the intended meaning, the validity of the stipulation, the justification for departing from it, the holder of power, and the effect — was worked out earlier in our study “Sulṭat mukhālafat sharṭ al-wāqif” [The Power to Depart from the Founder’s Stipulation]. The chapter also draws on our study “Ḥīna ṣāra al-qurb fiʾa” [When Nearness Became a Category] in identifying the entry standard for the benefit. The chapter does not attribute this order to a single jurist, nor does it repeat the tests of the two studies as new independent evidence; its aim is to apply what has been established of it to the link between wording, right and decision.76
Footnotes
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Bandar, “Sulṭat mukhālafat sharṭ al-wāqif: maʿāyīr al-istibdāl bayna al-taʿaṭṭul wa-l-maṣlaḥa al-rājiḥa — nizāʿ dākhil al-madhhab al-wāḥid” [The Power to Depart from the Founder’s Stipulation: Criteria for Substitution between Disuse and Preponderant Benefit — A Dispute within a Single School], version dated 27 August 2026, the section on interpretation, the decision chain and the German comparison; and “Ḥīna ṣāra al-qurb fiʾa: binyat miʿyār al-dukhūl ilā al-manfaʿa al-waqfiyya wa-l-khayriyya fī Miṣr, wa-maṣdar taʿrīfihi wa-sulṭat tafsīrihi” [When Nearness Became a Category: The Structure of the Standard for Entry into Waqf and Charitable Benefits in Egypt, the Source of Its Definition and the Power to Interpret It], the version used, the section on interpreting the standard and its note on the fatwā on “the nearest”. These are two references to earlier work in two unpublished papers of ours, and they do not stand in for the sources specified below. ↩
2. The Force of a Stipulation Does Not Exempt It from Interpretation or from Scrutiny of Its Validity
This section tests the likening of the founder’s stipulations to the words of the Lawgiver, a view that Ibn Taymiyya reports from some jurists: is it a likeness in how they indicate the intended meaning, or in the obligation to act on them as well? The texts read on this point differ in their answer. Ibn Taymiyya’s words must first be taken back to the question he was answering. He was asked about a ribāṭ (a hospice) whose owner had dedicated it to a group of people devoted to the Qurʾān, assigned them a stipulated stipend (maʿlūm), stipulated recitation at particular times, in a particular place and in a particular manner, with its reward to be gifted to him, and tied receiving the stipend to performing according to these stipulations. His answer therefore examines the effect of those stipulated acts on entitlement; it is not merely a theoretical definition of the force of the founder’s wording.77
The first of his rulings is that the meaning of a stipulation is distinct from the source of its binding force. He reports the division of stipulations into valid and invalid, and then explains the saying of some jurists that they are like the words of the Lawgiver as meaning that they are “like the texts in indicating the founder’s intended meaning, not in the obligation to act on them”. He mentions generality and specificity, unrestricted and restricted expression, and sharing and sequencing (tashrīk and tartīb): tools by which the intended meaning of the wording is known. Taken in this sense, the likening makes it possible to understand who shares and who comes later, and does not raise an invalid stipulation to the rank of a ruling that must be followed.
He then adds a qualification that should not be dropped: a speaker’s words are construed according to his habitual manner of speech and his language, even if it is not Arabic, together with the circumstances of the utterance that accompany it. For him, then, signification does not mean subjecting every waqf deed to an assumed eloquent phrasing or to the Lawgiver’s usage in every word. This is a direct basis for reading waqf deeds in their own languages and contexts; it does not make every reported custom authoritative before its connection with the founder’s words has been verified.
His second ruling is that a stipulation does not draw unlimited binding force from the will of the person who made it. His strong objection in this answer in Majmūʿ al-fatāwā [The Collected Fatwās] is directed at putting human texts on a par with the Lawgiver’s text in an unqualified obligation to act on them. It cannot be inferred from this that a valid stipulation is not binding, or that any nāẓir may set it aside at his own discretion. Lawful binding force remains governed by its source in the sharia, and the founder does not create for himself obedience in everything he stipulates.
This is Ibn Taymiyya’s interpretation of the likening, and it does not become a consensus confining the function of the rule to interpretation. In Minḥat al-khāliq [The Creator’s Gift], Ibn ʿĀbidīn reports the binding formulation and then allows that the likeness may extend to the obligation to act as well. The passage is a gloss on al-Baḥr al-rāʾiq [The Clear Sea], not wording whose whole may be attributed to that work’s base text.78 The existence of a binding formulation is not enough in itself to establish that the person who used it made an invalid stipulation obligatory; nor is a difference in wording enough to rule out comparing the two views. What is retained here is the difference in treatment; in each question, the criterion of a stipulation’s validity and its effect is then sought, rather than constructing a disagreement wider than the texts establish.
His third ruling in the answer is that keeping property durably inalienable requires work that has a recognised benefit. He begins from the requirement that the work to which these awqāf are dedicated be a qurba (an act of drawing near to God), and excludes forbidden work, then disapproved work, and then, on what he holds to be the correct view, merely permissible work. In the rest of the answer he describes the case of binding the entitlement-holders (mustaḥiqqūn) to work from which neither the founder nor the worker benefits: property held inalienable, and recipients of the benefit whom the imposed tasks keep from their religious and worldly interests. The argument thus takes in property, work and benefit together; it does not equate merely keeping expenditure going with achieving the purpose.79
The scope of this argument must be kept in view. For its author it is a normative justification, not a historical measurement establishing that every stipulation that respected the objective (maqṣid) lengthened the life of the waqf. Nor is it to be carried over into voiding every permissible organisational measure that the service needs; determining how such a measure relates to maṣlaḥa (legally relevant benefit) is part of the inquiry. This is one of the points of disagreement that Abū Zahra discussed, as will follow. What the Dustūr takes from it is the question of what we want to preserve: a right or a recognised service, or a form of work that has continued and lost its benefit?
