Paper

Abstract

Paper 3

An institution’s relationship with the state is often understood along a single axis: greater state presence and bureaucratic intervention mean less independence, while removing dedicated property from state ownership increases that independence. This paper examines the validity of this single axis by comparing four legal and institutional arrangements: irṣād (public treasury allocation) and waqf (a legal-institutional arrangement in which property is dedicated to a designated purpose under a founder’s stipulations and managed by an administrator) as treated in Islamic jurisprudence; the private purpose foundation under the German Civil Code; and the Federal Foundation for Gender Equality (Bundesstiftung Gleichstellung), a federal foundation under public law established by statute. The study disaggregates institutional independence into seven powers: (creation of the legal person, ownership of property and funding, appointment of governing bodies, establishment and amendment of the purpose, supervision, dissolution, and determination of the destination of assets). It finds that ownership is a determining dimension but does not encompass the entire relationship. The state can create and fund a separate legal person, allow it the legal capacity to act, and simultaneously retain powers to appoint its governing bodies, supervise it, veto some of its decisions, dissolve it by statute and recover its property after dissolution. A public authority can also supervise a private foundation and dissolve it in certain circumstances without owning its principal. “Outside the state” therefore does not mean the absence of the state; supervision does not mean ownership; and independence cannot be measured by a single indicator. The jurisprudential distinction between irṣād and waqf retains its value because it distinguishes allocated public property from property removed from ownership, but it cannot alone provide a general theory of independence. The outcome is a practical tool: the institutional powers profile, which precludes describing an institution as “independent” or “governmental” before identifying the holder of each power.

Keywords: irṣād; waqf; institutional independence; public foundation; purpose institution; supervision; property ownership.

1. The Question: Where Does the Boundary of Independence Lie?

If the state establishes a school, research centre or charitable institution, is it part of the state because the state created and funded it? If property passes from the treasury to a separate legal person, has the institution left the state? If the ministry retains supervision of legality, does this protect the purpose or control it?

The previous version of this paper answered through a single criterion: “Who owns the principal?” It derived a general principle from the jurisprudential distinction between irṣād and waqf: retaining property in state ownership leaves the institution subject to the state’s decisions, while removing it from ownership gives the institution an independent existence. It then tested this principle against the private purpose foundation in Germany, identifying eight shared elements and two differences.

Peer review and re-examination showed that the conclusion exceeded the evidence. The table had conflated legal personality with ownership, binding force with perpetuity, supervision with the power of dissolution, and administrative recognition with a subsequent judicial ruling. It also generalised from a private foundation to the relationship between purpose institutions and the state, although the more consequential case for the claim was a foundation under public law or a permanent government allocation. As for the curve that attributed transformations of waqf to “the will to extend the state’s reach”, it measured neither capacity nor ideology nor the relative proportions of the instruments, and therefore cannot sustain a causal claim.

The question is therefore reformulated:

Is the independence of a purpose institution a single property determined by ownership of its assets, or the outcome of powers that can be distributed separately among the funder, owner, governing bodies, supervisor and legislature?

The paper’s thesis is:

Institutional independence is a bundle of powers, not a single status. Ownership determines some of these powers without necessarily entailing the others. An institution may therefore stand outside the treasury in its legal personality and property while remaining within the architecture of the state through the appointment of its governing bodies, amendment of its charter or dissolution. It may also be subject to state supervision without the state owning its principal.

2. The Contribution and Its Limits

The paper does not claim that jurists formulated a modern theory of legal personality or public governance. It reads their distinction between irṣād and waqf as a source for a problem that persists: the difference between allocating public property to a purpose and establishing separate property or a separate legal person through which that purpose is sustained.

Nor does it claim that the German public foundation is an exact counterpart of irṣād, or that the private foundation is an exact counterpart of waqf. The comparison is functional and concerns specified powers; it is neither historical nor civilisational.

