1. Dedication Changes the Relationships to Property
If real property is made a waqf and its yield is assigned to a family, and one of the family’s members takes on its administration as nāẓir for a wage, the case brings together a relationship to the asset, entitlements to the income, a power of administration and a wage for work. Some of these roles may be combined in a single person, but their combination does not make their grounds and their rulings one. The nāẓir may be entitled to wages for his work and not to a family share; he may be entitled to both on two different grounds; or the niẓāra (the office of waqf administration) may be his under a juristic view connected with his ownership, without his having the right to sell the asset as he sells his unrestricted property. This is an analytical example showing why the question “Who owns the waqf?” is not enough.
The rule on which the chapter builds its argument is that dedicating property to a waqf rearranges the rights and powers relating to it, and does not by itself determine a single answer on the ownership of the asset, the bearing of debt or entitlement to the benefit. These answers differ with the school, the instrument and the law. Legal personality, for its part, brings some of these relationships together in a single legal bearer where the legal system provides for it, and its effects need to be specified; the whole regime of ownership, debts and protection is not to be derived from its name alone.
We therefore begin with four matters: (1) the property to which the waqf attaches, (2) to whom its ownership is attributed, (3) who has the power to dispose of it, and in what role, and (4) who is entitled to which benefit from it. We then add the question of debt: if the manager undertakes an obligation for the benefit of the waqf, who is the debtor, and from which property does the creditor obtain payment? These questions extend the distinctions of our earlier works on personality and dhimma, and are used here to show the rules of waqf and their effects in a single case.33
Endowed property does not begin as a page clear of rights. A creditor’s right may have reached the property first; the rights of a sick person’s heirs may attach to his disposition; or the asset may be held in common with someone other than the founder. Al-Zarqāʾ showed the effect of a debt that exhausts the estate, and of final illness, on the legal effect of the disposition. Establishing a charitable purpose is therefore not enough to erase those rights, just as not every restriction imposed by those rights may be described as interference from outside the waqf. Protecting the holders of prior rights is part of determining the property that the founder’s will was able to dedicate in the first place.34
Footnotes
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Bandar, “al-Shakhṣiyya al-iʿtibāriyya li-l-waqf: al-dhimma al-mustaqilla wa-ḥudūduhā fī al-sharikāt” [The Legal Personality of Waqf: The Independent Dhimma and Its Limits in Companies], comprising the two studies “Dhimmat al-waqf fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī” [The Dhimma of Waqf in the Saudi Legal System] and “Waqf ashum al-sharikāt fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī” [The Waqf of Company Shares in the Saudi Legal System], fifth version, 29 August 2026, two unpublished papers; first study, parts three and five, and second study, parts two to five. The reference is made to preserve the origin of the analysis; the texts on which the rulings rest are cited in their places below. ↩
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Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, pp. 37–39, paras 33–34. The effect of a prior right on the legal effect of creation is set out in detail in Chapter 1. ↩
2. Ownership of the Asset, Authority of Administration and the Undivided Share
The jurists differ on to whom the ownership of the asset is attributed after the waqf, and the effect of the disagreement appears when we connect the attribution with a particular ruling. Abū Zahra presents the Mālikī view that ownership remains with the founder, in the context of their view permitting limited duration. Al-Buhūtī reports, for a waqf in favour of a specified human being or a determinate group, that ownership passes to the mawqūf ʿalayh (the one for whom the waqf is made); in his presentation this differs from the form of a mosque or of the indeterminate poor.35
Al-Marghīnānī, in al-Hidāya [The Guidance], presents the view of Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan that waqf is “holding the asset on the footing of the ownership of God Most High”, with the founder’s ownership ceasing. Set against this is his presentation of Abū Ḥanīfa’s view that the founder’s ownership remains, with the details given earlier on the rules of binding force. The two companions’ formula is therefore not to be attributed to all the Ḥanafīs without qualification, and the disagreement over the transfer of ownership is not the same as disagreement over the basic legitimacy of waqf.36
Al-Nawawī lays down in Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn [The Garden of the Seekers] that the authoritative Shāfiʿī doctrine (al-madhhab) on the substance of the waqf is “that ownership of it has passed to God Most High”; he then reports the view that it passes to the mawqūf ʿalayh, and a derived view (takhrīj) that it remains with the founder, and treats the mosque and the cemetery separately in detail.37 These are thus different juristic constructions of the dedicated property; they are not to be gathered into a statement that no one owns the asset, or that all the entitlement-holders own it.
The fruit of this detail is that the asset’s leaving the founder’s ownership does not by itself determine to whom its ownership is attributed afterwards, and the juristic construction of ownership does not dispense with specifying the authority of administration, who bears the debt and who holds the right to claim. When the question is connected with the German jurist Alois Brinz’s theory of “purpose-bound property” (Zweckvermögen), which Chapters 8 and 10 present, these effects must be examined; neither the equation of the juristic construction with property that has no owning subject, nor the establishment or denial of legal personality, is to be inferred from the phrase “the ownership of God” alone.
The effect of the Ḥanbalī attribution is visible in the niẓāra when the waqf has no stipulated nāẓir, or when the person appointed to it dies: Sharḥ Muntahā al-irādāt [Commentary on The Utmost of Aims] assigns the administration (naẓar) to the determinate mawqūf ʿalayh, each over his own share, and gives as the reason his ownership and his income. This explains the combination of ownership, entitlement and the niẓāra in a specific form. The unqualified statement that the mutawallī does not own the asset in any case is defeated by this example. More precisely, the authority of administration does not in itself create ownership of the asset; the two may be combined for another reason. And the word “ownership” here does not lift the waqf restrictions on dealing with the substance.38
In the other direction, stipulating the income for the founder does not indicate that the property remains available to him for every disposition. Ibn ʿĀbidīn mentions that, according to Abū Yūsuf, the founder may assign the income of the waqf to himself, and that this is the view adopted for fatwā in the text he is commenting on, with Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan disagreeing. Retaining a stipulated benefit is one thing, and revoking the dedication is another. The view must be specified for both; the dedication is not to be judged void merely because the founder benefits from it, nor is this benefit to be taken as evidence of freedom to take the asset back.39
The waqf of undivided property (mushāʿ) reveals that identifying the property comes before examining its administration. In al-Zarqāʾ’s presentation of Muḥammad’s view, the prohibition on the waqf of an undivided share (ḥiṣṣa shāʾiʿa) of an asset capable of partition is linked to the requirement of full receipt (qabḍ): the property is first partitioned, and then the separated share is made a waqf and delivered. The bathhouse and the mill in his example, which cannot be partitioned, have a different ruling because such receipt is impossible. Abū Yūsuf, in the same presentation by al-Zarqāʾ, permits the waqf of an undivided share in both cases, without requiring delivery to a mutawallī for the waqf to be complete.40
A waqf of a share in real property, an entitlement to a proportion of its income, and the waqf of a company share (sahm) in a company that owns the real property are thus three different forms. The ruling on partitioning the asset after it has been made a waqf is not to be derived from the permissibility of the first form; partition, in the text mentioned, precedes creation. Likewise, assigning the administration to each entitlement-holder over his own share does not establish his right to have the substance of the waqf partitioned off. In this way each piece of evidence stays within the question it deals with, and the later study of the company and the fund is prepared for without projecting the rulings of either onto the juristic undivided share merely because the word for “share” (ḥiṣṣa) is similar.