His fourth ruling is that protecting the objective does not give the administration unrestricted power. In a neighbouring question about a ribāṭ for which no waqf deed was known, its nāẓir had introduced conditions on prayer and recitation and begun recording absences. Ibn Taymiyya bars the introduction of conditions that neither the founder nor the Lawgiver required, on the ground that the nāẓir had withheld the entitlement-holders’ right until they did what was not required of them. In the case of a madrasa in Jerusalem, he permits performing the prayers in al-Aqṣā while remaining entitled to the stipend, and states that the stipulation of praying in the madrasa is not a valid one on which entitlement depends. The first bars the creation of a restriction without a basis, and the second rejects a specific restriction; the two are not to be brought together under a general power to depart from every valid stipulation.80
His answer in Majmūʿ al-fatāwā on giving the nāẓir a choice according to maṣlaḥa concerns a waqf for a group of specified persons, among them holders of posts that carry a stipend, with the nāẓir delegated to remove whomever of them he wished, to put another in his place, and to increase or reduce the stipend. The nāẓir dismissed one of the specified post-holders and appointed in his place someone who would perform the post for part of his stipend, so that the rest would remain with the waqf. The question therefore touches both the entitlement of a specified person and the decision to assign the post. Ibn Taymiyya ties the delegation to maṣlaḥa as the sharia recognises it, and voids the stipulation that leaves the nāẓir free to do as he pleases. These are the limits of an authority (wilāya) whose basis was established in the question; they do not create an authority to modify for every nāẓir, nor a general delegation to remove every mawqūf ʿalayh (the one for whom the waqf is made). Working out the move from a valid delegation to the modification of a valid stipulation belongs to Chapter 7.81
The conclusion of this answer completes the picture of review, following an explicit question on whether the maṣlaḥa must be stated. The nāẓir must state it; if it becomes evident, it must be followed; if it becomes evident that it is a harm (mafsada), it is rejected; and where the matter is doubtful, his independent judgement (ijtihād) is acceptable if he is knowledgeable and upright. The trade-off is not confined to keeping his act or restoring what preceded it: a third course preferable to both may be required. The answer reverses the contravening act as far as possible, so the possibility of reversal remains part of setting out the effect of review. This completes the particular case; it does not make every dispute in waqf administration subject to a single procedure, but it shows how the power to choose is linked to stating its ground and to protecting entitlement when that choice is reviewed.82
Ibn al-Qayyim begins by objecting to the likening, and then, giving its proponent the benefit of the doubt, construes his words as concerning signification; it is therefore not accurate to reduce his position to accepting the rule and then restricting it. Elsewhere he permits departing from the stipulation in favour of what is more beneficial, subject to its religious qualification. This view does not by itself determine who issues the decision in every case, nor does it make every benefit that the nāẓir assesses a sufficient reason for departure.83 The chapter keeps each text attributed to its author, rather than treating the later reception of a view as independent evidence that the authors agreed.
Abū Zahra’s preferred view, presented in Chapter 1, §3, adds a more precise question: by what criterion is the validity of a stipulation tested? He draws on al-Shāṭibī’s distinction between the conditions of acts of worship and the conditions of transactions, and prefers to treat waqf stipulations according to the rules governing transactions, while the waqf itself remains a qurba. On his view, then, not every restriction the founder writes need be a specific qurba; yet a stipulation that is contrary to the sharia or harmful is still not valid. Abū Zahra departs from a narrowing in Ibn Taymiyya, while at the same time drawing on the analysis of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim; he is therefore neither to be described as following them in everything nor as rejecting all they said.84
The difference over the criterion of a stipulation’s validity affects the scope of the founder’s own right: if the absence of a specific qurba in the stipulation is held to require rejecting it, what the founder may regulate narrows. If, in the law of transactions, it is enough that the stipulation not contradict a recognised aim, the room for stipulation widens. This is an analytical consequence of the difference over the criterion of validity, not a new ruling that every stipulation whose harm is not apparent is valid. In each detailed ruling (farʿ), the view that carries the conclusion must be identified, rather than referring the reader to “the higher objectives (maqāṣid)” in general.
This connects with an earlier analysis of ours in Taḥqīq manāṭ maqāṣid al-waqf [Establishing Where the Objectives of Waqf Apply]: a general objective may serve to justify two opposing rulings, and so it is not enough on its own to prefer one of them. Preserving the benefit may be invoked to keep a stipulation or to change it; what remains needed is to identify the state of the waqf, the expected harm, the alternative and the authority that holds the decision. The objective guides the inquiry into the ruling, and does not take the place of its evidence, of the operative ground (manāṭ) of its application or of the basis of authority.85
In al-Iʿtiṣām [Holding Fast], al-Shāṭibī separates the correctness of attributing a view from the soundness of the ground on which it is preferred. Following a report of a ruling on aḥbās (sing. ḥabs, another name for waqf), he first questions whether the doctrine attributed to the people of Iraq is established; he then states that granting that a view is correct does not make it right to prefer it on the grounds of friendship, office or meeting someone’s need, and that preference is made only on grounds that the sharia recognises.86 In building a waqf system, choosing a rule from among recognised disagreements needs both: that the view is established within its precise limits, and a statement of what justifies following it. Correct attribution does not on its own perform the function of justification, just as the ground of preference does not establish the power to approve the rule for someone who has not been shown to hold it.