The paper also does not investigate institutional performance, rulers’ motives or the extent of state intervention across the centuries. It excludes the historical curve presented in the previous version and the contemporary comparison between Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia: the body of sources contains no common measure that would permit them to be ranked.

Its contribution beyond the previous papers is specific. P102 examines constitutive capacity and the moment of recognition. The paper “Who Is Counted in the Official Estimate?” examines the construction of the statistical population. This paper examines the distribution of authority after an institution has come into existence: who appoints, who amends, who supervises, who dissolves, and to whom the property passes.

3. Method: From a Label to a Bundle of Powers

3.1 The Four Conceptual and Applied Cases

1- Irṣād in Islamic jurisprudence: an allocation of public treasury property to a public interest or recipient, with the principal remaining in the public domain. It is used here as an arrangement, not as an independent legal person.

2- Waqf under Islamic law: considered here in a valid, binding form in which the endowed principal has left the founder’s ownership, while explicitly acknowledging the disagreement within the Ḥanafī school over when binding force takes effect and ownership ceases. “Waqf” is therefore not presented as a single doctrinal position where the texts differ.

3- The German private purpose foundation: a legal person without members under civil law, created through an act of foundation and legally constrained administrative recognition, to which the dedicated property is transferred upon recognition.

4- The Federal Foundation for Gender Equality (Bundesstiftung Gleichstellung): a federal legal person under public law established by the Law of 18 May 2021 and brought into existence when it entered into force. It was selected because it is a named entity whose founding instrument encompasses powers over funding, governing bodies, supervision and dissolution, and because the earlier work had already adopted it as the public replacement case; no new comparator is invented here.

3.2 The Seven Fields of Institutional Power

FieldQuestion
CreationWho initially brings the legal personality or allocation into existence?
Property and fundingWho owns the principal, and who provides the institution’s ongoing funding?
Governing bodiesWho appoints and supervises the management?
Purpose and amendmentWhere is the purpose established, and who can change it?
SupervisionIs it supervision of legality or substantive direction, and in whose interest?
DissolutionWho can terminate the legal person or allocation, and under what conditions?
Destination of assetsTo whom do the assets pass upon termination?

These fields must not be reduced to a numerical total. Possessing the power of dissolution carries greater weight than requesting a report; annual funding is not equivalent to ownership of the principal; and a limited veto is not equivalent to day-to-day management.

3.3 The Falsifier

The thesis fails if the seven powers align perfectly with ownership across the four cases: wherever the funder owns the principal, it invariably controls the governing bodies, amendment, supervision, dissolution and destination of assets; wherever it does not own the principal, it controls none of them. The thesis also fails if it is established that the public foundation’s “separate legal personality” produces no independent legal capacity that has any effect.

4. The Jurisprudential Side: What the Distinction Establishes and What It Does Not

4.1 Irṣād: Allocating Public Property Without Claiming Its Removal from Ownership

The jurisprudential material underlying the previous paper states that “irṣād” draws on public treasury property and is instituted by the imām (ruler) or his deputy, unlike waqf, which may be instituted by the ruler or others. According to Ibn ʿĀbidīn, if the property belongs to the public treasury and the founder has not acquired full ownership of it, the arrangement is irṣād rather than a waqf in the strict sense. The allocation is restricted to those entitled to public property and to the public interest.

Three conclusions can safely be drawn: the source of the property is public; the initiator holds authority over public property; and the purpose is constrained by what is lawful in disposing of that property. This does not entail that the allocation can be withdrawn at any time without procedure, or that there is a single governing body. Nor does it entail that jurisprudence assigned irṣād a separate legal personality. These cells require their own textual evidence and cannot be filled through the general principle.

This yields the first correction to the previous version: retention of the principal in the public treasury indicates that its ownership has not passed to a private institution, but does not by itself answer every question about subsequent operational powers.