The dedication of a usufruct and of an intangible financial right adds questions that differ from the ownership of the substance. The General Authority for Awqaf’s al-Dalīl al-irshādī li-ikhtiyār al-uṣūl al-waqfiyya [Guidance Manual for the Selection of Waqf Assets] presents these two types; it is a guidance manual, not a binding regulation.41 If the governing normative framework permits the waqf of a usufruct for a fixed period, the holder of the right, its duration, the limits on its transfer and what needs the consent of the owner of the substance are specified, and then the obligations that remain on each party. For a financial right connected with a work or an invention, the dedicated right and its proof must be specified: does the dedication bear on a particular right of exploitation or on its return, and what is the power of licensing, collection and protection? For a trademark or a trade name, the connection of the right with the activity it signifies is examined, together with whether it can be dedicated or exploited separately from that activity under the specified normative framework. Owning one of these rights does not entail owning the others. These are questions for identifying the object of the waqf and its effects, not a single ruling that the waqf of every usufruct or intangible right is permissible in all systems.
Footnotes
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, p. 77, para. 60; and Manṣūr ibn Yūnus al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-qināʿ ʿan al-Iqnāʿ [Unveiling the Mask from The Persuasion], ed. a specialist committee at the Ministry of Justice, first edition (Riyadh: Ministry of Justice of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1421–1429 AH / 2000–2008), vol. 10, p. 34. The latter text is from the digital copy; the chapter does not claim a fresh examination of its printed edition. ↩
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Burhān al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr al-Marghīnānī, al-Hidāya fī sharḥ Bidāyat al-mubtadī [The Guidance: A Commentary on The Beginner’s Start], corrected by Ṭalāl Yūsuf, first edition (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1425 AH / 2004), Book of Waqf, at its beginning, vol. 3, p. 15. The volume was determined by comparing the digital text with the passage of the digital edition on al-Shāmila; the image of the printed edition was not examined. The page presents the disagreement between Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad, and states explicitly the formula “on the footing of the ownership of God” for the two companions. It qualifies the denial that the founder’s ownership ceases, according to Abū Ḥanīfa, by a judicial ruling or by making the waqf contingent on death, and holds that waqf is permissible in his view while not binding. ↩
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Abū Zakariyyā Muḥyī al-Dīn Yaḥyā ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn wa-ʿumdat al-muftīn [The Garden of the Seekers and the Mainstay of Muftis], under the supervision of Zuhayr al-Shāwīsh, third edition (Beirut, Damascus and Amman: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, 1412 AH / 1991), vol. 5, p. 342. The text is from the digital copy. It reports the views on the ownership of the substance, and distinguishes making a plot of land a mosque or a cemetery as a release from ownership with which the exclusive rights of human beings are cut off; so all the forms are not to be attributed to a single view. ↩
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Manṣūr ibn Yūnus al-Buhūtī, Sharḥ Muntahā al-irādāt [Commentary on The Utmost of Aims], first edition (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1414 AH / 1993), vol. 2, p. 412. The condition of determinacy, and the absence of a stipulated holder of the niẓāra, are part of what the passage indicates. ↩
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār ʿalā al-Durr al-mukhtār, second edition (Egypt: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī wa-Awlāduh, 1386 AH / 1966), vol. 4, p. 384, the commentary on assigning the income of the waqf to the founder; Ibn ʿĀbidīn distinguishes between Abū Yūsuf’s view and Muḥammad’s disagreement. ↩
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Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, pp. 31–33, paras 27–28; pp. 32–33 were compared with the facsimile. The partition mentioned on these pages precedes the waqf. ↩
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General Authority for Awqaf, Regulatory Affairs Sector, al-Dalīl al-irshādī li-ikhtiyār al-uṣūl al-waqfiyya [Guidance Manual for the Selection of Waqf Assets], the official version saved at the time of reading on 20 October 2026, pp. 3 and 6–7. A non-binding manual; the images of pp. 6–7 were compared on 20 October 2026. The date in the link’s folder is not to be taken as the year of publication. It is useful for identifying the questions, not for establishing that a uniform ruling is in force for all assets and contexts. ↩
3. The Entitlement-Holder: Ownership of the Substance, the Right to the Income, and Membership of the Designated Use
A person for whom a known stipend has been named, a person entitled to a proportion of the income, and a person who fits the qualifying description of a broad class on which the waqf spends are not in the same position. The entitlement-holder may own the substance, in the earlier Ḥanbalī form, or he may have a right to the benefit without this ownership. Hence counting the beneficiaries or naming the designated use is not enough to show the rights that have arisen for them.
Specifying the right requires knowing the basis on which it is calculated: is it a proportion of the income or a fixed stipend? The effect of a change in revenue differs between the two forms, as appears in Abū Zahra’s detailed account, which Chapter 4, §6, presents with its qualifications.42 Al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī adds that naming a specific sum is not by itself enough to determine the effect of a shortfall; the effect may differ with the place of the sum in the structure of the dedication. The two forms, dedicating a thousand (1,000) to two persons and then stating a hundred (100) for one of them, and dedicating the hundred to him and the remainder to the other, end in the same two amounts when the thousand is realised. But if five hundred (500) is realised, the distribution in the first is fifty and four hundred and fifty (50 and 450), and in the second a hundred and four hundred (100 and 400), according to the text’s interpretation of the two forms.43
Before these two forms, al-Muḥīṭ lays down, for a group each of whom has been named an amount, that they bear the shortfall pro rata according to the named amounts; it explains, in another form, that the named amount takes precedence over the person to whom the remainder was assigned; and it reports another view of Hilāl on combining a half and a hundred. Pro rata sharing (taḥāṣṣ) is thus itself a ruling derived from a particular formula, not the choice of an accounting ratio made before the rights are known. The distribution of income among these persons remains distinct from ranking an external debt against a share already established for its holder.44
This is an arithmetical illustration that assumes the income is available for distribution, with no prior debt or competing expenditure. Its function is to show that the calculation follows the specific ruling on the entitlement: how much of the shortfall its holder bears is not to be derived from the figure alone. The disagreement that the text reports, and its forms, remain within their limits; the second form does not turn into a priority for every fixed stipend. Here the subject of the right is specified; Chapter 4 then examines the limits on changing it, and Chapter 6 the route to protecting it.
