Paper

Knowledge, Litigation, Accounts and the Effect of Judgements on the Delivery of Benefit

Its link to the blog’s introductory texts: The Introduction prepares the ground for its question in §§2, 5 and 10, and the Framework uses it in decision domains 12, 13 and 17.

1. Two New Nāẓiras and a Judgement the First Nāẓira Does Not Want to Be Bound By

The protection of entitlement depends on whether the route that carries it to a body with the power to correct the defect is fit for that purpose, and on identifying against whom it can validly be established and from whom its payment can be demanded. It is therefore not enough to describe the beneficiary as the holder of a right, or the judiciary as protecting the waqf. The route may be obstructed by a dispute over the evidence, over the opposing party against whom the judgement can validly be issued, or over the person from whom the money is to be demanded once it has been issued.

A fatwā (juristic opinion) by ʿAbd al-Majīd Salīm, dated 19 December 1932, reveals the distance between the establishment of a right and its satisfaction. Its question relates that an entitlement-holder in a waqf claimed his yield from the nāẓira (female nāẓir) before the Native Court, and his action was dismissed until he established his entitlement by a sharia court judgement. It then relates an action brought by entitlement-holders against the nāẓira seeking her removal for acts of betrayal of trust that they alleged. According to the question, the matter ended with two nāẓiras from among the entitlement-holders being joined to the first nāẓira, authorised to act without her. The question does not identify who brought the second action, so we do not know whether the person who made the first claim was among them.147

The man obtained a judgement of entitlement against the two nāẓiras, and then returned to claim from the first what he was entitled to of the income (ghalla) she had taken before they were joined to her. She refused, arguing that the judgement had not been issued against her. The question then became: must he establish his entitlement again against her? He had obtained the judgement he had lacked, and there remained an objection to relying on it against another nāẓira for earlier income. The judgement was issued after the two nāẓiras were joined; the question therefore does not relate an old judgement reopened after a succession of nāẓirs, nor does it establish that the first was removed.

The muftī stated that he had examined the judgement attached to the question, issued by the Miṣr Sharia Court of First Instance on 13 October 1929. He held that the judgement of entitlement against the two nāẓiras authorised to act alone did not require a fresh action to establish it against the first, and that the man could claim from her what he was entitled to of the earlier income. The effect of what is adjudged against a person who may properly be sued is thus not confined to that person alone.

This is an event transmitted in the question put to a muftī, and its answer contains a statement that an attached judgement was read; the original documents of the case file are not before us. Nor does the fatwā tell us that the income was paid. The distinction is necessary to the argument itself: the report of a judicial procedure, the determination of the judgement’s effect and the money’s reaching its owner are three levels, none of which can stand in for the others. Likewise, we do not attribute the date of the attached judgement to the judgement joining the two nāẓiras, nor do we turn the acts of betrayal of trust mentioned in the question into facts that we have established from a judgement on them.

Our paper “Man yamlik al-daʿwā?” [Who Holds the Action?] has already used this fatwā to show how the waqf is represented in litigation. Placing it here, between the chapter on decision and the chapter on change, adds a question about the continuity of protection: how does an entitlement-holder rely on a judgement issued against two nāẓirs when he claims from another nāẓir the earlier income that nāẓir took? Identifying the proper defendant (khaṣm) against whom entitlement is established, and the effect of the judgement on others, adds to the description of waqf what does not appear in a list of founder, nāẓir and beneficiary.148

Footnotes

  1. ʿAbd al-Majīd Salīm, “Mukhāṣamat nuẓẓār al-waqf fī al-istiḥqāq” [Litigating against Waqf Nāẓirs over Entitlement], fatwā no. 398, register 37, 19 December 1932, in: Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyya (the Egyptian fatwā authority), al-Fatāwā al-islāmiyya min Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyya [Islamic Fatwās from the Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾ], Cairo: Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyya, 1431 AH / 2010, vol. 7, pp. 220–221. Its digital text was checked against the text of this printed edition; the images of the two pages were not examined, and the original of the court judgement attached to the request for the fatwā is not available here. The occurrence of the word “trustworthy” (thiqa) and then the appointment of two nāẓiras in the question cannot be taken as a separate count of appointment decisions; the account is therefore limited to what the question and the answer state about the two nāẓiras. ↩

  2. Bandar, “Man yamlik al-daʿwā?” [Who Holds the Action?], section 6.3, unpublished paper. This is a reference to the earlier use of the case; its direct basis is the fatwā in the previous note. ↩

2. What Do We Need to Know About the Right Before Describing Its Protection?

Chapter 4 moves from dedication to benefit, and Chapter 5 identifies who holds the decision and who holds the knowledge it needs. Here we reach another side of the relationship: what can a person seeking the benefit ask for, from whom, with what evidence and to what result? A person may claim a share of the yield, may ask to know how it is calculated, may object to his exclusion from a category, or may report the diversion of property from its purpose. A difference in what is sought changes the opposing party, the evidence and the possible remedy, even if all of them concern the same waqf.

We have used “claimability” to describe the institutional route between a claimed entitlement and a corrective outcome. Our definition disaggregates it into recognition, proof, activation, review and remedy. This is a tool for reading, not a transmitted juristic classification, nor a chain through which every case must pass in the same order. A scheduled audit may precede the discovery of a violation, correction may happen before the matter reaches the courts, and review may be review of a decision barring the action rather than of the substantive entitlement.149

This classification is not the same as the layers of “Qābiliyyat al-muṭālaba ʿalā niṭāq wāsiʿ” [Claimability at Scale]: the right, evidence, information, standing and initiation. Those distinguish the components of the capacity to start the route, whereas the links listed above extend to remedy. In “Baʿd daʿwā al-tamāyuz” [After the Distinctiveness Claim], we distinguished, in protecting the purpose, between information, objection or report, enforcement or litigation, and remedy. We keep the attribution of these tools to our earlier works, and use from them what serves the question, without standardising their terms or attributing the result of an earlier test to this chapter.

The Egyptian case precludes equating a right with the capacity to obtain its satisfaction. The ground of entitlement was not the subject of the final objection; its point was the effect, on another nāẓira, of a judgement issued against two nāẓiras. The right itself may therefore remain settled while the usability of its evidence changes. A right may also be established while a dispute remains over the amount of the income, its receipt, or the person who must pay it. The description of waqf therefore needs rules on how evidence passes between opposing parties and bodies, alongside rules on how property passes between endowed properties and designated uses (maṣārif).

When we move from establishing the service to seeking its correction, the type of competition changes the angle from which the right is viewed. An applicant’s claim that he was excluded although the entry requirement applies to him is different from his claim that he was admitted and then not paid a specified amount, and both differ from a request to have his turn put ahead of someone else’s when the available capacity is limited. A single answer, such as that the number of beneficiaries rose or that the income fell, is not enough for these requests: an overall increase does not negate a breach of a particular right, and a shortfall in resources does not by itself identify the person who bears its effect. Nor does the assertion that there is congestion establish that the person who applied has the better claim, or that equal shares is the required rule; that depends on the basis of the entitlement, on any order of priority or delegation that has been established, and on the limits that govern them. This distinction entails a difference in the evidence required: what is examined may be the interpretation of the qualifying description for entry, the establishment of an amount due, or the basis for putting some requests ahead of others. If all that exists is a general purpose of funding a service, no personal share of specified amount and timing can be derived from it by itself; yet it cannot be inferred from this that there is no route at all for asking questions, or for objecting to the diversion of property from its purpose. In this way the observation on counting made in Chapter 4 serves to identify the subject of the dispute without settling it: the person seeking correction specifies what he seeks, and the administration then answers that request with the obligation and the evidence connected with it. The overall service report keeps its usefulness, but it cannot by itself stand in for an answer to an individual claim or to an objection to the way the benefit is distributed.

When this chapter is linked to the findings of Chapter 2, it is unsound, in designing the system, to recognise the right while leaving the route for claiming it unstated. Recognising a share or a contract requires also identifying the proper defendant against whom the right is established, the person from whom its payment is demanded, the property that may be resorted to, and the body that reviews a refusal. These roles may be combined in one person or divided. The opening fatwā is an example of the proper defendant for establishing entitlement differing from the person from whom earlier income is demanded; and the questions of debt are an example of the property from which payment is made differing from the property on which the expenditure finally rests after recourse.