4.2 Waqf: Public Authority Does Not Have a Uniform Effect

The jurisprudential examination showed that the previous version had treated distinct acts as equivalent. For Abū Ḥanīfa, the judicial ruling occurs in a dispute after the legal act has been executed: the founder delivers the waqf to the mutawallī (waqf administrator), then seeks to revoke it because it is not binding; the two enter into a dispute, and the judge rules that it is binding. The ruling is therefore a subsequent judicial act, not prior administrative recognition. For Abū Yūsuf, the waqf becomes binding upon declaration; for Muḥammad, upon delivery to the mutawallī; and for the majority, upon declaration alone, provided the conditions are fulfilled.

The case addressed in the 1962 fatwā of Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyya (the Egyptian fatwā authority) establishes the distinction between three acts: registering the deed in court, delivering the property to the mutawallī, and a judicial ruling establishing binding force. Registration had already taken place in 1938, but for the Ḥanafī question at issue it did not make delivery or a judicial ruling unnecessary. The register here was evidentiary, not constitutive of the effect at issue in the dispute.

For Abū Ḥanīfa, a mosque is also exempted from the requirement of a judicial ruling through a public physical act: construction, demarcation, permission and prayer. This precludes treating “state intervention” as a uniform condition even within waqf itself.

In the case of a binding waqf removed from ownership, however, two principles central to this paper are established: the property passes beyond the founder’s power of disposal, and the governing bodies are bound by the stipulation governing the purpose within the limits of Islamic law. Yet judicial authority to reform the administration or amend what has become impossible to fulfil is not ownership of the property. Supervision and ownership are distinct powers.

4.3 What Cannot Be Attributed to Jurisprudence

The texts do not establish that waqf is “against the state”, or that all supervision diminishes its independence. Nor does the absence of legal personality in the modern sense mean the absence of an institutional arrangement. What is established is narrower: jurisprudence was able to distinguish property removed from ownership from an allocation remaining within public property, and to distinguish the judge’s jurisdiction from ownership of the property.

5. The German Private Foundation: Separation of Property Does Not Eliminate the Authority of Law

§80(1) of the German Civil Code defines a foundation as a legal person without members and provides for its creation through an act of foundation and recognition by the authority. Recognition is legally constrained: it must be granted when the legal conditions are met. Upon recognition, the founder’s right of revocation ends and the founder must transfer the dedicated property; the principal becomes separate from the property of others and bound to the purpose.

This structure shares important elements with a binding waqf: a legal person or patrimony through which the purpose continues beyond the founder, property no longer subject to withdrawal by the funder, and a continuing restriction to a specified purpose. Yet it does not place the foundation outside the public legal order. The authority verifies the conditions for creation; the laws of the constituent states provide for supervision of legality; and federal law permits amendment of the purpose or termination of the foundation under stringent conditions, including a threat to the public interest.

The most consequential correction arising from the comparison is that the power of dissolution is separate from ownership. The authority can terminate a legal person whose principal it does not own when the statutory grounds are met, and the property passes according to the charter or the fallback rule. The earlier principle is therefore untenable: “Whoever does not own the principal does not control continuity.” The correct proposition is that ownership may underpin an interest in continuity, but the law distributes the power to end it independently.

Nor can administrative recognition be treated as equivalent to a judicial ruling concerning a waqf. The former precedes the legal person’s existence; the latter is a subsequent judicial determination of binding force in the Ḥanafī case examined. The difference concerns the type of act, its timing and the effect of its absence.

6. The German Public Foundation: Separation Within the State

6.1 An Independent Legal Person Created by Statute

§1 of the law governing Bundesstiftung Gleichstellung provides for the creation of a federal foundation with legal capacity under public law, with creation occurring when the law enters into force. Its legal personality is thus legally separate from the ministry; the Directorate (Direktorium) represents the foundation in and out of court (§7); and the foundation may conduct its transactions and accept donations (§4(3)).