The time of the right is part of specifying it: the period of entitlement to the income, the time at which its condition is met, and the date for paying what has been established are distinct matters. In Ibn Nujaym’s base text as printed in Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir [The Eyes of Insight], there is the form in which the stipends of the entitlement-holders are cut, in whole or in part, because of the need for upkeep, so that what was cut from their stipends does not remain a debt owed by the waqf. The effect of this appears when the founder stipulates the surplus beyond them for the freedmen: what remains in the second year after the stipends of that year have been paid is spent on the freedmen, and is not given to the first group in compensation for what was cut. The text ties this to the time when upkeep was needed, “whether he carried out the upkeep or not”; so cash remaining unspent does not by itself establish an entitlement to distribute it.45
The balance between the parties changes as the period of use changes. In the same commentary, al-Ḥamawī reports the form in which the income of a piece of land goes to one person for a year and then to another for as long as he lives, and the juristic preference (istiḥsān) for postponing upkeep so that the first may take his year’s income, provided that the postponement does not take the waqf out of its condition. He follows this by reporting an objection that distinguishes this case from neglecting upkeep where there is manifest harm. No absolute priority for the holder of the year is to be derived from it; but it reveals that the timing of expenditure may place its cost on a person who will miss its later benefit.46
For building the system, it follows that for every entitlement the ground on which it is established and its duration should be stated, and that, when payment falls short, a distinction should be drawn between a sum that did not become due because of an expenditure that took precedence, and a right that was established and whose payment was delayed. The first, in the form mentioned, does not create arrears automatically; the ruling on the second is not to be derived from it. The accounting period comes after this specification as a tool for showing rights and payments, so closing the financial year does not by itself create a right or extinguish it. This is the distinction that the reading takes up again from our study of the timing of income.47
Another limit appears in Muḥammad Bakhīt’s fatwā of 1917 on a family waqf for specified entitlement-holders. He reported that the income becomes their property once the nāẓir receives it, even before it is divided, and that it is in his hands as an amāna (property held in safekeeping). He then prohibited buying real property with their yield without their permission, and made real property bought with their permission or ratification their joint property in proportion to their shares, not waqf unless they make it a waqf. The ruling on the property here is thus not determined by its historical source alone; it may arise from the waqf and then enter the ownership of its entitlement-holders, and the person whose permission is needed to invest it changes accordingly. The fatwā restricts this ruling to yield owned by specified persons, and separates from it the surplus of a mosque’s waqf. It does not examine competition from the creditor of an earlier repair; so the lapse of his right merely upon receipt of the income is not to be inferred from it alone.48
The family waqf needs this detail in particular. It connects the organisation of property with kinship relations and the succession of generations, but reducing it to a device for evading inheritance assumes a single aim for different periods, regions and documents. Peter C. Hennigan’s study reads the formation of waqf in an early Ḥanafī discourse, and presents a disagreement between historical readings on the relation of waqf to the division of property among kin. In its introduction it sets the findings of Layish and Powers against each other instead of making one of them a general truth about every family waqf.49 Beshara Doumani, for his part, studies the family and property in Ottoman Nablus and Tripoli, and reads waqf as an instrument for organising material and moral relations among kin.50 The difference between the two works in their questions and their material rules out combining them in a single historical interpretation.
For describing the waqf system, it follows that one should state whether the property was dedicated during the owner’s lifetime, what benefit and power remained with him, how the generations (ṭabaqāt) of entitlement-holders were specified, and what restrictions preserved prior rights. Then what those rules did within the family is examined from its documents and disputes. The juristic rule alone is not made evidence of the fairness of social distribution, and a case of exclusion or preference is not made an explanation of all family awqāf. The connection of waqf with inheritance and kinship adds questions within its system, not a social label outside its rulings.
Footnotes
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, p. 159, para. 145 and the top of the page, on the ten stipulations, with the qualification on combining them. The power of increase mentioned is tied to the stipulation, and is not derived from merely holding the niẓāra. ↩
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Ibn Māza, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, vol. 6, pp. 186–187, according to the digital text matching the pagination of ʿAbd al-Karīm Sāmī al-Jundī’s edition. The image of the printed edition was not compared. The digital copy has a garbled name and some disorder in the ending, on which no ruling was based. The amounts fifty and four hundred and fifty are an arithmetical explanation of the rule, not a literal quotation or a ranking of debts with different causes. ↩
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Ibn Māza, al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, vol. 6, pp. 186–187. ↩
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Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Makkī al-Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir fī sharḥ al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir [The Eyes of Insight: A Commentary on Similarities and Analogues], first edition (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1405 AH / 1985), vol. 2, pp. 255–256. The ruling is from Ibn Nujaym’s base text printed at the top of the page; the form of the surplus for the freedmen is restricted to the cutting of part of the stipends because of upkeep, not to the lapse of every debt at the end of the year. ↩
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Al-Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir, vol. 2, pp. 255–256. The form of successive entitlement to the income is from the commentary’s report of al-Khaṣṣāf’s Awqāf, together with the objection that distinguishes manifest harm from the possibility of postponement. The attribution is to the reporting text that was read; al-Khaṣṣāf’s original was not opened independently. ↩
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Bandar, “Matā tuṣraf al-ghalla? Ḥaqq al-ḥāḍir wa-tanmiyat al-aṣl” [When Is the Income to Be Disbursed? The Right of the Present and the Growth of the Principal], the second instalment of the series “Istithmār al-aṣl wa-khidmat al-mustafīd: al-waqf fī madāris al-ʿamal al-khayrī al-muʿāṣir” [Investing the Principal and Serving the Beneficiary: Waqf in the Schools of Contemporary Charitable Work], unpublished paper, second release, 2026, sections 2–5. The reference attributes the distinction between the time of the right and the accounting period, and between the restricted reserve and the surplus whose growth is authorised; the evidence for the detailed juristic rulings is given in this section from the text of Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir, and in Chapter 4, §5, from the text of Mukhtaṣar Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj. ↩
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Muḥammad Bakhīt, “Waqf istiḥqāq” [A Waqf of Entitlement], fatwā dated 16 August 1917, Shawwāl 1335 AH, in Fatāwā Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyya [Fatwās of the Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾ], p. 6 in the pagination of the digital copy taken from the al-Shāmila copy, not by the page number of an edited printed edition. The fatwā was read in full; its quotation of Articles 401–402 of Qānūn al-ʿadl wa-l-inṣāf [Code of Justice and Equity] is part of its reasoning, and no fresh comparison with an edition of the Code is claimed here. The part on the ownership of the income was used in our two earlier studies, “Man yamlik al-daʿwā?” [Who Holds the Action?] and “Ḥīna ittasaʿat al-fiʾa wa-ḍāqa al-ḥaqq” [When the Class Widened and the Right Narrowed], both unpublished; the effect of the purchase and of the endorsement is also examined here. ↩
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Peter C. Hennigan, The Birth of a Legal Institution: The Formation of the Waqf in Third-Century A.H. Ḥanafī Legal Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2004), xvi, n. 12. The contrast between the readings of Layish and Powers is from his presentation; no new independent reading of the two works is made here. ↩
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Beshara Doumani, Family Life in the Ottoman Mediterranean: A Social History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 22. His subject is social history within the field of his study, not the ruling on every family waqf. ↩
4. Legal Personality: Where Do Rights and Obligations Come Together?
Describing waqf as a legal person raises three distinct questions: Did the source use this concept? Did it lay down rulings that perform some of its functions? And did the courts and dealings establish those rulings in actual cases? The absence of all the functions is not established by the absence of the name, and their combination in a single legal person is not established by the presence of some of them.