What this requires is linking the document of dedication to the documents of entitlement, contract, accounts and judgement, to the extent that the specific request needs. Each of them has a function: identifying the purpose, establishing a right, identifying an obligor, showing the movement of property, or determining a judicial effect. Collecting them in one register does not give them a probative force they did not have, but it makes it possible to test the point at which the chain of inference broke off or access became impossible. The adequacy of protection depends on whether this route can be used, on its cost and on the enforcement of its outcome, and is not established merely by the documents being complete. This is an inference for the design of the system from verified differences, not a claim that some historical system gathered them in one register.

The Saudi Regulation Organising Niẓāra Work shows that reporting a violation, correcting it and objecting to a sanction are connected functions that need to be distinguished. Article 23 provides for the Authority’s receipt of reports through its official channels, and regulates grievances lodged with it against penalty decisions. Article 26 includes, among the corrective measures the Authority may take, requiring the nāẓir to correct the violation and to restore the rights of the entitlement-holders arising from it. Article 25, for its part, places objections to a warning or a fine before the Administrative Court, and objections to suspension or removal before the circuits competent to remove a nāẓir. The text has thus specified a route for receiving reports and bodies for reviewing sanctions; but these articles alone do not establish a right of the person making a report to obtain a decision on it, or a route for reviewing the Authority’s refusal to intervene.150

Footnotes

  1. Bandar, “Qābiliyyat al-muṭālaba ʿalā niṭāq wāsiʿ fī fiqh al-waqf wa-l-trust al-khayrī” [Claimability at Scale in Waqf Jurisprudence and the Charitable Trust], sections 2 and 8; and the definition of “Qābiliyyat al-muṭālaba bi-l-manfaʿa” [Claimability of Benefit]; and “Baʿd daʿwā al-tamāyuz: mā alladhī yuḍīfuhu al-waqf fī al-siyāq al-muʿāṣir?” [After the Distinctiveness Claim: What Does Waqf Add in the Contemporary Context?], section 8; and “Man yaḥrusu al-mustafīd min al-muʾassasa?” [Who Guards the Beneficiary of the Institution?], section 6. These are earlier papers of ours, unpublished, referred to in order to attribute the tools and the questions; no reliance is placed here on the results of their comparative tests. The definition and the lists used are set out in the body of the chapter. ↩

  2. General Authority for Awqaf, Lāʾiḥat tanẓīm aʿmāl al-niẓāra [Regulation Organising Niẓāra Work], arts. 23/5 and 23/7, p. 13; art. 25, p. 14; and art. 26/5, p. 15, according to the pagination of the Authority’s copy, checked against images of its pages. Article 23/7 gives sixty days from the date of knowledge for a grievance to the Authority, and article 25/2 gives thirty days from the issue of the decision for an objection to suspension or removal before the competent circuits. The two periods are not to be combined into a successive route, nor is one to be held dependent on the other, without the relevant procedural rules. The subject of these routes is penalty decisions; no general right of the person making a report to have a refusal to intervene reviewed is to be derived from them alone. ↩

3. How Do the People of the Waqf Know What Is Worth Asking?

Kashshāf al-qināʿ [Unveiling the Mask], in the passage already discussed in Chapter 4, §6, sets out a ruling that combines preserving the founder’s appointment with the right of the people of the waqf (ahl al-waqf) to knowledge. Commenting on the base text of al-Iqnāʿ [The Persuasion], it says: “(The people of the waqf have no right of objection against the person whom the founder put in charge of the waqf’s affairs, if) the appointee (is trustworthy. And they), that is, the people of the waqf, (may question him), that is, the nāẓir, (about the matters of their waqf that they need to know, so that their knowledge of it and his are equal).” It then affirms their right to request a copy of the waqf deed.151

In this context the appointee’s trustworthiness does not extinguish the right to ask. Nor does the right to ask turn into a power to appoint the nāẓir, or to object to his appointment without cause. This separates the entitlement-holder’s capacity to know what concerns his waqf from his capacity to administer the waqf. It restricts two opposed conceptions: that the entitlement-holder’s questioning is interference in the nāẓir’s work, and that his right to ask gives him authority over all the nāẓir’s decisions.

A copy of the waqf deed has a function beyond preserving a record of how the waqf was founded. With it the people of the waqf can compare what they have been told about their entitlement with what the founder stipulated, identify the point of disagreement, and hold a document outside the administrator’s possession. Keeping the information with the nāẓir alone differs from there being a copy in the hands of the person whose interest it concerns. In this way the organisation of the document enters into the organisation of power: who has knowledge of the rule, and who can rely on it when its interpretation is disputed?

But the text does not define “the people of the waqf” in a way that excludes every individual in an open category. We therefore do not infer from it that no one among an indeterminate body of the poor can request a copy. Nor is asking about what they need to know, in its wording, an obligation to provide a detailed periodic account to everyone. Every move from one of the two requests to the other needs its own ruling; some of this appears in the cases of accounting that follow.

On the same page of Kashshāf al-qināʿ, al-Buhūtī states that the ruler (walī al-amr) may establish a dīwān (bureau) that takes the full accounts of awqāf property where there is a maṣlaḥa (legally relevant benefit), and sets out what is allotted to the official who works on the accounts. The context thus combines the questioning of the people of the waqf with a general route for compiling accounts. It does not by itself establish that the dīwān was set up, was independent or published its accounts to the public. But it shows that the organisation of knowledge in jurisprudence is not confined to one person’s request; it may take the form of specialised work organised at the level of many awqāf.

In the financing of this work there is a restriction worth bringing out: the ruler allots to the official who takes the accounts (mustawfī) “for his work what someone like him is entitled to, from every fund he works” on, “in proportion to that fund”, and ties entitlement to what is allotted to his performing the work required of him.152 Accounting here is work that is paid for, and it may concern several funds, with its cost distributed among them. The wording does not specify a fixed financial ratio, nor does it establish that sharing the cost is more economical in every case. But it makes it possible to distinguish the question of financing the accounts from the question of whether they are obligatory and from the question of the independence of the person who keeps them.

A proposal for shared accounting for small awqāf is therefore not complete when a body bearing that name is set up. It should state the work the body performs for each waqf, the basis for assessing its fee and allocating it, and who verifies that the work was done. And if the awqāf bear this cost, it affects the property available for their purposes, so it must be assessed together with the degree of protection required. These are design questions called for by linking the fee to the work and to the funds; they are not a description of a historical dīwān established to have operated, nor a claim that the waqf’s paying the mustawfī’s fee establishes or negates his independence.

In the Regulation Organising Niẓāra Work already mentioned, a distinction appears between requesting information, organising communication and periodic access. Article 10 obliges the nāẓir to make information and data available to the mawqūf ʿalayhim (those for whom the waqf is made) if it concerns their interests and they request it, and to put in place a means of communication with stakeholders in order to receive their enquiries, suggestions and complaints and deal with them. It likewise obliges him to inform the mawqūf ʿalayhim periodically of the financial statements, “in particular large and medium-sized awqāf”. Article 22 exempts from confidentiality the disclosure required under the Regulation, in a manner that preserves the rights of the waqf. When these duties are applied to a particular waqf, it must be checked whether its nāẓir has been granted an exemption under Article 28, which permits the Authority to exempt one or more nāẓirs from some provisions according to the type, size and condition of the waqf, without prejudice to the relevant laws. These texts establish different duties, but they do not by themselves establish the extent of their use or their effect, nor how every refusal to disclose, or every handling of a complaint, is to be decided.153

A historical Indian text shows the difference between financing the accounts and enabling the holder of the right to use them. Section 7 of the Mussalman Wakf Act, 1923, in the official consolidated version that was read, permits the mutawallī to spend properly from the income of the waqf on statements, documents and the preparation and audit of accounts for the purposes of the Act, notwithstanding anything in the instrument creating the waqf. Section 9 then allows any person to inspect and copy, with the court’s permission, on payment of the prescribed fee and in the manner specified, and section 11 identifies the power to make rules on fees. This is thus a basis for expenditure on producing the evidence, and a separate route for obtaining it.154

The text does not establish how great the burden on the applicant was, or that it barred him from his right; neither the amounts of the fees nor data on the use of the route were obtained here. But it changes the way the cost of the system is reckoned: the expenditure of the accounting apparatus may fall while the cost of obtaining and understanding the document stays with the claimant. The person establishing a system therefore sets the financing of the production of information against the conditions of access to it and of its use, and does not count a transfer of expenditure from the administration to the person seeking the right as an established saving. Choosing a fee, an exemption or a subsidy needs its basis and an assessment of its effect; this comparison does not require that all requests be free of charge, or that they all be charged to the yield.