In al-Muwāfaqāt [The Reconciliations], al-Shāṭibī links the choice of a view to the very purpose of adjudication: ending the dispute while keeping the ruling free from suspicion. He discusses ruling differently for two persons in the same question according to the interest of each, and forbids choosing among views by whim and self-interest without ijtihād.87 From this the study draws a question about the ground for choosing a rule and the consistency of its application where cases are alike, alongside the correctness of its attribution. The text concerns adjudication and fatwās; choosing a general rule from among recognised disagreements in new legislation, by contrast, requires stating the ground of the choice, the power of approval and its effects, and this piece of evidence alone does not decide whether such a choice is valid or invalid.
Consequently, the waqf system is not ordered by a single, unilateral will operating outside jurisprudence and law. The private will has a sphere shaped by its words; its interpretation has principles; giving effect to what it requires has limits; and acting under it rests on authority. This restores to the name Dustūr al-Waqf the restricted meaning it has in this book: reading the rules of waqf and their relationships, including the rules that the founder does not create himself.
Footnotes
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Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā [The Collected Fatwās], compiled and arranged by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Qāsim (Medina: King Fahd Complex for the Printing of the Holy Qurʾān, 1425 AH / 2004), vol. 31, pp. 46–48. The pages were read in full in the digital copy: the question on p. 46, signification and habitual usage on p. 47, and its continuation and the limit of binding force on p. 48. The edition details are from the title and imprint page; the image of the printed edition was not examined. ↩
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Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Minḥat al-khāliq ʿalā al-Baḥr al-rāʾiq [The Creator’s Gift: A Gloss on The Clear Sea], printed with Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Nujaym, al-Baḥr al-rāʾiq sharḥ Kanz al-daqāʾiq [The Clear Sea: A Commentary on The Treasure of Subtleties], second edition (Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, n.d.), vol. 5, p. 266, as verified in the paper “Sulṭat mukhālafat sharṭ al-wāqif”, version dated 27 August 2026. The identification of the source quoted as Ibn Nujaym is supported by the citation in Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s treatise al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya fī qawl al-wāqif ʿalā al-farīḍa al-sharʿiyya [The Pearl Necklaces on the Founder’s Phrase “According to the Shares of the Sharia”]; the exact place of the wording in the Book of Judgeship of al-Baḥr, however, remained unidentified in that reading. The ruling here is not built on the possible attribution of “the author” (al-muṣannif) to Ibn al-Sāʿātī. ↩
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Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, vol. 31, pp. 49–50, the continuation of the answer on the works of the ribāṭ. The context was read up to p. 52; it contains detail on manner, time, vows and gifting the reward. The chapter has not quoted those detailed rulings or generalised them to administrative tasks. ↩
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Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, vol. 31, pp. 52–54: the madrasa on p. 52 and the rest of its answer at the top of p. 53, then the question on the ribāṭ and its answer on pp. 53–54. The two fatwās do not describe a documented judicial enforcement, nor do they establish that the two institutions survived after the answer. ↩
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Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, vol. 31, pp. 67–69. The question concerns a waqf for a group of specified persons, among them holders of posts carrying a stipend; the facts are the dismissal of one of the specified post-holders and the appointment of another for part of his stipend. At its end is an explicit question on whether the maṣlaḥa must be stated. The pages were read in the digital copy, and the images of the printed edition were not collated for these passages. The voidness, in the answer, of the stipulation that lets the nāẓir follow his whim does not mean that the waqf is void, and the ruling on every form of modifying a stipulation is not to be carried over from it. ↩
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Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, vol. 31, pp. 67–69. ↩
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Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Iʿlām al-muwaqqiʿīn ʿan Rabb al-ʿālamīn [Informing Those Who Sign on Behalf of the Lord of the Worlds], ed. Abū ʿUbayda Mashhūr ibn Ḥasan Āl Salmān, first edition (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn al-Jawzī, 1423 AH), vol. 3, p. 64, and vol. 5, p. 251. The two passages were collated with the digital text; their printed images were not collated here. ↩
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf [Lectures on Waqf], pp. 146–151, paras 134–138; these pages were collated with the printed edition. The general distinction is in Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt [The Reconciliations], ed. Abū ʿUbayda Mashhūr ibn Ḥasan Āl Salmān, first edition (Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1417 AH / 1997), vol. 1, pp. 438–440; its application here to waqf stipulations, and the preference for the rules governing transactions, are Abū Zahra’s. ↩
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Bandar, Taḥqīq manāṭ maqāṣid al-waqf [Establishing Where the Objectives of Waqf Apply], “al-Kitāb al-jāmiʿ” [The Comprehensive Book], first release, the introduction: testing whether the stated objective can explain the ruling rather than its alternative. A reference to earlier methodological work in an unpublished book; the chapter does not rely on its old example describing all nāẓirs as acting without pay and without ownership, and the later study of status and ownership has set out in detail the forms in which functions and rights are combined. ↩
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Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā al-Shāṭibī, al-Iʿtiṣām [Holding Fast], ed. Salīm ibn ʿĪd al-Hilālī, first edition (Saudi Arabia: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1412 AH / 1992), vol. 2, pp. 686–687. The edition details are from the front of the digital copy, which states that its pagination matches the printed edition; the identification of the volume is supported by the reference of the editor of al-Muwāfaqāt to vol. 2, pp. 684–686, Ibn ʿAffān edition. ʿIyāḍ’s report ends before al-Shāṭibī’s comment; the checking of the school’s doctrine and the ground of preference are therefore al-Shāṭibī’s words. The image of the printed edition was not examined for this passage. ↩
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Al-Shāṭibī, al-Muwāfaqāt, ed. Mashhūr, vol. 5, pp. 84–86 and 90–91. The volume was identified from the front of the volume in the digital copy read, and the pages from their headers; the images of the printed edition were not collated. On p. 86 is the justification for appointing judges, and on p. 91 the restriction on whim and self-interest without ijtihād. The question is not to be reduced to moving between schools; the context includes choosing between the reported positions within a single school. ↩