This separation does not, however, remove it from the architecture of the state. Its purpose is established by statute (§2). Its property consists of assets acquired by the Federation to fulfil that purpose, and it receives an annual allocation from the federal budget (§4(1–2)). This provision alone does not determine title to each asset, but the source of the property and its funding are indisputably public.

6.2 The Governing Bodies Are Neither a Simple Administrative Extension nor Private Bodies

The Foundation Council (Stiftungsrat) consists of ten members of parliament and the competent federal minister as chair (§6). The council supervises the Directorate and decides on the work programme, charter, budget, appointments, dismissals, litigation and acceptance of donations. The Directorate manages day-to-day affairs and represents the foundation; the council appoints it on the ministry’s proposal for a five-year term (§7).

There is therefore separate day-to-day management, but the principal powers over the governing bodies are distributed among parliament, the ministry and the council. Legal personality is insufficient to describe the foundation as unconditionally “independent”, while the minister’s chairmanship is insufficient to describe it as direct ministerial administration.

6.3 The Purpose Is Secured, but Through Public Rather Than Private Authority

§4(4) restricts the use of property, returns and revenues to the foundation’s purpose. The council adopts the charter and amendments to it by a two-thirds majority (§11), but the minister serving as chair has a reasoned veto over amendments to the charter, the budget and personnel matters (§6(4)). The purpose is therefore secured by a restriction, but the institutional holder of that restriction is not a deceased private founder: it is the law and active public bodies.

The foundation is subject to supervision of legality by the ministry (§14), to federal financial administration rules, and to audit by the Federal Court of Audit (§13). The term Rechtsaufsicht must not be converted into a power of substantive direction without textual authority. What is established is supervision of legality, alongside other specified powers over the governing bodies and budget.

6.4 Dissolution and the Destination of Assets Reveal the Boundary

The foundation may be dissolved only by statute, and the Federation is entitled to its property upon dissolution (§15). This combines two features that may appear contradictory: neither the ministry nor the foundation’s governing bodies can terminate it by a unilateral decision, but the legislature that created it retains the final decision, and the property returns to the Federation.

It therefore stands outside the ministry as a legal person capable of acting, and within the state in its creation, funding, governing bodies, supervision, dissolution and destination of assets. There is no contradiction here; the contradiction arises only if independence is treated as a single axis.

7. Comparison: Four Maps of Power

DimensionIrṣādBinding waqfPrivate purpose foundationFederal public foundation
CreationAllocation by the holder of authority over public propertyAct of the founder; the moment at which it becomes binding variesPrivate act + legally constrained administrative recognitionThe statute itself
PropertyRemains in the public domainPasses beyond the founder’s power of disposalTransfers to the private legal personIts source and funding are federal; title to each asset is not determined here
Governing bodiesNot specified in the current body of sourcesMutawallī, founder’s stipulations and judicial supervisionBodies provided for in the charter, subject to supervision under the lawParliamentary/ministerial council + Directorate
Amendment of purposeGoverned by authority over public property; details are not specifiedThe founder’s stipulation is constrained by Islamic law and feasibilityRules in the charter and the law, with intervention by the authority in exceptional circumstancesCouncil acting by a two-thirds majority, with a limited ministerial veto; the original purpose is established by statute
SupervisionGeneral authority over the propertyJudicial in the cases examinedSupervision of legality by the constituent stateMinisterial supervision of legality + federal financial audit
DissolutionNot specified by a separate ruleDoes not follow from ownership of the endowed principal; rules on substitution of waqf assets and termination varyBy the foundation itself with permission, or by the authority on statutory groundsBy statute only
Destination of assetsReturns to public property insofar as ownership has not left the public domainTo the stipulated recipient or as prescribed for a substituteTo the designated recipient or the statutory fallback recipientThe Federation is entitled to it by statute

The rows do not align along a single axis. The private foundation has greater separation in property, but the public authority retains supervision and an exceptional power of dissolution. The public foundation is an independent legal person in its transactions and day-to-day management, but the state has roles throughout its governing bodies, funding and dissolution. Waqf removes property from the founder’s control, but the judiciary does not disappear. Irṣād keeps property public, but the body of sources does not permit every subsequent decision to be attributed to the ruler without textual evidence.