The question becomes more precise still if we separate making information available from being able to use it. A copy of the document identifies the rule of entitlement; the accounts show what came in and what went out; and an explanation of how the income is distributed links the figures to that rule. These things do not do one job. Useful disclosure in a contemporary design is therefore tied to the decision that it is meant to enable its holder to make: is it establishing eligibility, reviewing an amount, or exposing an action outside the purpose? This is an analytical conclusion drawn from the difference in what is sought, not a claim that the old texts required the contemporary model of disclosure.

Connected with making the accounts available is the effect of what is said about them. In the judgement of the Egyptian Native Court of Appeal issued on 23 January 1919, the refusal to entertain a request for a new account rested on a prior approval of the accounts, and on the fact that the period the judgement regarded as applying to accounting had not elapsed. The outcome is therefore not to be traced merely to the entitlement-holders’ having seen the accounts, nor is the approval to be made a waiver of every later claim while the rest of the reasoning is disregarded.155 This case reveals another need in building the system: stating what consent means, for which period or action, and in what capacity it was given. If a representative of a group is relied on, the delegation he holds and those bound by the effect of what he says must be identified; this is a design conclusion that the question calls for, and the judgement mentioned did not rule on a delegation to a committee or on a representative’s power over all the entitlement-holders.

Another part of Bakhīt’s 1917 fatwā adds a juristic precedent for the effect of approval. The specified entitlement-holders learned from the accounts that the nāẓir had bought a property with their yield, and approved the accounts; this was treated as ratification (ijāza, validating an act after the fact) of the purchase by implication (bi-ṭarīq al-dalāla). The effect of approval on the known action is established in this case, without making mere silence or presence a general release. The effect here is the ratification of a dealing with property, unlike the 1919 judgement on a request for a new accounting, so the two outcomes are not to be combined in a single ruling.156

The American Uniform Trust Code sets another distinction against them. Section 1009 relieves the trustee of liability to a beneficiary for a breach to which the beneficiary consented, from which he released the trustee, or in which he ratified the trustee’s action, unless this was induced by improper conduct or the beneficiary did not know of his rights or of the material facts relating to the breach. The comment on it requires an affirmative act, so a failure to object is not enough. Under section 301, the consent of an authorised representative binds the person represented, unless that person objects to the representation before the consent takes effect. Section 304, for its part, does not give every interested person the power to represent others; it confines that power to specified categories not otherwise represented, among them a minor, an unborn individual, and a person whose identity or location is unknown and cannot be ascertained by reasonable means, and to an identical interest in the question with no conflict.157

The model code also separates the effect of consent from the time limit for bringing an action. The one year in section 1005 runs from the sending of a report that adequately discloses the possibility of the breach and informs the beneficiary of the time allowed for bringing a proceeding, not from any annual account. The period mentioned in the 1919 judgement is therefore not to be matched with it as though the two were a single effect. The conclusion for the system is that it should set out the effect of the report, of consent, of representation and of the time limit, each on its own basis; making the accounts available does not by itself perform all these functions.158

Footnotes

  1. Al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-qināʿ, Ministry of Justice edition, vol. 10, p. 76. What is in parentheses is the base text of al-Ḥajjāwī’s al-Iqnāʿ, and what is outside them is al-Buhūtī’s commentary. The same page contains the establishment of a dīwān for the accounts of awqāf where there is a maṣlaḥa. The digital text of the page was read; the edition and volume are identified in the copy’s metadata, and no visual check is claimed. ↩

  2. Al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-qināʿ, Ministry of Justice edition, vol. 10, p. 76. The context of the phrase combines the base text of al-Iqnāʿ and al-Buhūtī’s commentary, and provides for remuneration for the work and for its being due once the work has been done. The digital text is what was read for this passage; no examination of a historical dīwān is claimed from it. ↩

  3. General Authority for Awqaf, Lāʾiḥat tanẓīm aʿmāl al-niẓāra, arts. 10/3 and 10/5, p. 8; art. 10/9, p. 9; art. 22, p. 13; and art. 28, p. 16, in the copy checked against images of its pages. The conditions of interest and request attach to the provision of information in item 3, and item 5 concerns putting in place a means of communication to receive enquiries, suggestions and complaints and to deal with them. Periodic access is the rule of item 9, and its wording “in particular large and medium-sized awqāf” does not confine it to them. Article 22 saves lawful disclosure from the basic rule of confidentiality, and article 28 permits an exemption that the Authority assesses according to the type, size and condition of the waqf; it is not to be assumed that one has been issued for a particular waqf. This is a comparison of the text’s duties, not a verification of their practice or their effect. ↩

  4. The Mussalman Wakf Act, 1923, Act No. 42 of 1923, ss. 7, 9 and 11, pp. 5–6 of the historical official consolidated copy saved from India Code, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/repealedfileopen?rfilename=A1923-42.pdf . The extracted text was checked against the locations of the sections. This copy is not credited with being a facsimile of the 1923 original, nor with describing the law in force today. The amounts of inspection fees, and their effect on access, were not examined here. ↩

  5. Al-Majmūʿa al-rasmiyya li-l-maḥākim al-ahliyya [The Official Collection of the Native Courts], year 21, January 1920, judgement 5, pp. 10–11; appeal judgement of 23 January 1919. Checked against the two images of the published judgement. The case file and the approval document were not opened. Its use is taken up again from Bandar, “Ḥaḍara al-mustafīd, fa-hal sumiʿa qawluhu?” [The Beneficiary Was Present, but Was He Heard?], release 2.5, Series Thirteen, unpublished paper; the reference to the earlier work preserves the origin of the analysis, and the evidence is the published judgement. ↩

  6. Muḥammad Bakhīt, “Waqf istiḥqāq” [A Waqf of Entitlement], in Fatāwā Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyya [Fatwās of the Egyptian Dār al-Iftāʾ], p. 6 in the pagination of the digital copy. ↩

  7. Uniform Trust Code (2000, Last Revised or Amended in 2003), section 1009 and its comment, pp. 173–174; 301, pp. 43–44; 304, pp. 47–48; and 1005, pp. 169–170. Checked against the text of the saved copy. Consent, release, ratification and the time limit for an action differ; the requirement of adequate disclosure and of notice of the time limit is not to be dropped from section 1005. ↩

  8. Uniform Trust Code, sections 1009, pp. 173–174; 301, pp. 43–44; 304, pp. 47–48; and 1005, pp. 169–170. ↩

4. The Demand for an Account: What Opens It, and Who Holds It?

Al-Damīrī says in al-Najm al-wahhāj [The Blazing Star]: “If the mutawallī of the waqf claims to have paid its yield to the entitlement-holders, then if they are specified individuals (muʿayyanūn) … their word prevails, and they may demand an account from him; and if they are not specified, may the imam [the head of state] demand an account from him? There are two views (wajhān), which Shurayḥ reported in Adab al-qaḍāʾ [The Conduct of the Judge].”159

This ruling concerns a case of dispute over payment. Al-Subkī, in transmitting it, states expressly that the specified individuals claimed they had not received payment. Their right here is therefore not to be turned into an unrestricted right to call for a full account at any time. What the case makes clear is that the specification of those to whom payment is claimed to have been made allows the mutawallī’s claim to be met with their denial, and establishes their right to demand an account in this dispute. If they are not specified, the question transmitted concerns the imam’s demand, and there are two views on it; the answer is therefore neither that the breadth of the category erases all protection, nor that it transfers protection to the imam without disagreement.160

Al-Subkī then transmits Shurayḥ’s firm statement that trustworthy custodians (umanāʾ) may not be required to render an account, and follows it by restricting the prohibition to those about whom no suspicion (rība) has arisen, with an account to be demanded when suspicion does arise. The transmitted prohibition and the later reconciliation are two layers in the text; it is not sound to merge them into a single view in the name of the school. Here a difficulty becomes clear that did not appear in the list of powers: what is enough to start an accounting, and who assesses whether it is enough?