3. The First Question: What Powers Does the Supervisor Have When the Founder Appoints a Mutawallī with Him?
Al-Durr al-mukhtār [The Choice Pearls], citing the fatwās of Muʾayyadzāde, where the point is attributed to al-Khāniyya [Qāḍīkhān’s Fatwās] and other works, states that the supervisor does not have the power of disposition, only of safekeeping. Had we stopped here, we would have come away with a simple division: a mutawallī who disposes and a supervisor who safeguards. But Ibn ʿĀbidīn opens up the meaning of “safekeeping” itself, and reports from Fatḥ al-qadīr [The Triumph of the Almighty] that the ruling varies with custom (ʿurf) in the meaning of “supervisor”; he then concludes that the supervisor’s acting together with the mutawallī is recognised where custom so runs.88
Three (3) different matters come in here. The first is the word for the office; the second, the custom that determines what is understood by it; and the third, the form in which the founder combines the two offices. When the names “qayyim”, “mutawallī” and “nāẓir” are used on their own, the texts present them as synonyms. But when the founder stipulates a mutawallī and a nāẓir over him, Ibn ʿĀbidīn does not interpret the combination as a repetition of the name; in this form he construes the nāẓir as the supervisor. The relationship that the wording created between the two persons is thus an indication that the work assigned to each of them differs.
The reasoning does not stop at the dictionary. Ibn ʿĀbidīn raises the possibility that safekeeping means watching over the mutawallī when he acts, so that he does no harm, and draws on the ruling on the supervisor of a waṣī (testamentary executor). He reports that the waṣī has the better claim to hold the property, and that the supervisor does not become a waṣī, while disposition is restricted to what is done with the supervisor’s knowledge. He then connects this with the question of waqf, and mentions the fatwā in al-Ḥāmidiyya [The Ḥāmidian Fatwās] on permission and being informed. Drawing on the rules of bequest (waṣiyya) thus carries over a restriction on the exercise of power while keeping the difference in status and in who holds the property. The chapter does not infer from this that waqf and bequest are alike in all their rulings.89
Ibn ʿĀbidīn reaches a specific answer in an actual case: the mutawallī does not lease without the nāẓir’s knowledge where the form of the stipulation is a mutawallī with a nāẓir over him. He states the rival view explicitly: al-Fatāwā al-Raḥīmiyya [The Raḥīmian Fatwās] holds that the nāẓir has no power to oppose a lawful lease at the customary rate (ujrat al-mithl), because he is in the position of a supervisor. The disagreement here is not between protecting the waqf and neglecting it; both approaches reason from the function of the supervisor, but they attach two different effects to their interpretation of it.90
The rival explanation makes the soundness of the lease, in its legal terms and its rent, a bar to the supervisor’s opposition. Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s answer, by contrast, preserves for the stipulated office of nāẓir an effect on the way the disposition is made, and is not satisfied with the soundness of the financial return. The text thus reveals two questions that may be confused in assessing administration: was the contract beneficial, or valid in its terms? And was it made in accordance with the distribution of powers fixed in the waqf? Establishing the first does not settle the second in Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s reading.
The limit of what can be inferred from the answer is that “without the nāẓir’s knowledge” is not in itself “without his prior consent”, even though the context reports the word “permission” from al-Ḥāmidiyya. Each formulation must be kept attributed to its place, and the chapter does not extract from the different words a single rule on the form and timing of consent. Nor does it rule void every contract concluded without that knowledge; the text used lays down that the disposition is barred in its own case, and does not set out here all the effects of the contract once it has been concluded.
The rest of the passage in Radd al-muḥtār [The Reply to the Perplexed] points out that the founder’s stipulation is not the only route to restricting the mutawallī: Ibn ʿĀbidīn discusses the judge’s appointing a nāẓir over him for a reason connected with his trustworthiness. Chapter 5, §6, examines the grounds for adding an assistant, and its effects, in the commentary of the Ḥanbalī al-Buhūtī. The point here is that a single name also needs the basis of the appointment: a supervisor stipulated by the founder and an assistant added by the judge do not share the same ruling merely because each of them may be called a nāẓir.91
This question prepares the ground for Chapter 5 on function and knowledge: before asking who evaluates the work or issues the decision, we need to identify what the wording of the appointment created. The fatwā reveals a line of reasoning on the distribution of power; it does not establish that this distribution was implemented in all the awqāf that named a supervisor.