8. Findings: From “Ownership” to an “Institutional Powers Profile”

8.1 Ownership Is Necessary in Its Own Domain, Not Determinative of Everything

Ownership distinguishes property that the funder can withdraw as owner (such as property allocated through irṣād and the assets of public foundations) from property that neither the funder nor the authority can withdraw under any circumstances because it has actually passed out of ownership (such as property dedicated to a binding waqf under Islamic law and the assets of a private purpose foundation). This is a real consequence of the jurisprudential distinction between irṣād and waqf. Yet it does not by itself determine who appoints the director, the criterion for amending the purpose or the holder of supervisory authority; nor does it determine the power of dissolution or the destination of assets.

8.2 Legal Personality Does Not Equal Political Independence

The public foundation establishes that a separate legal person may form part of the architecture of the state. Separation gives it a patrimony, legal capacity and governing bodies; it does not erase the sources of its creation, funding, appointments and supervision.

8.3 Supervision Does Not Equal Ownership

In waqf and the private foundation, a public authority can safeguard legality or the purpose without owning the principal. The converse is certainly true: the source of the property may be public without the ministry managing every day-to-day transaction.

8.4 Outside the State, Not Against It

An institution may leave the treasury or direct administration, or cease to be subject to withdrawal, without necessarily becoming an adversary of the state. True institutional independence is a distribution of powers that safeguards an autonomous sphere for the purpose, not a declaration of political rupture or overt confrontation with public authorities. This is the meaning of the title: being outside describes a structure of power, not a stance towards the state.

8.5 The Institutional Powers Profile

Before any institution is described as “governmental” or “independent”, seven fields must be completed:

1. Who created the legal person or allocation?

2. Who owns the principal, and who funds operations?

3. Who appoints and dismisses the governing bodies?

4. Who establishes and amends the purpose?

5. Who supervises, and what kind of supervision is exercised?

6. Who dissolves, and by what criterion?

7. To whom does the property pass?

The answers must not be combined into a numerical score unless the weight of each power has been demonstrated. The profile’s function is to prevent reductionism, not to produce a spuriously precise indicator.

9. Competing Explanations

9.1 “All This Amounts to Different Legal Names”

If the difference were merely verbal, the power of day-to-day management would not be separate from dissolution, ownership of property from supervision, or appointment from representation. The texts assign these powers to different bodies, so their separation is legal and consequential.

9.2 “Public Funding Makes an Institution Governmental, Whatever Its Form”

Recurrent funding creates dependence and justifies public supervision, but it does not answer who owns the existing property, who represents the legal person or who can act in its name. It is a highly significant dimension, not a comprehensive definition.

9.3 “Removal from Ownership Is True Independence; Everything Else Is Detail”

The private foundation refutes this simplification: the property has left the funder’s ownership, yet the public authority retains the power to dissolve the legal person on statutory grounds. The public foundation refutes it from the other direction: the source of the property is public, yet the legal person has legal capacity, management and representation. Ownership does not subsume the remaining powers.

9.4 “The Public Foundation Is a Marginal Case”

Bundesstiftung Gleichstellung is not used to generalise a conclusion to all public foundations, but as a falsifier of a general proposition. A single named legal case combining separate legal personality with public creation, funding and dissolution is sufficient to establish that independence does not align along a single axis.

10. Limits

First, jurisprudential rulings vary, and points of disagreement concerning validity, binding force and cessation of ownership have been specified. The waqf column does not represent a single school except where one is named.

Second, irṣād has not been examined exhaustively, either historically or in practice. The cells concerning its governing bodies, amendment of its purpose and dissolution remain unspecified where the source provides no account.