Requiring a ground for the demand may protect the custodian from vexatious demands, and preserve the waqf’s time and property from groundless litigation. But it raises a counter-question if the information needed to bring the suspicion to light is in the hands of the person who is to be called to account. This possibility does not establish that every requirement of suspicion obstructs accounting; it only requires us to look for the route to knowledge that is available before it. Taking al-Buhūtī’s text together with this Shāfiʿī case prevents us from reducing the question to two options: disclosing all the accounts without cause, or withholding all information until litigation begins.

The objection to our argument can be put like this: why is it not enough to give the judge wider power? The answer is that, alongside the extent of power, the texts set conditions for starting to use it. Widening the remedy the judge holds does not by itself identify who can reach it, nor does it establish the report of harm that sets it in motion. This is the chapter’s link with our earlier paper “al-Muḥāsaba wa-izāḥat al-tanshīṭ: man yaḥrusu al-mustafīd, wa-matā tataḥarraku al-raqāba?” [Holding to Account and the Displacement of Activation: Who Guards the Beneficiary, and When Does Oversight Move?], in its first and sixth sections, an unpublished paper: the person who has the power to start a procedure may differ from the person who has the power to decide it. As for the claim that the likelihood of another authorised body moving to protect the beneficiary is the heavier constraint in practice, that is a hypothesis that needs facts; the difference in the rulings does not by itself establish it.

Footnotes

  1. Kamāl al-Dīn al-Damīrī, al-Najm al-wahhāj fī sharḥ al-Minhāj [The Blazing Star in Explaining al-Minhāj], ed. by a scholarly committee, first edition, Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 1425 AH / 2004, vol. 5, p. 524, Book of Waqf. The quotation is from a digital copy, and the volume was identified by matching the passage in a second digital copy, not by noting the number of the book’s volumes. ↩

  2. Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā [The Major Biographical Dictionary of the Shāfiʿīs], ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Ṭanāḥī and ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Muḥammad al-Ḥulw, second edition, Hajar, 1413 AH, vol. 7, p. 106, the entry on Shurayḥ ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Rūyānī. The volume was identified by matching the passage in the al-Shāmila copy. The reading is from the open digital original, which contains the specified persons’ denial of receipt, the report of Shurayḥ’s firm statement, and then al-Subkī’s comment on suspicion. The last comment is not to be attributed to Shurayḥ. ↩

5. When the Proper Defendant in Establishing Entitlement Differs from the Person from Whom the Yield Is Demanded

Let us return to the first nāẓira. At the final stage, the entitlement-holder’s claim was for money for an earlier period, whereas the judgement of entitlement had been issued against the two nāẓiras who had been joined. In the question’s description, the first had not left the niẓāra (the office of waqf administration); she was the one to whom they had been joined. The difference here is thus between the proper defendant in establishing entitlement and the person from whom the yield is demanded, with the claim concerning income that the first had taken before the joining. The muftī answered that the proper defendant in establishing entitlement is the nāẓir, and that a judgement against one of the nāẓirs in the case described extends beyond that person. The reach of reliance on the judgement is thus linked to the capacity of whoever represents the waqf in establishing entitlement; in the muftī’s answer, it does not depend on the first nāẓira’s accepting that it be relied on against her.161

What remains here is specific: the effect of the judgement of entitlement validly issued against the two authorised nāẓiras. We do not infer from it that every judgement in any litigation binds all those in charge of every waqf, nor that the establishment of entitlement by itself settles all accounts of the income. The claim went back to the person who had taken the earlier income, and the muftī did not treat the mere appointment of two nāẓiras as a transfer of every obligation to them personally.

This reveals the link between the rules of proof and the organisation of the post. Identifying who represents the waqf is not only an internal administrative matter; on it depend whom the entitlement-holder may properly sue, and how far what is established against that person reaches. Connected with it is the question of the institution’s history and the preservation of its documents of record (ḥujaj): where are judgements kept, how does an entitlement-holder find the document that records them, and how does whoever later takes over the administration learn of them? These are design questions that extend from this case to others; they do not establish an archiving system for the court, nor that the judgement in question preceded a change in those in charge of the waqf.

What the fatwā separates is establishing the substantive entitlement from claiming from a particular nāẓira the income she took. From this a question opens that links this chapter with Chapter 8: if nāẓirs actually succeed one another, what remains of the judgement’s effects, and which claim is directed to the new mutawallī and which remains against the previous one? This case alone does not answer every form of succession; it identifies the elements of the question, and prevents them from being reduced to the statement that the post survives the persons who hold it.

Footnotes

  1. ʿAbd al-Majīd Salīm, “Mukhāṣamat nuẓẓār al-waqf fī al-istiḥqāq”, vol. 7, p. 221. The muftī’s ruling on the specific question rests on the judgement of entitlement against the two authorised nāẓiras, and does not establish that payment of the income was carried out. ↩

6. Protecting the Purpose When the Action Is Not a Claim to a Share

Some procedures guard a personal share, and some guard the manner of administration or the survival of the dedication. The removal of a nāẓir may lead to the administration being corrected without the overdue yield being paid at once to a particular entitlement-holder. An entitlement-holder may obtain his financial right while a violation that harms others remains. Protection as a whole is therefore not measured by the existence of a single route for the beneficiary, and the soundness of the purpose is not to be inferred from the success of an individual claim.

The Shāfiʿī case above does not negate the general right of care (riʿāya) when the entitlement-holders are not specified; it asks about the imam’s demand for an account in a particular case, and records a disagreement on it. Likewise, al-Buhūtī’s text on the dīwān makes it possible to conceive of an accounting function that goes beyond an individual’s request, but it does not make every interested party master of the dīwān’s affairs. The question remains: who starts the examination, on what ground, and can the person harmed ask for a refusal to start it to be reviewed?

The disaggregation of the functions of protection in “Baʿd daʿwā al-tamāyuz” is useful here, provided the difference between them is kept. A report carries information to the body; a claim asks the body, or an opposing party, for an outcome that has a basis; and enforcement uses a power to give effect to a ruling or a duty. The person making a report may hold no financial share, and the entitlement-holder may hold the share without having the power to set in motion every procedure for protecting the purpose. These persons are not to be grouped under a single standing until the text that confers it has been opened.

The difference matters in reading the public that benefits from a mosque, a school or a medical facility. We do not start from the assumption that every recipient owns a share, or from the assumption that none of them has standing. We look first for the rule that makes use of the benefit a matter of entitlement or leaves it to choice, and then for the rule that grants the right to ask, to object or to bring an action. This prevents the model of a waqf with known shares from being carried over to an open facility, just as it prevents the breadth of the category from being made a sufficient explanation for the impossibility of protection.

In Ḥanafī jurisprudence there is a division that determines the route of protection by the subject of the action. The waqf, “insofar as it is a right of God, exalted be He, because it is a charitable giving of the benefit, does not require an action (daʿwā); but if it is first for a specified person and it is sought to establish his entitlement, an action is required for that, even if the waqf itself (aṣl al-waqf) is established without one”. Ibn ʿĀbidīn presents this reconciliation in the form “it might be said” (qad yuqāl), and then prefers it.162 It follows that testimony to the waqf itself is accepted by way of ḥisba (on behalf of God’s right, without an action), and what is meant is “testimony to the waqf itself; as for its yield, no”. If the waqf itself is established but the specified entitlement-holder has made no claim, “nothing of the income is paid to him, and all of it is spent on the poor”.163 As for an action concerning the endowed asset itself, the position on which fatwās are given (al-muftā bihi) is that it is not heard from the mawqūf ʿalayh “except with an appointment (tawliya)” or a judge’s permission, “because his right is to the income, not to the asset”. In the school there is another view under which it is heard by way of ḥisba from him and from others.164 The general purpose thus retains a route of proof that does not depend on the holder of a share, while setting litigation over it in motion requires standing or permission.