Footnotes
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār [The Reply to the Perplexed], second edition, al-Ḥalabī edition, 1966, vol. 4, p. 458, “Maṭlab laysa li-l-mushrif al-taṣarruf” [Section: The Supervisor Has No Power of Disposition]. The digital page was read in full. The digital copy’s details give the title as: Muḥammad Amīn Afandī, known as Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Ḥāshiyat Radd al-muḥtār, ʿalā al-Durr al-mukhtār: sharḥ Tanwīr al-abṣār [The Gloss “The Reply to the Perplexed” on The Choice Pearls, the Commentary on Enlightening the Eyes], page 458. The image of the printed edition was not examined here. ↩
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, al-Ḥalabī edition, 1966, vol. 4, p. 458. His words on drawing on bequest: “You are well aware that waqf draws from bequest (waṣiyya), and its questions are derived from it.” The rulings of al-Faḍlī, al-Khāniyya, Adab al-awṣiyāʾ [The Conduct of Testamentary Executors] and al-Ḥāmidiyya are given here as Ibn ʿĀbidīn reports them; we did not go back to their sources. ↩
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, al-Ḥalabī edition, 1966, vol. 4, p. 458, from “Maṭlab al-qayyim wa-l-mutawallī wa-l-nāẓir bi-maʿnā wāḥid” [Section: Qayyim, Mutawallī and Nāẓir Have One Meaning] to the end of the page. The disagreement of al-Raḥīmiyya and the objection to the answer of al-Ismāʿīliyya [The Ismāʿīlian Fatwās] are known through his report of them; the chapter is not a direct collation of their copies. ↩
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, al-Ḥalabī edition, 1966, vol. 4, p. 458. ↩
4. The Second Question: “The Nearest” Between Degree of Lineage and Strength of Tie
In a fatwā by Muḥammad ʿAbduh dated Ṣafar 1320 AH, he was asked about a waqf in which a man had brought together his own real property and that of his wife, acting as her agent. He ordered entitlement in tiers, among them his children by a woman other than this wife, and his wife’s relatives, “the nearest, then the next nearest”, and provided that descendants take the place of anyone who died before entering into entitlement. After a series of deaths set out in the question, there remained the children of the founder’s two sons, and the wife’s brothers and sisters, both full and paternal half-siblings. The specific question was: if there is only one full brother, does he take the half alone, to the exclusion of the paternal half-brothers and half-sisters?92
The answer makes the full brother the nearer in this case, and concludes that he takes the half alone and shares with the children of the two sons. This is not merely the application of arithmetic after the entitlement-holders have been identified; it was the interpretation itself that determined which of the brothers enters into the sharing. Muḥammad ʿAbduh reasons that “the nearest” is an elative form (afʿal al-tafḍīl), and that what is meant here is strength of kinship. He then deals with an objection from farāʾiḍ (the science of fixed inheritance shares): the distinction between the degree of kinship and its strength, and the possibility that “the nearest” means the person of the nearest degree, as with a brother compared with a brother’s son.
The answer rejects this construction in the case at hand, because it is a specialised usage, and what governs the words here is custom and general usage. He says: “What is meant by ‘the nearest’ here, and in what resembles the case before us, is the person more closely connected to the mawqūf ʿalayh than anyone else.” The qualification “here, and in what resembles the case before us” is part of the conclusion, not an addition that can be dropped. The chapter does not hold that the usage of farāʾiḍ is excluded from every waqf deed, nor that words of lineage are always construed according to a single custom.93
The rival reading that the answer tests is making degree alone the criterion of nearness in this stipulation. For the muftī, the brothers’ equality in degree does not exhaust what the elative signifies in the intended usage, so strength of tie remains a ground of preference. This is not a replacement of the stipulation by maṣlaḥa, nor a modification of the designated use (maṣrif): the muftī determines whom the existing stipulation covers. The conclusion has a clear financial effect, but it remains the ruling of the fatwā on the question put to it.
The body of the answer also distinguishes between the word “relatives” and its pairing with “the nearest, then the next nearest”: the answer states that the plural is not taken into account in the same way when “the nearest” is stated explicitly, so a single person may hold the entitlement in question alone. This is evidence that reading the name apart from its qualifier may increase or reduce the number of entitlement-holders. We do not complete from the answer the calculation of the shares of the individual descendants of the two sons, because it did not set it out.
The state of the text bears on the reasoning. The two available digital copies carry, in the principles placed at the head of the fatwā, an attribution to al-Ṣāḥibān (Abū Ḥanīfa’s two leading disciples) that differs from what is in the body of the answer. The chapter relies on the answer for the question examined, does not reason from that disputed attribution, and does not correct it on its own authority. The sources used contain no follow-up on the disbursement of the yield and no court ruling enforcing the division; a particular fatwā therefore does not become a description of how the Egyptian courts as a whole worked.94
The difference between this question and that of the supervisor is useful for understanding the system: there the interpretation sets the restriction on power over the property, and here it identifies those covered by its benefit. In both, a discipline from outside the field of waqf in its narrow sense came in: the rules of bequest in the first, and language and farāʾiḍ in the second. But drawing on them was not a wholesale transfer of the other discipline’s ruling; a restricted ruling was accepted in the first, and a technical construction was rejected in the second. This is an inferential link that can be identified, and it is more precise than merely listing the disciplines connected with waqf.