Third, §4(1) of the law governing the public foundation does not by itself establish title to each asset during the foundation’s existence. The source of the property has therefore been distinguished from the determination of ownership.

Fourth, the law governing the public foundation is a specific federal case, not representative of every German public foundation.

Fifth, the comparison concerns legal structures and does not measure performance, efficiency or the extent of actual independence from government.

Sixth, the texts of §§80, 82, 85 and 87 of the German Civil Code have been inspected through archived snapshots of the official portal, preserved with their hashes among this paper’s sources. The same applies to the law governing the federal foundation, inspected through a snapshot dated 2 December 2023. The remaining provisions carried over from the previous source bundle (§§81, 83–84) are cited on the authority of the identified legislative mirror sites; the official gazette has not been inspected.

Seventh, this paper no longer claims that waqf was historically the predominant instrument or that transformations of the modern state were caused by an ideology of extending state reach. Nor does its current material refute Kuran’s thesis or explanations based on colonialism or religiosity.

11. Conclusion

Jurisprudence identified a real distinction between an allocation that remains part of public treasury property and a waqf that passes beyond its owner’s power of disposal. Ownership determines the powers of revocation and withdrawal, and must not be obscured by a shared public purpose. But converting this distinction into a general theory that the owner of the principal controls the institution’s entire fate goes beyond the texts and the comparative evidence.

The two German foundations reveal why. In the private foundation, property leaves the founder’s ownership while the authority retains supervision and an exceptional power of dissolution. In the public foundation, the law creates a separate legal person capable of acting, while the Federation remains the source of funding and its institutions participate in the governing bodies, supervision, dissolution and destination of assets. It is not that one is unconditionally “independent” and the other “subordinate”; each has a different map of powers.

The outcome is not to substitute one measure for another, but to refuse to rely on any single measure. Do not ask whether an institution is inside or outside the state before asking: in respect of which power, in relation to whom, and on what authority? It then becomes clear that an institution can stand outside direct administration without being against the state, that state supervision may protect a purpose the state does not own, and that separate legal personality does not erase the public policy that created it.

This returns the series to its question: who draws the map? At this level, no single owner draws it; the founder, legislature, funder, council, ministry and judge all participate. A map that places them solely in the cell of “the state” loses sight of what it ought to reveal: the distribution of power within a single name.

Selected Sources

Ibn ʿĀbidīn, Radd al-muḥtār [The Reply of the Perplexed], passages identified in the P121 body of sources and jurisprudential phase 0-1.

Al-Khaṣṣāf, Aḥkām al-awqāf [Rulings Governing Awqāf], passages concerning the ownership requirement and the disposal of public treasury property.

Al-Mullā ʿAlī al-Qārī, Fatḥ bāb al-ʿināya bi-sharḥ al-Nuqāya [Opening the Door of Care through a Commentary on The Quintessence], p. 565, on the case of a judicial ruling establishing binding force.

Dār al-Iftāʾ al-Miṣriyya, fatwā by Aḥmad Harīdī, “Ṣiḥḥat al-waqf wa-luzūmuhu sharʿan” [The Validity and Binding Force of Waqf under Islamic Law], 7 May 1962.

German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), §§80–88, in the version in force since 1 July 2023.

Law Establishing the Federal Foundation for Gender Equality (Gesetz zur Errichtung der Bundesstiftung Gleichstellung) vom 18. Mai 2021 (BGBl. I S. 1139), especially §§1, 4, 6, 7, 11, 13–16; inspected through an archived snapshot of the official portal (2 December 2023), preserved with a hash.

Official archived snapshots of BGB §§80, 82, 85, 87, preserved with their hashes in 01-بحث-ومصادر/.

Public comparator dossier: خارج-الدولة-لا-ضدها/01-بحث-ومصادر/ملف-Bundesstiftung-Gleichstellung.md.