Al-Juwaynī states the same criterion in Shāfiʿī jurisprudence: “Ḥisba testimony is accepted in God’s ḥudūd (the penalties He has fixed), since they have no claimant among human beings and are not connected with their private interests”; he then says: “A waqf, if it is for a general benefiting side (jiha), is established by ḥisba testimony.” As for a waqf for specified persons, on the view that ownership of the substance (raqaba) belongs to God, he transmits al-Ṣaydalānī’s firm statement that such testimony is accepted, and the disagreement of most of the school’s jurists (al-aṣḥāb), because “what predominates in this waqf is private interests connected with persons”.165 The two schools differ in the instrument. Ibn Nujaym says: “A ḥisba action is not permitted. Ḥisba testimony without an action is permitted in these cases”; and al-Ḥamawī points out in his commentary that the Shāfiʿīs treat the ḥisba witness as a claimant as well.166 Nor does the Ḥanafī separation itself hold without qualification. Ibn ʿĀbidīn states that the ḥisba witness “must claim what he testifies to if no other claimant is found”, then offers two possibilities for reconciling this with the denial in al-Ashbāh [Similarities and Analogues]: that the witness is not called a claimant, or that the opponent does not take the oath at his demand when there is no evidence (bayyina); and he concludes with “let this be considered” (fa-l-yutaʾammal).167

This division is read as a division by the subject of the action in the texts presented, and it does not describe every action relating to waqf. What the design of protection gains from it is that three matters be identified for each route: whether it protects the dedication itself or a share in it, who has the power to set it in motion, and whether proof suffices or litigation with standing or permission is required. Our paper “Man yamlik al-daʿwā?” has worked out this division and the disagreement over it.168

Identifying who may bring a claim is linked to identifying the effect of time on its route. An action concerning the endowed principal, a request for income that is due, and an action for the nāẓir’s breach of his duty are questions that differ in their subject and in their opposing parties; their rule cannot be derived from the survival of the dedication alone. The Majalla (Majallat al-aḥkām al-ʿadliyya [The Compilation of Juristic Rulings]) distinguished between actions, including those for income, in Article 1660, and the action of the mutawallī and the stipendiaries concerning the endowed principal in Article 1661, and tied taking the lapse of time into account to the absence of an excuse in Article 1663. The rule on actions concerning the endowed principal is not extended to everything whose benefit goes to the public; Article 1675 gave actions concerning public places a different rule.169

A bar on hearing an action is not the extinction of the right: Article 1674 states expressly that the right survives, and sets out the effect of acknowledging it (iqrār) before the judge in the case it regulates. Nor is it the same as acquiring waqf property through the lapse of time. In the Qatari text of 2021, Article 43 prohibits acquiring ownership of the waqf and its yield, or acquiring a right in rem over it, by prescription or by spending on it. Its rule thus concerns preventing the acquisition of property on these two grounds, and it does not dispense with working out the conditions for hearing each claim connected with it.170

Section 1005 of the American Uniform Trust Code, set out above in §3, regulates a beneficiary’s action against the trustee for breach. It does not make the mere sending of an account the start of the time limit; on the report route it requires disclosure of the possibility of a claim and notice of the period, and the text specifies another starting point when this route does not apply.171

The design of protection therefore requires, alongside identifying the competent body, a statement of the subject of each action, against whom its period runs, what starts it or stops it from being counted, and the effect of its expiry. This is connected with preserving the evidence, notifying its holder and the validity of his representation; the right may survive while its holder fails to reach the route for using it within the relevant time. These rules are taken from the context’s frame of reference, and it is to be identified who has the power to approve their rules and who decides on their application; a register or a procedures manual does not create them merely by setting a deadline for a response. The aim is to identify these relationships, not to transfer the periods of historical or comparative texts to a system that is to be established.

Footnotes

  1. Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār ʿalā al-Durr al-mukhtār sharḥ Tanwīr al-abṣār [The Reply to the Perplexed: A Gloss on The Choice Pearls, the Commentary on Enlightening the Eyes], Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, p. 410, in the discussion of ḥisba testimony on waqf. The rest of the passage after the point quoted reads: “So what the author said is established; and this is in truth a verification, a combination and a reconciliation of the two views by close examination.” Its wording was checked against an image of the printed text of the new revised and corrected Dār al-Fikr edition supervised by the Office of Research and Studies, vol. 4, p. 609; its pagination differs from that of the Ḥalabī edition, and no image of the Ḥalabī edition was examined, so the page number given here for that edition comes from the digital text. ↩

  2. Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Nujaym, al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir [Similarities and Analogues], in: Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Makkī al-Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir fī sharḥ al-Ashbāh wa-l-naẓāʾir [The Eyes of Insight: A Commentary on Similarities and Analogues], first edition (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1405 AH / 1985), vol. 2, p. 424, from the base text. And Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, p. 409: in al-Ḥaṣkafī’s commentary, “among them is waqf, according to what is in al-Ashbāh, because its rule is the charitable giving of the income, and that is a right of God, exalted be He”; he then transmits from al-Khāniyya [The Khāniyya Fatwās] the rule on the entitlement-holder who has made no claim. In the same place Ibn ʿĀbidīn transmits from the author, in al-Minaḥ [The Gifts], the separation between establishing the waqf itself without an action and establishing the entitlement of a specified person, “and there is no doubt that it depends on an action”. The base text of al-Ashbāh on p. 424 was checked against an image of the page. The text of Radd al-muḥtār was checked in its wording against an image of the printed text of the new revised and corrected Dār al-Fikr edition supervised by the Office of Research and Studies, vol. 4, pp. 608–609; its pagination differs from that of the Ḥalabī edition, and no image of the Ḥalabī edition was examined, so the page number given here for that edition comes from the digital text. ↩

  3. Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, p. 406: “(except with an appointment [tawliya]) or a judge’s permission, even if the waqf is for a specified man, according to the position on which fatwās are given — ʿImādiyya [the source named in the commentary] — because his right is to the income, not to the asset”. What is in parentheses is from the base text of Tanwīr al-abṣār, and the rest from al-Ḥaṣkafī’s commentary. In the same place Ibn ʿĀbidīn states that his not holding the action concerning the endowed asset itself “does not conflict with the acceptance of testimony, because it is accepted by way of ḥisba even if the action is not valid”. The other view is on p. 410, after he transmits al-Bīrī’s reply to al-Ashbāh: “If the action is to establish the endowed asset itself, it is a right of God, exalted be He, so the action is heard in it by way of ḥisba from the mawqūf ʿalayh and others.” Its wording was checked against an image of the printed text of the new revised and corrected Dār al-Fikr edition supervised by the Office of Research and Studies, vol. 4, pp. 605–606 and 610; its pagination differs from that of the Ḥalabī edition, and no image of the Ḥalabī edition was examined, so the page number given here for that edition comes from the digital text. ↩

  4. ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, Nihāyat al-maṭlab fī dirāyat al-madhhab [The Utmost Aim in Knowing the School], ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm Maḥmūd al-Dīb, first edition (Jeddah: Dār al-Minhāj, 1428 AH / 2007), vol. 19, Book of Testimonies, Chapter on Testimony to a Bequest, para. 12205, p. 85. The text was checked against an image of the page. ↩

  5. Al-Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir, vol. 2, p. 425. Ibn Nujaym’s statement is in the base text before the commentary divider, together with: “The fatwā position is that the action is heard only from the mutawallī; so it is in al-Bazzāziyya [al-Bazzāzī’s Fatwā Collection], in the book of waqf.” Al-Ḥamawī’s comment after the divider: “This is contrary to what the Shāfiʿī scholars say, for they say that the ḥisba witness is a claimant as well.” Both passages were checked against an image of the page in the same edition. ↩