Footnotes
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Muḥammad ʿAbduh, “al-Waṣiyya li-l-aqārib wa-l-waqf ʿalayhim” [Bequests to Relatives and Waqf for Them], Ṣafar 1320 AH, in a group of scholars, Fatāwā Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyya [Fatwās of the Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾ], page 121 in the numbering of a digital copy; it corresponds to item 3121 in the al-Shāmila copy. The two numberings serve to identify the digital text, not to cite a printed page established by collation. The question and the answer were read in full and collated with a second digital copy. The details of the printed edition have not been established. ↩
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ʿAbduh, “al-Waṣiyya li-l-aqārib wa-l-waqf ʿalayhim”, the body of the answer, at the digital location identified in the previous note. The quotation is given in its own wording; the answer mentions the strength of kinship and the distinction between it and its degree. The chapter does not make this an interpretation of all words of kinship in awqāf. ↩
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ʿAbduh, “al-Waṣiyya li-l-aqārib wa-l-waqf ʿalayhim”, the principles at its head and the answer. The principles say of al-Ṣāḥibān that “only maḥramiyya (kinship within the degrees that bar marriage) is taken into account”, while the answer says “by blood relationship (raḥim) without maḥramiyya”. The digital collation established the difference but did not identify its origin, and the image of the printed edition was not examined. The attribution of this part was kept out of the reasoning. The explicit date is Ṣafar 1320 AH; the chapter has not relied on the Gregorian year inferred from the details of the digital copy. ↩
5. Between Interpreting the Valid, Voiding the Invalid and Supplementing What Is Left Unsaid
Invoking the founder’s objective does not dispense with identifying what kind of question is at issue. If he stipulates that the nāẓir is not to be removed even if he betrays his trust, the problem is not an obscure word whose signification needs widening. Al-Durr al-mukhtār, the commentary on Tanwīr al-abṣār [Enlightening the Eyes], states that a stipulation that he not be removed is void because it contravenes the ruling of the sharia, as presented in Chapter 1, §4. Ibn ʿĀbidīn counts it among the cases of departing from the founder’s stipulation. At the level of analysis, what was voided here is the shielding of a treacherous nāẓir by stipulation; the example alone therefore cannot serve as evidence that the administration is free to override a valid stipulation whenever it judges an alternative to be more beneficial.95
Modifying a valid stipulation for a later reason differs from this, just as it differs from acting under a valid delegation in which the founder left the choice to the holder of authority. If the choice lies within the delegation, not every change in the decision need be a modification of the stipulation; and if it goes beyond the delegation, it does not become permitted merely by being described as interpretation. Identifying the delegation and its limits comes before the ruling, and the detailed differences between maṣlaḥa, necessity and the preserved stipulation in the sources on substitution (istibdāl) are left to Chapter 7.
What the waqf deed does not provide for is examined under the supplementary rules, whose place relative to the document Chapter 1 (§1) set out, following Abū Zahra’s account.96 The effect of this will appear in Chapter 4 (§4), in giving priority to upkeep (ʿimāra) even if the founder did not stipulate it, and in the limits of that priority where claims compete (tazāḥum).
The effect of this distinction appears in the family waqf when the founder’s stipulation conflicts with a right claimed by one of his relatives. The source of the right is identified first: is it an entitlement created by the waqf deed, a prior right that restricts the legal effect of the dedication, or a mandatory entitlement imposed by the law of the setting even if the founder did not mention it? The interpretation of “the nearest” in the previous section determines whom the stipulation covers, while the heirs’ rights connected with maraḍ al-mawt (the illness preceding death), in Chapter 2, §1, restrict the legal effect of the disposition. Where the law makes an entitlement mandatory for specified relatives, that is another source, whose scope and exceptions need to be set out; kinship alone does not make all endowed property part of the estate (tarika), or all its shares subject to the division of inheritance.
Evidence of this kind includes a codified law that gives the founder a free choice over part of his property and, beyond that part, makes an entitlement mandatory for relatives whom it names, while leaving some grounds of exclusion to the court’s assessment. This is to be read as a legislative choice within its scope, not as a uniform juristic ruling on every family waqf.97 If the exclusion rule changes, the time from which it applies must be identified: the change may apply to new creations, to division on termination, or to claims whose judgements have not become final; none of these effects is to be inferred from the mere issuing of a new rule.98
The book therefore proposes a condition for any decision to establish the system or to change the rules of entitlement: that it be accompanied by a statement of the source of each right, the scope of the founder’s choice, the restriction binding on him, the effect of a contravening stipulation, and the time from which the rules apply. The statement identifies who approves the rule, who decides on the validity and interpretation of the stipulation, and who carries out the division. What is binding in the normative framework is established by its evidence; what is left to choice is exercised within its limits; and a change of rule is sought from the holder of the power to make it. This is an addition to the decision dossier in Chapter 11, §§1 and 2, not a delegation to the nāẓir to redistribute rights in the name of justice; and the effect of the choice on the delivery of the benefit needs evidence from its application.