The importance of the distinction appears in the disagreement between researchers. Nada Moumtaz reads in the survival of waqf after its founder, in its transactions, and in the protection of its property from the creditors of the nāẓir and of the entitlement-holders, features of a legal personality, even though the jurists did not formulate the concept in the modern way. Doris Behrens-Abouseif separates the use of the concept from the legal and social conditions of waqf, and rules out equating what its autonomy indicates with what the autonomy of European institutions means in their context.51 These are two studies in the interpretation of rulings and of history, and what they say is not to be taken as a juristic consensus, or as establishing independence from the state everywhere.
Al-Zarqāʾ describes waqf as an institution with legal personality (shakhṣiyya ḥukmiyya), having a dhimma, capacity and representation. But when he comes to borrowing on credit (istidāna), he presents a ruling that places the debt first on the mutawallī, who then has recourse for it against the waqf’s property, and he prefers attributing the obligation directly to the dhimma of the waqf. His preference here matters, because it reveals that the combination of effects in a single dhimma is an interpretive construction that he defends, not merely the transmission of a name agreed upon in all the texts he reads.52
In the contemporary Saudi legal system the question has become different as far as the text is concerned: the Civil Transactions Law counted awqāf among persons having legal personality in Article 17, and conferred on the legal person an independent financial dhimma, capacity, the right to litigate and a representative in Article 18. In Article 26 it counted “the right of waqf” (ḥaqq al-waqf) as an original real right (ḥaqq ʿaynī aṣlī). There is thus a bearer of rights and obligations, and there is a right attached to the property; neither description encompasses the other.53
Article 90 attributes what arises from a contract to the represented party (al-aṣīl) if the agent contracts in the represented party’s name and within the limits of his agency. Applied together with the rules on personality, it makes identifying the debtor in this form direct: the waqf in whose name the contract was concluded, subject to verifying the nāẓir’s standing and the limits of his agency. This is a specific legal effect, not mere praise for the idea of personality. It does not follow from it that every act of the nāẓir binds the waqf, or that the independent dhimma gives him unrestricted power to borrow.54
Our earlier study of the waqf’s dhimma built its analysis on the questions of the debtor, the property available for payment and the litigation, and distinguished between the statutory text and a limited number of judicial cases that preceded its entry into force. This chapter draws on its analysis, without treating the text alone as evidence that the courts applied all its effects, and without treating that study’s reading of a juristic sample as a final description of all the schools.55
Footnotes
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Nada Moumtaz, God’s Property: Islam, Charity, and the Modern State (Oakland: University of California Press, 2021), 37; DOI: 10.1525/luminos.100; Doris Behrens-Abouseif, “The Waqf: A Legal Personality?,” in Astrid Meier, Johannes Pahlitzsch, and Lucian Reinfandt (eds.), Islamische Stiftungen zwischen juristischer Norm und sozialer Praxis (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2009), 57–59. The distinction between the name, the functions and the practice is an analytical tool of this book, and does not attribute an agreement on terminology to the two researchers. ↩
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Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, p. 25, para. 23, and the first footnote, and pp. 34–36, paras 30–31. The difference is observed between his general statement and his preference on the dhimma, on the one hand, and the juristic views he presents, on the other. ↩
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Civil Transactions Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/191 of 29/11/1444 AH, published in Umm al-Qurā on 1/12/1444 AH, 19 June 2023, Arts 17, 18, 26 and 698, the text in the official gazette. These articles were read from the official text available on 19 October 2026. ↩
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Civil Transactions Law, Art. 90; the conclusion is an application of the rules on agency together with the rules on personality, not a ruling on the validity of every disposition made by a nāẓir. ↩
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Bandar, “al-Shakhṣiyya al-iʿtibāriyya li-l-waqf: al-dhimma al-mustaqilla wa-ḥudūduhā fī al-sharikāt”, first study, parts three and five, and second study, parts two to five. ↩
5. Three Creditors and the Questions of Protection
Suppose that a nāẓir borrowed to repair endowed real property. At the same time a creditor claimed from him a personal debt unconnected with the waqf, and one of the entitlement-holders owed a third debt. The phrase “the waqf has an independent dhimma” does not by itself answer how the three claims are ranked: Who is the debtor on the first loan? Does he have recourse against the income? What property can the nāẓir’s creditor or the entitlement-holder’s creditor enforce against? And does dedicated income differ from income that has settled in the ownership of a particular entitlement-holder? This is an analytical example; its answers need the applicable ruling to be specified, not the assumption of a single immunity for all property connected with the waqf.
Al-Baḥr al-rāʾiq [The Clear Sea] reports that a debt can be owed in the first instance only in a dhimma, and that borrowing by the qayyim (waqf administrator) establishes the debt against him. Al-Ṭarābulusī presents, for the case of need, borrowing by order of the ḥākim (judge) and then recourse against the income of the waqf. This is the form of borrowing in case of need where the founder has not delegated it; the passage of al-Baḥr al-rāʾiq mentions the effect of such delegation and a disagreement over some forms of necessity, so the ḥākim’s permission is not to be made a uniform condition for every borrowing. On this approach, then, the continuity of the purpose and the survival of some effects of the obligation are possible without uniting the initial debtor and the property available for payment in a single legal person.56
Different from this is a form that our study of the waqf’s dhimma reported from the gloss (ḥāshiya) of al-Ramlī the Elder: establishing a debt against “the waqf side” (jihat al-waqf) that attaches to the successive generations (buṭūn), with the ḥākim’s permission justified on the ground that its effect goes beyond the term of the incumbent nāẓir, unless borrowing is provided for in the founder’s stipulation. The base commentary mentions al-Bulqīnī’s disagreement on whether permission is required, so no single answer is to be attributed to all the Shāfiʿīs. Al-Buhūtī presents, in the chapter on loans, an attachment to the borrower’s dhimma and to the waqf side, with payment from the yield, so that the borrower is not bound to pay from his own property in the form he prefers. These are differences in the locus of the obligation, the extent of its effect and the route of payment; their transmission here remains restricted to those carefully examined passages, and the words “side” (jiha) and “dhimma” are not automatically equated with modern personality.57
This comparison needs to bring out the cause of the debt and the route of recourse for whoever paid it. Ibn ʿĀbidīn reports the answer of the Ḥanafī Khayr al-Dīn al-Ramlī in al-Fatāwā al-Khayriyya [The Khayriyya Fatwās]: the mutawallī permitted a lessee to carry out repairs (maramma) to the waqf so that their cost would be a debt against the waqf side, and then permitted a second lessee to pay the first lessee’s debt so as to take his place. After the mutawallī’s death, the claim is directed against his estate, and his heirs then have recourse against the income of the waqf held by the new nāẓir. The reason given for the answer is that the waqf has no independent legal capacity to incur debts (lā dhimma lahu), and that the debt is established against the qayyim, with recourse against the waqf. The context of the page describes the authorised expenditure as charged (murṣada) on the house and on the waqf side; the charging (irṣād, a charge on the waqf for sums advanced) here specifies what the expenditure attaches to, and does not dispense with working out who is to be claimed against in the first instance.58
The route of the answer of the Mālikī Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Laqānī, reported from the fatwās of al-Shalabī, differs, in the case of a nāẓir who permitted a mat-maker to furnish the mosque with mats, the price of the mats to come from the yield, and who was then dismissed before the mat-maker had received anything from the yield. The answer requires the second nāẓir to pay off the mat-maker’s right from the yield, and mentions that a Ḥanbalī jurist agreed with it. The attachment of the right to the yield is stated in the question; so an independent reasoning that the respondent did not state is not to be attributed to him. Ibn ʿĀbidīn follows this by reporting an objection and a detailed treatment of purchase, expenditure and attestation with the intention of recourse. The difference of school is a rival explanation for the difference between the two routes, together with the difference in the dispositions and facts; so death and dismissal alone are not to be made the reason for the difference, and it is not to be inferred from two answers that they are two answers to a single question in two schools.59
Another question appears in the passages that Ibn ʿĀbidīn collected: the effect of permission, and of silence on the stipulation of recourse. He reports the gist of al-Qunya [The Acquisition]: the lessee has recourse against the qayyim if he carried out upkeep with the qayyim’s permission, except where most of its benefit goes to the lessee, which needs a stipulation of recourse. He then reports from Khayr al-Dīn al-Ramlī the agreement on upkeep carried out with the mutawallī’s permission where recourse was stipulated, the disagreement where nothing was said about it, and the categorical position reported from al-Qunya and al-Ḥāwī al-Zāhidī [al-Zāhidī’s Compendium] in favour of recourse if most of the benefit of the upkeep goes to the waqf.60 Identifying the main recipient of the benefit is thus decisive here for the reported view, together with permission and stipulation; the name of expenditure, or the existence of permission alone, is not enough to establish a right of recourse in every form. These remain detailed rulings reported in the Ḥanafī context, not a rule that takes the place of the rules of contract and expenditure in other normative frameworks.