  6. Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār, Dār al-Fikr reprint of the Ḥalabī edition of 1966, vol. 4, p. 410: “It is clear, moreover, that the ḥisba witness must claim what he testifies to if no other claimant is found. On this basis, everything in which ḥisba testimony is accepted can truly be said to be something in which a ḥisba action is accepted, and this conflicts with what was said above from al-Ashbāh, unless what he means is that he is not called a claimant, or that the opponent does not take the oath at the demand of a ḥisba claimant when there is no evidence, so that it cannot be made out without testimony, which is why he denied it; let this be considered.” Its wording was checked against an image of the printed text of the new revised and corrected Dār al-Fikr edition supervised by the Office of Research and Studies, vol. 4, p. 610; its pagination differs from that of the Ḥalabī edition, and no image of the Ḥalabī edition was examined, so the page number given here for that edition comes from the digital text. ↩

  7. Bandar, “Man yamlik al-daʿwā?”, sections 3–5, unpublished paper. ↩

  8. Majallat al-aḥkām al-ʿadliyya [The Compilation of Juristic Rulings], ed. Najīb Hawāwīnī, Karachi: Nūr Muḥammad, Kārkhāna-yi Tijārat-i Kutub, Ārām Bāgh, n.d., Book Fifteen, Chapter 2, arts. 1660, 1661 and 1663, pp. 333–334, and art. 1675, p. 337. The digital text of this edition in al-Maktaba al-Shāmila was read; no image of the printed edition was examined here. The underlying question is taken up again from Bandar, “Man yamlik al-daʿwā?”, unpublished paper, sections 6.4 and 7. The text distinguishes actions for income, actions concerning the endowed principal and actions concerning public places, and its rules do not make a general binary division. Section 7 of that paper assimilates actions concerning the public to the period for actions concerning the endowed principal, and article 1675 rejects this; that section is to be read with this correction. ↩

  9. Majallat al-aḥkām al-ʿadliyya, art. 1674, p. 337, within the same limits of reading as above; and Qatar, Law No. 9 of 2021 on Waqf, art. 43, the official text saved from the Al Meezan portal on 8 October 2026. The article prohibits acquiring ownership of the waqf and its yield, and acquiring any right in rem over it, by prescription or by spending on it. The comparison is with the saved text, without determining whether it is currently in force or covering the rules on hearing actions in other laws. ↩

  10. Uniform Trust Code (2000, Last Revised or Amended in 2003), section 1005(a–c), p. 169, and the comment, p. 170. The section was checked in full against an image of p. 169, which is page 174 of the local file «UTC-النص-الرسمي.pdf»; the comment was read from the extracted text. The text deals with an action for breach, not with a request for an account alone; it restricts the representative to someone with power of representation, and leaves the effect of fraud and the like in suspending the period to the law of the state. The model code is not in itself law in force in all the states. ↩

7. The Comparison: Standing to Bring a Claim and Review of the Refusal of Permission

Section 59 of the Tamil Nadu Act offers an example of a detailed route to a particular remedy. What is meant here is the revised version used in this comparison, the latest amendment mentioned in whose notes is from 2013; not the text of 1959 as enacted, nor a report on the law as it now stands. The scope of the section is the trustee of the Hindu institution called a “math”, or of a specific endowment attached to it.172

In this case the Commissioner may bring the suit, as may two (2) or more persons who meet the description of persons having interest, after obtaining his written consent, to seek a court decree removing the trustee on enumerated grounds. These include breach of trust, waste of the institution’s funds or their application to purposes unconnected with it, and persistent and wilful default in the performance of duties. Consent opens the route to the suit; the court decides the removal. These are two functions that cannot properly be combined in the phrase “administrative oversight removes”.

Section 6(15) defines a person having interest, in the case of a math, as a disciple of the math or a person belonging to its religious persuasion; and for a specific endowment there is a definition relating to entitlement to, or the habit of, attending the service or partaking in its benefit. We therefore do not translate this standing as “holder of a share in the yield”. A recognised connection with the institution may exist without any financial share being specified, and this links the protection of the purpose to the kind of affiliation that the law recognises.

If the Commissioner refuses consent, subsection (2) of section 59 gives the aggrieved person an appeal to the Government within three (3) months of receiving the order of refusal. The Government may confirm the refusal or direct the Commissioner to give the written consent. This is a review of the refusal to open the route, preceding the judicial decision on the merits of the removal. Had we mentioned only the requirement of consent, we would have hidden an established route for reviewing its gatekeeper; and had we mentioned only the appeal, we would have hidden the number, the standing and the consent from which the request starts.

A Western counterpart stands against it: section 115 of the English Charities Act 2011, in its text on the official legislation website as accessed on 5 September 2026. It names who may begin the charity proceedings falling within its definition: the charity, any of its trustees, any person interested in it, or two (2) or more inhabitants of its area if it is a local charity. Subject to the exceptions provided, it requires the Charity Commission’s authorisation for the court to entertain or proceed with such proceedings. This wording is not enough to establish that every potential beneficiary falls within the standing of a person interested.173

If the application for authorisation is refused, subsection (5) allows leave to be obtained from one of the judges of the High Court attached to the Chancery Division. Subsection (6) exempts proceedings by the Attorney General, and proceedings by the Commission under section 114, from the preceding restrictions. It cannot therefore be said that the Attorney General’s permission is an alternative to the Commission’s authorisation in this text; he holds a route exempted from these restrictions. Subsection (4) likewise exempts proceedings in a pending cause or matter, and appeals, from the requirement of an order of the Commission. And subsection (3) prohibits the Commission from authorising proceedings without special reasons if it considers that the case can be dealt with under its other powers, apart from those of section 114. This is a restriction on granting authorisation; it does not provide here that the alternative remedy must be pursued.

The proceedings meant here are those that subsection (8) defined as falling within the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales with respect to charities or to the administration of a charitable trust. The section is not a rule for every dispute affecting a charity. With this limitation, a point in common with the Indian case is established: standing does not by itself meet the conditions of the route, and the refusal of permission is not an end without review. A named difference is also established: review of the refusal is governmental in the Indian case, while the application for leave after a refusal is judicial in the English text. As for the independence of the reviewing body, its speed, its cost and its effect on access, these are not decided merely by the difference in the body’s name.

The specific caseWho initiates, and what does he seek?What must be distinguished from the request?
The people of the waqf in al-Buhūtī’s textQuestioning the nāẓir and requesting a copy of the documentKnowledge does not in itself confer appointment or removal, and it does not establish a comprehensive periodic account
The specified individuals in the case of claimed payment and denied receiptDemanding an account from the mutawallīEstablishing that the request is admissible tells us nothing about the outcome of the accounting or the recovery of the money
The entitlement-holder in ʿAbd al-Majīd Salīm’s fatwāRelying on the judgement of entitlement and claiming earlier incomeThe continuing effect of the judgement does not establish that payment was made
The suit to remove the trustee of a math under section 59The Commissioner, or two (2) or more persons with standing with his written consentAn appeal against the refusal of consent is not the court’s decision on removal
Charity proceedings under the English section 115The categories specified in the text, with the authorisation and the exceptions set outThe judge’s leave after the Commission’s refusal opens the route but does not decide the merits of the action

This is a comparison of particular functions and procedures; accounting, establishing entitlement and removal are different subjects, and the table does not permit the systems to be ranked from most to least protective. What is established as common is that the path from a request to a remedy is distributed across functions, and that standing, initiation and decision do not always coincide. The differences identified lie in the type of applicant, the ground for the procedure, the number of applicants, and the route of permission and review. A judgement on the equivalence of protection needs the same request to be compared by its subject, evidence and remedy, and then an examination of how these routes work in practice.

One form of linking accounts to a response is what the Saudi Waqf Investment Products Regulation provides in its June 2026 version. Article 31 obliges the nāẓir to provide the Authority with whatever information or reports it requests concerning the product, and with an annual report to it within three (3) months of the end of the financial year, covering distributed and undistributed returns and the justifications for non-distribution, operating expenses and their details, the programmes or projects financed and the numbers of beneficiaries of the yield, the extent of compliance in implementing the founder’s stipulations, and material events or information that may affect the achievement of the purposes. Article 32 then has the Authority coordinate with the competent body in cases of default or breach affecting compliance with the founder’s stipulations or the fate of the assets, in accordance with the relevant laws. The competent body, in this Regulation’s terminology, is the Capital Market Authority.174

These provisions link the money realised, what was retained of it and why, the work financed, and the body that responds to a breach. But obliging the nāẓir to report does not establish that reporting took place or the quality of its data, and coordination does not by itself identify each individual’s right of access or the route to his remedy. The description of the system therefore distinguishes between the duty to report to the supervisory body, the rights of those with standing to make requests, and the action that follows when a defect comes to light.