| Where the question lies | What needs to be established | The effect one may not leap to |
|---|---|---|
| A word open to more than one reading, such as “supervisor” or “the nearest” | What it signifies in its context and custom, and the indication that favoured the reading | Preferring a reading does not become a modification merely because the outcome differs from an earlier understanding |
| A stipulation of known meaning that is claimed to be void | The higher ruling it contravenes, and the effect of the contravention on the stipulation and on the waqf | The whole waqf need not be void because one of its clauses is void |
| A case on which the document is silent | The supplementary rule or the scope of the valid delegation | No unrestricted freedom is established for the person who administers |
| A valid stipulation from which departure is sought | The justification for departing, the competent party, and the limit of the permission and its effect | Declaring the objective or the greater benefit is not enough to establish the power |
The table is a way of reading the questions gathered in our earlier studies; it does not claim that the jurists of waqf formulated this classification in its wording. Its value lies in making it possible to object to a decision at a specific point: an objector may accept the supplementary ruling and dispute that the document is silent, or accept that modification is permissible and dispute the capacity of the one who issued it. In this way the reasoning becomes open to scrutiny, and the question moves on to the protection that Chapter 6 discusses.
Footnotes
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, Dār al-Fikr’s reproduction of the al-Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, p. 382. The wording inside the brackets is from Tanwīr al-abṣār [Enlightening the Eyes], the explanation of departing from the stipulation is al-Ḥaṣkafī’s, and then comes Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s comment. The layers taken together are not attributed to a single author. ↩
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, p. 145, para. 132. The passage was previously collated with the image of the printed edition; the collation was not repeated here. ↩
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Lebanon, Qānūn al-awqāf al-dhurriyya [Law on Descendants’ Awqāf], 10 March 1947, Articles 37 and 38; the publication details carried by the digital text: al-Jarīda al-Rasmiyya [Official Gazette], no. 11, 12 March 1947, p. 178. The text preserved from the Centre for Legal Informatics at the Lebanese University was read; the image of the Gazette was not collated here. Article 37 sets the scope of choice at the third calculated at the time of death, and Article 38 makes an entitlement mandatory, in what exceeds that third, for the heirs among the descendants, the spouse and the parents living at the time of death, with listed grounds of exclusion, among them strong motives whose weight the court assesses. This is dated legal evidence; it does not establish the general juristic ruling or that the law is in force today. Nor is it to be inferred from it that the two articles apply only to new awqāf, without establishing their temporal application. ↩
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Evidence of a limit on temporal application: Presidential Decree-Law No. 175 of 1958 of the United Arab Republic, amending certain provisions of Legislative Decree No. 76 dated 16 May 1949, al-Jarīda al-Rasmiyya, no. 32, 16 October 1958, p. 4, Articles 2 and 3. Article 2 reinstated the exclusion provision, and Article 3 made it apply to cases that had not been decided and to those whose judgements had not acquired final force. The citation here is through Bandar’s study “Jīlān thumma al-waratha” [Two Generations, Then the Heirs], an unpublished paper, the paragraph on the succession of exclusion rules, and its notes 21 and 36, which record the collation of the photographed page in that earlier study; the collation was not repeated here. The evidence establishes this temporal limit alone; it is not evidence that every retroactive application is valid or that reopening final judgements is permissible. ↩
6. The Founder’s Will in the Purpose Institution: How Far Does the Comparison Reach?
Dedicating property to a purpose does not establish that the founder alone interprets his document for ever, nor that respect for his will is specific to waqf. In the German Civil Code, section 83(1) provides that the make-up of the rules of the foundation (Stiftung), in so far as they do not rest on federal or state (Land) law, is determined by the act establishing it and by its statutes. Section 83(2) requires the foundation’s governing bodies in their work, and the competent authorities in their oversight of it, to have regard to the will that the founder expressed at its establishment and, in the alternative, to his presumed will.99
The text serves to identify those addressed by the obligation, the time of the will that serves as the reference, and the place of the presumed will relative to the expressed will. It does not make the presumption of a will a general delegation to change. Changing the foundation’s statutes has its own rules, which our study “Sulṭat mukhālafat sharṭ al-wāqif” addressed. The sources for changing a waqf stipulation, and their limits, are set out in Chapter 7. The text alone does not answer every means that the courts accept for proving the will.
Our study “Sulṭat mukhālafat sharṭ al-wāqif” compared the order of decision on a waqf stipulation with the provisions on the German foundation.100 What is taken from it here is narrower than restating its conclusion: respect for the founding will is a shared question that can be broken down into rules, while the ways of interpretation, validity and modification remain different. Custom as Ibn ʿĀbidīn or Muḥammad ʿAbduh expresses it is not to be equated with the presumed will in German law. The former was used in two questions to determine the meaning of a form of words and of a function; the latter is a fallback reference named by a statutory text, and determining its reach requires the jurisprudence of its application.
This is the place of the dialogue that the chapter serves: a scholar of waqf and a scholar of purpose institutions can discuss the evidence that records the will, who interprets it, who is harmed by its interpretation, and the body that reviews the decision. To say, however, that the durability of the founder’s will alone establishes the uniqueness of waqf is not supported by the comparison. Nor does sharing the question of interpretation make the sources of legitimacy, the rulings or the outcomes of the work the same.