Ibn ʿĀbidīn infers from these passages that recourse was not made conditional on the judge’s permission. He distinguished the mutawallī’s spending from his own property from borrowing a loan (istiqrāḍ) and buying on deferred payment (nasīʾa), and inclined to the view (istaẓhara) that the person whom the mutawallī authorises is assimilated to him. He then inclines to the view that the mutawallī’s permission to the lessee for necessary upkeep is sufficient for the lessee’s spending to be charged on the house and the waqf side, and states explicitly that this departs from the practice of his own time and of those before him.61 Who gives the permission, and how far his permission suffices, are thus part of the ruling; and this is Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s own inclination (istiẓhār), not a description of settled judicial practice, nor a denial of the need for the judge’s permission in every borrowing.
Here a relationship appears between the continuity of the dedication and the preservation of rights: the resource for payment may remain while the person in charge of it changes, while there is a difference in who may properly be asked to pay and who has recourse for what he paid. This is why the description of the system specifies four connected matters: (1) the cause of the debt, (2) the debtor, (3) the property available for payment, and (4) the basis of recourse if someone other than the person on whom the expenditure finally rests pays it. It then examines the effect of a transfer of the niẓāra on each of them. It is not enough for the accounts to say that the expenditure is “on the waqf”; this may be true of where it ends up, while hiding the person who bears the payment, and the waiting, before that.
Articles 599–601 of Murshid al-ḥayrān [The Guide for the Perplexed] bring some of these elements together in a specific form. The murṣad (a charge on the waqf for sums advanced) is there a debt owed to the lessee who spent from his own property on necessary upkeep with the nāẓir’s permission, when there was no property available in the waqf and no one who would lease it for rent paid in advance from which the upkeep could be funded. Article 600 prohibits the sale of the murṣad and of the building that the lessee built for the waqf, and gives its holder the right to claim from the mutawallī or to deduct the debt from the customary rate (ajr al-mithl) itself. Article 601 permits him and his heirs to retain the leased asset until payment is obtained, and then specifies, after the mutawallī’s death, the route of claiming against his estate and his heirs’ recourse against his successor in the niẓāra for payment of the murṣad from the income.62 This route agrees with Khayr al-Dīn al-Ramlī’s answer given above, and the comparison adds the specification of the conditions of the murṣad and of the means of obtaining it. It is a juristic formulation by Qadrī Pāshā; it does not by itself establish legislative force or direct borrowing from the fatwā. Nor does identifying the opposing party and the property available for payment dispense with examining priority when established rights compete.
In al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya [The Pearl Necklaces], Ibn ʿĀbidīn reports from al-Ḥānūtī the prohibition of borrowing in order to pay the entitlement-holder and its permissibility for what is indispensable, such as upkeep, and distinguishes borrowing a loan and buying on deferred payment from the mutawallī’s spending from his own property. This is followed by a question about holders of posts that are not among the posts serving the religious rites (shaʿāʾir), whose waqf’s mutawallī received a year’s rent in advance and then disappeared without paying their stipends; in this case there is an agent charged with managing the affairs of the waqf. This agent does not derive from that alone the power to borrow or to collect the following year’s rent in advance. The text mentions the restriction on spending one year’s yield in another year, subject to the founder’s stipulation or the sultan’s text in the appointment. But the comment that follows excepts the posts serving the religious rites, and mentions borrowing for them with the judge’s permission, in the view reported; so it does not make the prohibition on financing stipends a denial of all its forms within the school. These are rules on the cause of borrowing, the powers to borrow and the time of the resource, and are not by themselves a ranking between two established debts.63
In the same book Ibn ʿĀbidīn works out a narrower form: a debt spent on needed upkeep, and a murṣad owed to a group who spent on necessary upkeep while the need for upkeep recurred. On the question of the murṣad, he reports from Fatāwā al-Shaykh Ismāʿīl [The Fatwās of Shaykh Ismāʿīl] that upkeep and payment of the murṣad take precedence over payment to the entitlement-holders, and he inclines to the view that payment to them is barred until the debt is discharged, in the form he discusses. He explains before this that the shares paid from income realised at the time of upkeep, or of the need for it, are among what they have no right to, and he distinguishes upkeep that may be postponed without manifest harm.64 This is a ruling on the specified form before the distribution share is set aside, and it does not by itself establish that every creditor takes precedence over property whose ownership had already settled in an entitlement-holder. In building the system, it is to be specified whether the rule of the normative framework operates before the share arises or ranks rights that have already been established; this question is not to be left to the calculation of the distribution or to general pro rata sharing.