The usefulness of this disaggregation shows when reading the Core Principles for Effective Waqf Operation and Supervision, prepared by Badan Wakaf Indonesia (the Indonesian Waqf Board), Bank Indonesia and the Islamic Research and Training Institute in 2018. Under Core Principle 5, the supervisor has the power to reject a transfer of management if it considers that it harms the beneficiaries, and paragraph 31 counts paying their entitlements among the nāẓir’s tasks. This is protection with content: the beneficiary’s interest is a restriction on the supervisor’s decision, and paying his entitlement is work required of the administrator. But these two provisions do not, by themselves, identify who can demand an account or set in motion a review of a refusal to pay. Paragraph 24 establishes the priority of local law in case of a conflict relating to waqf programmes; reading the standard thus leads to the law of the country to complete the route.175

Nor is the route of claim to be inferred from the definition of ownership in the Waqf Core Principles. In their introduction they adopt binding force and the cessation of the founder’s ownership, then acknowledge the differences among the schools and mention limited duration, attributing its permissibility, in paragraph 29, to the Mālikīs, the Imāmīs and what is transmitted from Abū Yūsuf. The consensus (ijmāʿ) in paragraph 1 is attached to the legitimacy of waqf. In paragraph 27 they state that the beneficiary does not own the principal, while making him the holder of an entitlement that is paid to him. What their conception entails, then, is the protection of a benefit together with a restriction on dealing with the property, not an inference that there is no claim because the asset is not owned. This remains the document’s own choice; Chapter 2 has already set out the ruling on ownership by a determinate mawqūf ʿalayh in the Ḥanbalī case.176

The 2019 joint report of the World Bank, the International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) and the International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) adds another layer. In the Malaysian example it discusses the conflict of jurisdiction over waqf cases between the civil and sharia courts, and reports the civil courts’ argument for continuing to hear these cases: that the sharia courts do not have the power to grant the damages and court orders in question, and that these powers are vested in the civil High Court. For Singapore it presents mediation and inquiry for nāẓirs and trustees in dispute. These are two descriptions of the route of settlement and of its parties; they do not by themselves establish that the entitlement-holder has the same standing to bring a claim. Nor do they establish its absence if the language of complaint does not appear in the report. Mentioning the remedy, identifying who requests it and showing how he reaches it are connected rulings that need to be compared in a single place.177

Accordingly, the rules on questioning, accounting and litigation presented here add to the reading of the supervisory standard the identification of the act that the holder of the entitlement has the power to perform. The effect of this appears, for example, in a transfer of management: rejecting a harmful transfer protects him from a particular decision, but his continuing ability to rely on a judgement or to claim earlier income needs the rules on representation, on the effect of judgements and on claims that the Egyptian case revealed. We do not ask a supervisory standard to become a code of civil procedure; rather, we refuse to let conformity with it replace a statement of that law where the entitlement-holder’s right depends on it.

This is the outcome of the comparison, for which our paper “Maṣfūfat ʿanāṣir al-waqf wa-l-uṭur al-dawliyya” [The Matrix of Waqf Elements and International Frameworks] prepared the way: a standard that restricts the supervisor and a rule that gives the entitlement-holder a claim can complement each other without coinciding. If an institution’s file sets out the supervisor’s power but not the route of claim, the description of its protection remains incomplete. Its local law may complete it; in that case it is not sound to attribute the gap to its system merely because the international document is silent. As for a judgement that this connection improved the delivery of benefit, that needs facts about its use and their outcomes.178

Footnotes

  1. The Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959), the revised version from IndiaCode, sections 6(13) and 6(15), pp. 6–7, and section 59(1–2), pp. 54–55. The version consulted on 17 October 2026 is this copy: the latest amendment named in the copy’s notes is from 2013, and the date of the technical file does not establish that it was brought up to date to that point. This identifies the text of the comparison; no claim is made to have verified all amendments to the present day. ↩

  2. Charities Act 2011, c. 25, section 115(1–8), the text on the official legislation website as accessed on 5 September 2026, England and Wales. The section was read in full; the comparison is with this text, and no claim is made to have traced any later amendment of it. Source: the official legislation website. ↩

  3. General Authority for Awqaf, Lāʾiḥat al-muntajāt al-istithmāriyya al-waqfiyya (Umm al-Qurā [Official Gazette], 12 June 2026), arts. 1 and 31–32. The official text was relied on; the obligation to report and to coordinate does not establish that either was performed for a particular product. ↩

  4. International Working Group on Waqf Core Principles, Core Principles for Effective Waqf Operation and Supervision, para. 24, p. 4; para. 31, p. 5; and Core Principle 5, essential criterion 3, p. 26. The comparison is with the text of the standard, not with a claim that it is applied in a particular country. ↩

  5. International Working Group, Core Principles for Effective Waqf Operation and Supervision, introduction, paras. 1 and 5, pp. 1–2; and Sharīʿa considerations, paras. 27 and 29, p. 5. The reference in para. 1 is to AAOIFI Shari’ah Standard No. 33, 2/2, 2015 edition, p. 814. The consensus in the statement concerns the legitimacy of waqf; binding force and the cessation of ownership are a further ruling. This page is not to be carried over to the 2017 Arabic collection of the standards, in which the text appears on p. 823. ↩

  6. World Bank Group, International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) and International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA), Maximizing Social Impact Through Waqf Solutions, joint publication, May 2019, pp. 17 and 27. The first concerns the conflict of judicial jurisdiction in Malaysia; the second, the dispute-settlement committee in Singapore and the possibility for nāẓirs and trustees to choose mediation and then inquiry. What is taken from them is the dated report’s description; neither the current legislative position nor the entitlement-holder’s standing in each route is to be inferred from them. ↩

  7. Bandar, “Maṣfūfat ʿanāṣir al-waqf wa-l-uṭur al-dawliyya” [The Matrix of Waqf Elements and International Frameworks], 16 October 2026, cell 7c and the axis of entitlement, participation and protection, unpublished paper. The matrix separated procedure from standing, and stated that the rulings of its cells do not in themselves establish standing to claim. It is used here to attribute the earlier disaggregation, and the comparative rulings remain based on the texts identified above. ↩

8. The Cost of Visibility: When Protection Itself Is a Burden on the Use of the Benefit

We have used “the silent beneficiary” for a person who obtains the benefit without an intensive need to make himself visible, to disclose or to negotiate personally. This describes a way of enjoying the benefit; it is not a name for someone who has no right or who cannot speak. A right may be specified, and a way of paying it prepared for its holder that does not oblige him to claim it each time; and the door to reporting may be open while the cost of going through it remains high.179

The Egyptian case makes one form of this possible cost visible: the attempt to oblige the entitlement-holder to establish again what had already been established. The muftī’s answer denies that repetition was required in the case he considered, without relieving us of the need to know what else is required to obtain payment of the money. A specific contemporary question can be built on this: which document is it enough to submit once, which needs updating because the ground of entitlement has changed, and who bears the burden of producing what the apparatus already holds? This is a question about allocating the burden of proof, not a call to suspend it.

The cost of visibility includes time, knowledge and the possibility of exposing a sensitive personal situation. We do not measure it here, nor do we claim that every waqf reduces it. But leaving it out of the description of the route makes a multitude of channels misleading evidence that they are easy to use. If the person seeking the benefit needs knowledge he does not have in order to tell which body handles the complaint, or is passed back and forth between bodies each of which holds part of the evidence, the channels may exist while the relationship between them is where things break down.

Dealing with the problem has a countervailing price too: receiving unspecified requests may weigh on the waqf’s property, and undisciplined disclosure may harm the entitlement-holders’ privacy. The design of protection is therefore linked to the type of request: a general statement of the rules of entitlement, information specific to the person making the request, a detailed account for a qualified body, and a decision that gives the reason for a refusal and the route for reviewing it. These are options we propose to test, and we do not attribute them all to a single juristic text.