Footnotes
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Federal Republic of Germany, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, section 83, “Stiftungsverfassung und Stifterwille”, that is, “The Foundation’s Rules and the Will of Its Founder”, subsections 1 and 2, the text published by the service of the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Federal Office of Justice, accessed 19 October 2026. The official text was read; the account in the body is a summary of it, not taken from a published Arabic translation. The earlier comparison in “Sulṭat mukhālafat sharṭ al-wāqif” does not dispense with identifying the text used here. ↩
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Bandar, “Sulṭat mukhālafat sharṭ al-wāqif”, the section on interpretation, the decision chain and the German comparison. ↩
7. The Effect of This on Contemporary Waqf
In building a waqf or a waqf investment product today, documenting the property, the purpose and the functions is useful, but it is not enough if the words carry different meanings for the parties. Chapter 2, drawing on the study “Waqf ashum al-sharikāt fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī” [The Waqf of Company Shares in the Saudi Legal System], showed that the stipulation of a founder who dedicates shares does not take effect on the company’s assets and dispositions in the same way that it governs the endowed shares. The author of the document, the property it addresses and the body that holds the decision must be identified before any word in it is interpreted.101
The chapter’s findings can be turned into a practical proposal: where a decision depends on interpreting a stipulation, it should be accompanied by a brief statement of reasons setting out the wording, the facts, the rival reading, the reason for preferring one reading, and the basis of the authority of the person issuing the decision. This is an organisational proposal drawn from the questions examined, not a single legal procedure in force in all countries, nor a practice whose success is established merely by presenting it.
Suppose that the document of an educational waqf gives priority for a study grant to “the nearest of the founder’s relatives”, or assigns a matter to a supervisor over its board of directors. It is not sound to carry Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s fatwā over to the first, or Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s fatwā over to the second, merely because the word is shared. One must examine the document’s definition, the law of the country, the kind of benefit, and how the supervisor was appointed. The value of the two precedents is that they draw attention to where the question lies and reveal the effect of a difference in meaning; they do not provide a ready-made ruling for a new case.
The proposed statement of reasons serves both the person entitled and the person who administers. The entitlement-holder can show that the decision construed the word according to a usage that was not intended; the administration can show that its choice lies within an established delegation; and the reviewer can distinguish an error of interpretation from an excess of competence. Assessing the benefit of this arrangement requires applying it to actual decisions, and measuring the burden of documenting it and the ability of those affected by it to be informed and to object. The chapter does not claim that fuller statement alone prevents disputes or reduces their cost.
Footnotes
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Bandar, “Waqf ashum al-sharikāt fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī” [The Waqf of Company Shares in the Saudi Legal System], unpublished paper; and Chapter 2 of this book, §7. The earlier study was used to identify the person addressed by the stipulation and the property on which it takes effect; no new inquiry into its legal effect in companies was opened in this chapter. ↩
8. Rules of Reading and What They Reveal of the Waqf System
The findings of the two questions and of the inquiries around them can be ordered in six (6) rules of defined scope:
- Wording is read within the relationship it created. Combining the nāẓir and the mutawallī in the form “a nāẓir over him” carries weight for Ibn ʿĀbidīn, and pairing “relatives” with “the nearest” carries weight in Muḥammad ʿAbduh’s answer. A dictionary of names is not enough to identify the holders of rights and powers.
- Where custom applies is identified before it is used. In the first question, it is the custom on the meaning of the post; in the second, the usage that the muftī preferred to a specialised usage. Neither establishes that a single custom governs all waqf deeds or takes precedence over every text.
- The layers of reasoning and attribution are kept distinct. Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s report from al-Fatḥ, his inference from it, his report from al-Ḥāmidiyya and his answer in an actual case are not a single view of Ibn al-Humām. Likewise, the principles placed at the head of a fatwā do not replace the answer of its author where the two differ.
- Establishing the meaning does not entail the validity of the stipulation, and maṣlaḥa does not entail the establishment of competence. The criterion of a stipulation’s validity itself requires identifying the view on which it rests, and the justification for departing from the stipulation is a subsequent question.
- The effect is determined from the wording of the ruling. Knowledge is not necessarily synonymous with permission; entitlement to the half in a fatwā is not evidence that it was paid out; and barring a disposition is not enough on its own to determine all its effects once it has taken place.
- The document has a sphere in which it operates alongside supplementary and restrictive rules. Silence does not cancel those rules, and interpretation does not replace the lawful route for modifying a valid stipulation.
These rules reveal a characteristic of the forms of the waqf system read here: the effect of the founding act continues through renewed work in interpreting and applying it, in which the language of the document, jurisprudence, custom and the holders of authority all take part, and which is directly connected with the distribution of property and power. This is an analytical conclusion from specific evidence, not a claim that the same structure prevailed in every country or age, nor that its existence establishes that the waqf institution is unique.
The limits of the waqf arrangement’s independence also become clear: the dedication of property may be recorded in a document with long-lasting effect, without this isolating the document from the laws of proof and authority and the rules on stipulations. Conversely, the document is not to be reduced to a declaration of intention; the circle of entitlement-holders or the way decisions are taken may change with a change in the interpretation of a single qualification in it. Through this link between wording and effect we understand why linguistics, legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh), farāʾiḍ and the law of bequests enter into the working of waqf, and how a jurist can draw on them and then bar the transfer of one of their rulings to a place that cannot bear it.
Having identified the property and those in relationships with it in Chapter 2, and set out here how the rule is read, Chapter 4 turns to how the benefit reaches its entitlement-holder. The link remains with Chapter 5 on the power of decision, Chapter 6 on claims and review, and Chapter 7 on change: what is known through interpretation becomes an actual benefit, a remedy or a lawful modification only once the evidence for each of these is complete.