Before the question of competing claims, the rules presented distinguish questions that, if confused, change the answer:
| Question | What the specific text establishes | The limit the reasoning preserves |
|---|---|---|
| Creating the debt and financing the rights | In al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya, a detailed treatment of the cause of borrowing and of permission, with the exception of the posts serving the religious rites in the passage mentioned | The validity of borrowing does not by itself determine the creditor’s rank when the property falls short |
| Distributing income whose shares have not settled | In al-Muḥīṭ, pro rata sharing among the named persons, or precedence of the named amount over the holder of the remainder, according to the formula | The calculation among entitlement-holders is not carried over to the ranking of an external creditor without evidence |
| Expenditure on upkeep and on posts | In the Ḥanafī and Ḥanbalī texts, rulings of precedence detailed by stipulation, harm and work, as in Chapter 4, §4 | No priority is to be formulated that cuts across the schools or across the views on limited duration |
| Upkeep debt before entitlement to distribution | In al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya, precedence for the debt for needed upkeep and for the murṣad in the specified form, with the statement that the entitlement-holders’ share had not been established in that income | This precedence does not carry the answer to competition between a debt and income whose ownership had already settled in specified persons |
| Ownership of income received | In Bakhīt’s fatwā, specified persons’ ownership of the yield and their power to ratify a purchase made with it | The fatwā is not a ruling on the priority of an earlier debt connected with the income |
| The income of each period | In the question in al-ʿUqūd, the restriction on spending from one year in another, with the exception of the stipulation and the text of appointment | Closing the financial year is not made to create the right or to extinguish it |
These rules narrow the field of inquiry: whether the obligation has legal effect against the waqf is examined before it is entered among the waqf’s debts; who is bound by it, if it has no effect against the waqf, is worked out; what has been established for each entitlement-holder is calculated before it is described as delayed; and property that has passed into the ownership of specified persons is separated out. The ranking of an authorised repair debt and an entitlement-holder’s right, both established in income insufficient for the two, still needs a ruling under a particular normative framework. Among its forms that need to be distinguished are recourse against a nāẓir who consumed yield that was already owned, a claim on new yield, and a repair debt that precedes the settling of the share; the text cited earlier specified the ruling on its own form in upkeep, and applying it to other forms still needs its own evidence. The forms are not confined to these examples, and the texts that create a right do not carry the answer to enforcement against it.
Enforcement against the principal is a separate question: the Saudi Regulation on Reviving Unknown and Disused Awqāf, which Chapter 9, §5, presents, permits in its Article 23, within its scope, borrowing after the court’s permission, secured on the yield, on the properties or by a third party. This establishes that such security is possible in the specified form; the wording alone does not complete the ranking of enforcement, the rights of third parties and the ultimate destination of the principal’s dedication. Identifying the resource from which payment may be made comes before examining its sufficiency, and does not stand in for the ranking of rights when it is insufficient.
| Question | What must be specified | What is not enough to establish the answer |
|---|---|---|
| A debt created for the benefit of the waqf | The debtor, the basis of the permission, and the property from which payment may be made | The expenditure being beneficial to the waqf |
| A personal debt of the nāẓir | The limits of the separation between his own property and the property he administers | His mere holding of the asset or signing of the contract |
| A debt of an entitlement-holder | The right that has settled in him, and what remains conditional or unspecified | His falling under the name of the designated use alone |
| Transfer of the niẓāra | Whether the contract, the debt or the right of recourse survives, and who represents it after the transfer | The survival of the post’s title alone |
| Inability to pay | The ranking of rights, the scope of enforcement and the ultimate destination of the dedication | The establishment of legal personality alone |
This is where the value of comparison with law and economics is determined. Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, in their study of the private trust, show the effect, as against creditors, of separating the trust property from the trustee’s own property, and distinguish this effect from the regulation of the trustee’s duties towards the beneficiary. They also limit the protection of the property from the settlor’s creditors where the settlor retains a benefit. Their subject is the private trust, and they excluded the charitable trust from the scope of the article; so their conclusion is not carried over to waqf as a ruling about it.65 What we take from them is a question that lends itself to comparison: which creditor was barred from which property, and by which rule?
This question also disciplines the dialogue with Moumtaz. The protection of the endowed principal from the creditors of the nāẓir and of the entitlement-holders, which she mentions, does not settle enforcement against it for a debt created for the benefit of the waqf. Al-Qarī’s objection, as our earlier study of the waqf’s dhimma presented it, drawing on Mudawwanat aḥkām al-waqf al-fiqhiyya [Compendium of the Juristic Rulings on Waqf], is directed at this last question when revenues fall short.66 It is therefore necessary to separate the manager’s creditors from the creditors of the body he manages, and then to examine the rules governing each.
This does not imply that every waqf is capable of bankruptcy, or that its substance is general security for creditors. Personality determines who bears rights and obligations, while the scope of liability, enforcement and insolvency needs other rules. In the Saudi legal system, Article 698 refers the rules on the right of waqf to its own special texts. We therefore do not derive from Article 18 alone the permissibility of selling every inalienable (muḥabbas) property in payment of every debt, nor the ranking of creditors and entitlement-holders in case of inability to pay.67
Footnotes
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Zayn al-Dīn ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad, known as Ibn Nujaym, al-Baḥr al-rāʾiq sharḥ Kanz al-daqāʾiq [The Clear Sea: A Commentary on The Treasure of Subtleties], second edition (Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, n.d.), vol. 5, p. 227, digital copy. And Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā al-Ṭarābulusī, al-Isʿāf fī aḥkām al-awqāf [Assistance on the Rulings Governing Awqāf], second edition (Egypt: Maṭbaʿat Hindiyya, 1320 AH / 1902), p. 57. The passages of the first on the denial of dhimma and on permission, and the page of the second, were read again from the digital copy to complete their attribution and to qualify the meaning. ↩
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The gloss (ḥāshiya) of al-Ramlī the Elder, in Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī, Asnā al-maṭālib sharḥ Rawḍ al-ṭālib [The Loftiest Aims: A Commentary on The Seeker’s Garden], first edition (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1422 AH / 2001), vol. 5, p. 562; the page and its gloss were read in a digital copy bearing the particulars of this edition, with the attribution of the gloss and the volume as determined by the study “Dhimmat al-waqf fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī”. And al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-qināʿ, Ministry of Justice edition, vol. 8, p. 135, chapter on loans, according to the verification in the study “Dhimmat al-waqf fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī”, part three/4. The chapter does not claim a fresh comparison with the images of the two pages. ↩
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Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ʿĀbidīn, al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya fī tanqīḥ al-Fatāwā al-Ḥāmidiyya [The Pearl Necklaces: A Revision of the Ḥāmidian Fatwās] (Dār al-Maʿrifa, n.d.), vol. 1, pp. 218–219 and 221–223; the precedence of the upkeep debt and of the murṣad is on pp. 218–219, with Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s comment and its limits; the fatwā on the lessees is on p. 222, and the mat case continues onto p. 223. These were compared with the digital text, and the volume was determined by matching against al-Shāmila; the image of the printed edition was not examined. In the biography of Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Laqānī by al-Zahrāʾ bint ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Shamsān, “Iʿtirāḍāt Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Laqānī al-naḥwiyya wa-l-taṣrīfiyya ʿalā Ibn Hishām al-Anṣārī fī kitābihi Ḥawāshin ʿalā Tawḍīḥ al-Alfiyya: jamʿan wa-dirāsa” [Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Laqānī’s Grammatical and Morphological Objections to Ibn Hishām al-Anṣārī in His Book Glosses on Tawḍīḥ al-Alfiyya: Collection and Study], master’s thesis, Qassim University, p. 27 of the digital file: “the Egyptian Mālikī”. The analysis was taken up again from Bandar, “al-Mafhūm al-qānūnī li-l-waqf” [The Legal Concept of Waqf], Series Fifteen, release 3.3, the sections “Ittijāhān li-l-ḥimāya” [Two Directions of Protection] and “Ḥālatān takshifān waẓīfat al-wilāya” [Two Cases That Reveal the Function of Authority], unpublished paper; the reference is made to preserve precedence, while the basis of the ruling is the texts mentioned. ↩