The connection of waqf with rules against the misuse of funds adds a question to the cost of visibility: who has the power to oblige the founder, the administration or the recipient to disclose, for what purpose, and to which body? Keeping a name confidential from the public differs from withholding it from a competent body, just as a statement establishing entitlement differs from a statement requested to verify a financial activity. These differences affect the system’s capacity to link resources to benefit, and the distribution of responsibility for protection among the administration, the supervisor and public bodies.

Core Principle 29 of the Waqf Core Principles directs the reporting of suspicious activities to the supervisor, and calls for controls that prevent the abuse of services and assess the risks of money laundering and the financing of terrorism.180 As for a particular institution’s obligation to report or disclose, its basis and scope are to be sought in the competent law; uniform duties for all awqāf are not to be derived from the principle alone.

What this requires in designing the system is that the basis for requesting information and the holder of the power to use it be identified, that disclosure to the competent body be separated from publication, and that the route for reviewing the request, or a restriction on dealings, be known where the law provides for it. Then what the procedure adds to protection, and the cost it imposes on the delivery of benefit, should be tested; the resources of a lawful service may be held up, or its delivery delayed, without any change in the stipulations of its waqf. These are decision questions that the book derives from distinguishing the power to request information from its purpose, not the details of a uniform obligation for all institutions. As for the adequacy of the measures or their actual effect on the use of the benefit, these are not established by the existence of the standard or by an abundance of data; they require evidence of implementation and of its outcome.

The distance between established rights and their delivery was the subject of criticism from within Arabic writing on waqf. In the editorial “Wizārat al-Awqāf al-jadīda” [The New Ministry of Awqāf] of 1943, Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Zayyāt criticised delays in cases, complaints and enforcement, and linked the hoped-for reform to simplifying procedure. We read this as a reformist position contemporary with the institution, not as statistics on entitlement-holders’ experiences nor as a judgement on all awqāf. It puts before us a question that the earlier debate knew, and prevents the mere observation that enforcement is slow from being presented as a new discovery.181

Footnotes

  1. Bandar, definition of “al-mustafīd al-ṣāmit” [the silent beneficiary], endorsed on 23 July 2026, unpublished. Only the specific definition is borrowed; a generalisation in the same place about the Western model of giving is not taken with it, and silence is not made a denial of the individual right. ↩

  2. International Working Group on Waqf Core Principles, Core Principles for Effective Waqf Operation and Supervision, 2018, Core Principle 29, pp. 51–52; especially essential criterion 3, on reporting to the supervisor, and criteria 1–2 and 4–6, on its powers and on the institutions’ controls. The digital text was checked; the evidence is a supervisory standard, not evidence that it has been adopted as law in a particular country. ↩

  3. Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Zayyāt, “Wizārat al-Awqāf al-jadīda” [The New Ministry of Awqāf], al-Risāla [The Message], no. 526, 2 August 1943, pp. 601–602. The digital text was read in full; its image was not checked, so his position is used in substance and no new wording is quoted from it. His rhetorical generalisations or figures are not taken as statistical evidence. ↩

9. The Rules and Characteristics of the Waqf System That the Chapter Reveals

Waqf works here through the dedication of benefit, and through rules that make this dedication known and open to reliance and review. Whoever describes its entitlement-holders without showing how they come to know and how they litigate describes part of its organisation. And whoever describes the nāẓir’s power without identifying the questioning, accounting or judgement that answers to it misses another part. The value the chapter gathers from the earlier studies lies in linking these rulings so as to know how they support one another, and where a gap remains between them.

In the chapter’s findings we therefore distinguish three levels. A rule is a specific ruling whose source, form and addressee we state; it may be a school ruling or a fatwā’s answer in a particular case, so we do not gather rules under a single historical law. A characteristic is a description of the way these rulings and relationships are ordered, which analysis derives from the evidence for them; waqf need not be unique in having it. Distinctiveness is a difference established when the same question is compared in waqf and in a named counterpart. Design proposals then come declared as what they are, and are not attributed to jurisprudence or to history.

The rule derived, within its limitsWhat it adds to the description of the systemBasis and scope
Protection of the trustworthy nāẓir’s appointment coexists with the right of the people of the waqf to question him and to request a copy of the waqf deedConfidence in the administrator does not confine knowledge to his hands; those connected with the waqf have a way to know the rule that governs his actionAl-Iqnāʿ with al-Buhūtī’s commentary, §3. Asking about what they need to know; no right of administration or comprehensive periodic account follows from it
Specified entitlement-holders may demand an account from the mutawallī in a dispute in which he claims to have paid out the yield and they deny receiving itAccounting links proof of payment to the claim of the holders of entitlement, and allows the administrator’s statement to be examined instead of resting on his positionAl-Damīrī and al-Subkī’s transmission, §4. The imam’s demand on behalf of unspecified persons is a matter of transmitted disagreement
In the case of the two nāẓiras, the judgement of entitlement against the two nāẓiras authorised to act alone makes it unnecessary to establish entitlement again against the first nāẓira, while the claim against her for the income she took remainsThe proper defendant for establishing the right differs from the person from whom payment of earlier money is claimed; the effect of representation in court must therefore be identified together with the responsibility of the person who received the moneyʿAbd al-Majīd Salīm’s fatwā, §§1 and 5. The judgement was issued after the two nāẓiras were joined; the fatwā does not establish that payment was made
The ruler may establish a dīwān to take the full accounts of awqāf property where there is a maṣlaḥaGeneral supervision can support the accounting of many awqāf; the organisation of protection is not confined within the administration of the single waqfAl-Buhūtī, §3. A ruling that such organisation is possible, not a report that the dīwān was set up or that awqāf were unified in a single apparatus

Two characteristics that bear on the reading of waqf emerge from these rules. The first is the distribution of the capacity to preserve the dedication among different centres: entitlement to the benefit, knowledge of its stipulations, administration of its property, setting the accounting in motion and deciding disputes do not do one job. Some of them may be combined in one person on a stated basis, just as they may be separated. Listing the persons therefore does not make up for setting out what each of them holds and how his action connects with the actions of others. A copy of the waqf deed is a clear example: through it, knowledge of the rule passes to the person whose interest it concerns, while administration stays in the nāẓir’s hands.

The second is the connection of the single waqf’s arrangement with bodies and rulings that support its work from outside. The waqf deed specifies stipulations and entitlements; jurisprudence regulates questioning and accounting; representation before the courts determines who may properly be sued and the effect of the judgement; and public authority (al-wilāya al-ʿāmma) may organise the accounting function at a wider level. This connection explains why describing waqf as a system needs more than an explanation of the document or of the nāẓir’s work. Yet gathering rulings from different sources and periods reveals organisational possibilities; it does not establish that they came together, implemented, in a single country. Nor does setting up the dīwān, by itself, give us a description of the financial relationships among awqāf or of all the institutions of their system.

The comparison in §7, for its part, reveals that the standing of the person making a request, permission to begin an action and review of the refusal of permission are functions that can be separated in other systems as well. It identified the difference in the route for reviewing a refusal between the Indian and English texts. But it does not establish that waqf is unique in distributing functions, in the survival of the judgement’s effect, or in public accounting. To establish a difference specific to waqf, a waqf case and a counterpart that performs the same function must be identified, and then the difference in power or restriction shown with its evidence. An abundance of links does not stand in for this comparison.

The findings lend themselves to institutional dialogue with bodies from different systems: the rule of entitlement is presented, together with the route to knowing it, the standing of whoever sets its review in motion, the body that decides, the effect of its decision and the route for following up the remedy. These are proposals for setting out the design of the system drawn from reading the evidence, not a claim that any single method among them is open to institutional adoption (tabannī, that is, choosing a waqf arrangement in a particular context, with a justification of what it adds and a comparison with the possible alternatives) in every country. Their practical testing begins with a case whose papers are complete: what was decided, what could be requested, and what reached the entitlement-holder?

In this way the chapter carries to the Dustūr rules for preserving the effect of the dedication, and characteristics for distributing the work among the entitlement-holder, the administration, the judiciary and general supervision. The next chapter moves to the limits of change: who has the power to modify the arrangement these rules protect, who assesses the ground for it, and how do its actions remain open to review?