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya, vol. 1, pp. 222–223, on the mat-maker’s fatwā and the comment on it. For identifying the school of Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Laqānī: al-Shamsān, “Iʿtirāḍāt Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Laqānī al-naḥwiyya wa-l-taṣrīfiyya ʿalā Ibn Hishām al-Anṣārī”, p. 27 of the digital file; this is the reference for his biography, not the basis of the juristic ruling. And Bandar, “al-Mafhūm al-qānūnī li-l-waqf”, in the sections “Ittijāhān li-l-ḥimāya” and “Ḥālatān takshifān waẓīfat al-wilāya”. ↩
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya, vol. 1, p. 222, on the report from al-Qunya, Khayr al-Dīn al-Ramlī’s fatwā and Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s comment on both. The presentation separates the reports from Ibn ʿĀbidīn’s inclination to the view that the mutawallī’s permission suffices, and from his departure from the practice of his time. The source is the digital text; the image of the printed edition was not compared for this passage. ↩
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya, vol. 1, p. 222. ↩
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Muḥammad Qadrī Pāshā, Murshid al-ḥayrān ilā maʿrifat aḥwāl al-insān [The Guide for the Perplexed to Knowing the Conditions of Man], second edition (Būlāq: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Kubrā al-Amīriyya, 1308 AH / 1891), p. 98, Arts 599–601. The particulars of the edition and its pagination are from the front matter of the digital copy, which states that its pagination matches the print; the image was not compared. The agreement of the route of recourse with Khayr al-Dīn al-Ramlī’s answer does not by itself establish a direct lineage between the two texts or the legislative force of these articles. ↩
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya, vol. 1, pp. 222–223: the rest of the report from al-Ḥānūtī and the distinction between spending and borrowing on p. 222; the question on posts other than those serving the religious rites, the exception of the rites with the judge’s permission and the restriction on the year’s yield on p. 223. The text is digital, and was not compared with the image of the printed edition in this verification. ↩
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Ibn ʿĀbidīn, al-ʿUqūd al-durriyya, vol. 1, pp. 218–219, on the upkeep debt, the murṣad and precedence over the entitlement-holders, with the distinction of upkeep that may be postponed without manifest harm. The text is digital, and was not compared with the image of the printed edition in this verification. ↩
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Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, “The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis,” New York University Law Review 73 (1998), 437–438, 454. The limits of the private trust are on p. 437; the separation of the property on p. 438; and the restriction concerning the settlor’s benefit on p. 454. The passage on the restriction was read from the text of the article. ↩
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Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Qarī, “Athar al-khilāf bayna al-shakhṣiyya al-ṭabīʿiyya wa-l-iʿtibāriyya” [The Effect of the Difference between Natural and Legal Personality], pp. 9–10, as quoted in Mudawwanat aḥkām al-waqf al-fiqhiyya, p. 559 according to the digital copy, as worked out in the study “Dhimmat al-waqf fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī”, the preliminary section and the limits of the evidence. Al-Qarī’s separate study was not opened in this chapter; so its use was confined to the direction of the objection, and no broader ruling on all the functions of waqf was attributed to him. ↩
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Civil Transactions Law, Arts 17, 18, 26 and 698. ↩
6. The Personality of the Waqf and the Personality of the Body in Charge of It
If the law confers personality on the waqf, and also confers it on an authority that supervises it, the two persons or the two properties do not thereby become one. The question in disposition and litigation is this: does the body act in its own name and for its own account, does it represent a particular waqf, or does it exercise supervision that does not make it a party to the contract? Likewise, property does not become the property of the apparatus merely because the apparatus registers it, oversees it or administers its return.
This is where the chapter connects with our study “al-Jihāz qabla al-shakhṣ” [The Apparatus before the Person]: the question of when the status was conferred differs from the question of when the apparatus was established, of who holds ownership, and of who is the representative in a lawsuit. The earlier study separated these dates instead of inferring a transfer of power from the appearance of the word “personality”.68 In the Dustūr we need the result of this methodological distinction: the independence of the waqf, or its subjection to public administration, is not to be explained by the term for the status alone, but by the text that distributes ownership, representation and decision, and then by what practice is established.
The importance of this appears in a system in which a single apparatus administers many awqāf. A single manager does not establish that their property is single, just as the separate names of the awqāf do not by themselves establish that their accounts are separated in practice. Chapter 9 identifies their financial and administrative relationships; this chapter adds that identifying the person who bears the right and the debt is a condition for understanding those relationships. This is a question that bears on every attempt to transfer the tools of waqf to another charitable system: creating an enduring body is not enough until it is specified what it owns for its own account, what it represents for others, and what dedication it has no power to change.
Footnotes
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Bandar, “al-Jihāz qabla al-shakhṣ: matā ṣāra al-waqf shakhṣan iʿtibāriyyan fī al-tashrīʿāt al-ʿArabiyya wa-l-Turkiyya wa-l-Īrāniyya (1910–2025)?” [The Apparatus before the Person: When Did Waqf Become a Legal Person in Arab, Turkish and Iranian Legislation (1910–2025)?], fourth version, 8 October 2026, unpublished paper, “Li-man ṣārat al-ṣifa?” [To Whom Did the Status Pass?] and “al-Ḥudūd” [The Limits]. The distinction between the questions is taken up again; this chapter does not carry over the paper’s count, nor does it use the count to do without testing practice. ↩
7. The Waqf of Shares: The Survival of the Dedication alongside the Company’s Independence
The difference between the person, the property and the right becomes visible in the waqf of a company’s shares. The Saudi Companies Law lays down that the company acquires legal personality upon registration, and makes the joint stock company alone liable for the debts of its activity, with the shareholder’s liability limited to paying the value of the shares for which he subscribed. It also lays down that the Law applies to the holdings and shares owned by a waqf. The shareholder and the company are thus two persons, and the combination of all the shares in the waqf’s ownership does not lead to the union of the two dhimmas.69
Accordingly, if the object of the waqf is specified shares, the shares and their rights remain the object of the dedication, while the company disposes of its assets in accordance with its own rules. A sale by the company of real property it owns is not, merely because its shares have been made a waqf, a sale of an endowed asset under that instrument. Different from this is contributing a particular endowed property to the company as a contribution in return for shares: here the transfer of the inalienable property must first be characterised, and it may be a substitution needing its own conditions and permission. The company’s personality is therefore not to be used to validate that transfer retroactively.70
Our earlier study worked out this question on the Ajwād document published in al-Waṣiyya al-muwaḥḥada wa-l-waqf al-mushtarak [The Unified Will and the Joint Waqf]. Its value is that it shows the waqf’s design to be aware of the company’s independence and its dhimma; it does not by itself establish what was actually included in the company’s articles of association or how it was later applied. The study’s reading of the document indicates that the shares are the first asset, and that other property may enter the waqf or be attached to it in accordance with its instrument; so all the property that the waqf will own cannot properly be reduced to the initial shares.71
The juristic reservation about this analysis deserves consideration: describing a share as a portion of the company’s assets is a usage of the chapter on exchange contracts (muʿāwaḍa). But it does not by itself settle how far the rules of waqf extend to every changing asset of the company. The International Islamic Fiqh Academy permitted the waqf of shares, and regulated dealing in them and their substitution when the company is liquidated. The analysis therefore needs to combine the financial ruling on the share with the company’s independence, and then to specify the object of the dedication and the basis of every transfer; carrying over a description from the chapter on sale is not enough to do away with these questions.72
The Saudi Waqf Investment Products Regulation offers a direct application of this precision. In Article 12 it makes the object of the waqf the security or its value; Article 8 requires specifying whether the waqf is of the assets themselves or of their value, and specifying the rulings on dividends distributed in the form of shares: which of them follow the principal and which follow the yield. Article 15 requires the securities to be transferred from the founders’ account to the waqf’s investment account.73
The distinction between principal and yield here is thus a ruling on entitlement and disposition: a share that attaches to the principal is subject to a restriction different from that on property decided to be distributed as a return. We do not lay down in advance the ruling on every distribution; the Regulation requires it to be stated in the waqf annex. Likewise, the phrase “waqf of the value” does not make the value guaranteed or independent of investment risks; it specifies the object of the dedication, while guarantees of performance and risks need their own rulings and evidence.
This question intersects with accounting and governance without either of them taking the place of the law. The company’s assets may appear in consolidated statements because of control, and they do not become endowed properties through this presentation. The founder’s stipulation may bind the nāẓir in exercising voting rights, without all its content automatically binding the company and its creditors: the instrument that brought it into the company’s documents, resolutions or contracts must be identified, together with the limits within which it can be invoked. This is one of the results of the study “Waqf ashum al-sharikāt fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī” [The Waqf of Company Shares in the Saudi Legal System]; its point is that a ruling passing from one person to another needs a basis, even if the same people manage both.74
Footnotes
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Companies Law, issued by Royal Decree No. M/132 of 1/12/1443 AH, 30 June 2022, Arts 9, 58 and 273; the Ministry of Commerce copy. The copy used has 118 pages; Article 273 is on p. 115. The liability mentioned in the text is restricted to the form of the joint stock company. ↩
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Bandar, “Waqf ashum al-sharikāt fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī”, parts two to five, unpublished paper. The source of the case: the Awqaf Committee of the al-Fawzān Programme for Community Service, al-Waṣiyya al-muwaḥḥada wa-l-waqf al-mushtarak: al-āliyya al-āmina li-najāḥ wa-istidāmat al-waqf [The Unified Will and the Joint Waqf: The Safe Mechanism for the Success and Sustainability of Waqf], the Ajwād document, whose date of issue has not been established. The case is used here from the earlier study’s reading, without any claim to have seen a new deed or to have verified current application. The rules on the company’s independence are from the Companies Law, Arts 9, 58 and 273. The characterisation of contributing the endowed asset as a contribution in kind is a question conditional on its basis and procedures. ↩
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Bandar, “Waqf ashum al-sharikāt fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī”, parts two to five; the Awqaf Committee of the al-Fawzān Programme for Community Service, al-Waṣiyya al-muwaḥḥada wa-l-waqf al-mushtarak; and the Companies Law, Arts 9, 58 and 273. ↩
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International Islamic Fiqh Academy, Resolution 181 (19/7) on the Waqf of Shares, Sukuk, Intangible Rights and Usufructs, Sharjah, 1430 AH / 2009, Second/2–3; according to the text verified in our study “Waqf ashum al-sharikāt fī al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī”. The claim that characterising the share in exchange contracts settles all the effects of its waqf is not revived here. ↩
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General Authority for Awqaf, Lāʾiḥat al-muntajāt al-istithmāriyya al-waqfiyya (Umm al-Qurā, 12 June 2026), Arts 8/1, 8/5, 12 and 15, official text. The passages were read again on 19 October 2026. The Regulation specifies the rules of design and compliance, and does not by itself establish the performance of any particular product. ↩
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See n. 71. ↩
8. What This Chapter Establishes in the Rules of the System
Endowed property is not sufficiently described by a list of its endowed properties or by the value of its assets. One must describe the dedication attached to it, the rights that preceded it, its ownership, the power over it, the entitlement in it, and the debts that may arise in connection with it. The asset may remain while the entitlement-holder changes; the holder of the post may change while the contract remains; or the company’s investment may change while its shares remain the object of the waqf. Each change has its rule; sameness of name is not enough to establish that the rule is the same.
The results of the chapter are organised into five connected rules: dedication does not exhaust the rules of ownership; administration does not in itself create ownership; entitlement to the income is not the same as ownership of the substance or bearing the debt; legal personality needs its effects on dhimma, representation and enforcement to be stated; and the transfer of property between the waqf and another person needs an independent characterisation. Some of them are analytical distinctions drawn from comparing the texts, and their substantive answers are determined by the school, the law and the instrument.
From the connection of these rules a path of reading takes shape: the dedication identifies what the waqf attaches to and what rights remain to others; the basis of the disposition identifies who is bound by it; the cause and time of the entitlement show what has been established for the claimant; and then the rules of proof, representation and claim determine how it is protected. This is an ordering of the questions of analysis, not a chain of inference in which establishing the first is enough to establish what follows. The dedication may be valid while the jurists differ on who bears the debt, and the entitlement may be established while the dispute remains over the opposing party, the evidence or the property available for payment.
The value of this path appears in comparative dialogue: the bearer of an obligation is set against its counterpart bearer, the property available for payment against its counterpart, and protection from a personal creditor against protection from a creditor of the same kind. Then it becomes possible to discuss whether a difference in formulation hides a shared function or produces a difference in right and cost. The word “personality”, or the translation of niẓāra as “administration”, does not settle the comparison. Chapter 10 examines what is shared and what differs; Chapter 11, §2, turns these differences into decisions for establishing the system.
Among the comparative texts on determining liability and the capacity in which a defendant is sued is section 1010 of the American Uniform Trust Code as revised in 2003. Subsection (a) excludes, unless the contract provides otherwise, personal liability on a contract properly entered into in the course of administration if the fiduciary capacity was disclosed in it. Subsection (c) allows a claim to be brought against the trustee in that capacity, whether or not his personal liability is established. The text thus separates the capacity in which the defendant is sued from his personal liability, and is suitable for comparing this distinction with the answers of waqf. But it does not by itself identify the successor nāẓir, the creditor’s priority or the property subject to enforcement; so similarity of function is not to be made into identity of the whole route.75
With these rules the beginner can understand why not every nāẓir is an owner, nor every beneficiary a co-owner of the substance, just as not every asset of a company owned by a waqf is endowed.
Once the property and the parties have been identified, the question of Chapter 3 remains: by which words and rules of interpretation are these rights determined, and what do we do when the waqf document admits more than one meaning? Chapter 6 then takes up what their holder needs in order to prove and protect them. In this way the reader knows where to find the basis of the right, and where the question of its exercise begins.
Footnotes
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Trust Code (2000, Last Revised or Amended in 2003), the official text saved with its comments, section 1010(a), (c) and its comment, printed pp. 174–175. An American model in a specific version; it is not attributed to all the states or to the English trust. The account in the text is a summary of the section, not a published translation. ↩