Paper

Abstract

Supplementary memorandum

A supplementary memorandum to P102 · Bandar — with the assistance of al-Warrāq

To determine who has the power to form an institution, it is not enough to identify the body that first performs the act producing legal effect. Legal personality may arise through an administrative decision where the applicant’s legal position obliges the administration to issue that decision. It may arise through registration, with refusal of registration then subject to fresh judicial consideration that may result in an order requiring the authority to grant the application. Or it may arise upon notification alone, with the administration subsequently objecting to an existing legal effect.

This memorandum compares three specific cases: (1) legally constrained recognition of a German purpose foundation, (2) formation of a charitable incorporated organisation (CIO) in England and Wales, and (3) subsequent objection to an Egyptian association under Law 149 of 2019. It concludes that two questions must be separated: who first produces legal effect, and who has the final say? The CIO case establishes an intermediate position between creation by private act alone and entitlement to an automatic administrative decision: the administrative act is constitutive, but the First-tier Tribunal (General Regulatory Chamber) considers the refusal afresh and can order the application to be granted, making registration mandatory and giving rise to legal personality. This does not establish an absolute right to have the application granted or direct judicial creation.

In Egypt, legal personality is established as arising upon notification before any subsequent administrative objection. The material examined, however, does not specify the court’s standard of review or its remedy; this gap is therefore stated openly rather than filled by inference.

1. Why a Memorandum Rather Than a New Paper?

P102 addressed distributed constitutive capacity and distinguished between creation without prior public authorisation and administrative recognition that must be granted once the conditions are met. The work on the series subsequently proposed a broad paper on “Modes of Creation”.

An inventory of earlier work showed that this would repeat P102, P143 and “Three Doors, Not One”: the modes — waqf (a legal-institutional arrangement in which property is dedicated to a designated purpose under a founder’s stipulations and managed by an administrator), entry in a register, recognition, notification and licensing — had already been analysed.

Only one wholly new distinction remained: the type of remedy available when formation of a CIO is refused. The Egyptian material stops at the right of challenge and does not specify the standard applied by the court or its powers, while the French material did not address the remedy for refusal of creation. A full paper is therefore not contrived from a single case, nor is new research launched to maintain the number of papers. The result is presented as a supplementary memorandum that corrects a concept in P102 and adds a specific case to it.

2. Three Questions, Not One

The following must be separated:

1. Timing of legal effect: when does legal personality or status arise?

2. Authority to refuse: are the grounds exhaustively specified, or does the authority have open-ended discretion?

3. Remedy: are the courts limited to annulment and remittal, do they consider entitlement afresh, or can they order legal effect to be produced?

None of these answers entails the others. A decision may be constitutive while the authority remains legally constrained; notification may produce legal effect while leaving scope for a subsequent objection; and an appeal may result in an order to grant the application without the judgement itself creating the legal person.

This brings into view two questions that earlier work had treated together:

Who first produces legal effect?

Who has the final say?

3. Germany: A Constitutive Administrative Act and Entitlement Subject to Conditions

Under the German Civil Code (BGB), a private purpose foundation does not come into existence through the founder’s act alone. §80(2) requires an act of foundation and recognition by the competent public authority. But §82 makes recognition mandatory once the conditions are met: Die Stiftung ist anzuerkennen, wenn ...

The administrative act is therefore constitutive of legal personality, but it is not a licence subject to open-ended discretion. This finding was already established in P102 and is not presented as a discovery of this memorandum. It serves to establish one side of the distinction: an institution may need a decision by a public authority in order to exist, while the applicant nonetheless has an entitlement to that decision, not merely a hope of receiving it.

Here, the courts examine whether the conditions are met, and an action is available to compel the legally constrained decision. Describing the administration as the body that performs the constitutive act therefore does not mean that it has an absolute final say.

4. CIO: Merits Review That May Result in an Order to Grant the Application

4.1 The Constitutive Act

The Charities Act 2011 calls this an application for a CIO to be constituted and registered. Section 208 specifies the grounds for refusal: refusal is mandatory if the organisation is not charitable or its constitution does not meet the requirements, and discretionary on the specified grounds relating to its name. If the application is granted, registration is mandatory under section 209. Section 210 provides that the CIO becomes a legal person by virtue of registration.

The Charity Commission (for England and Wales) therefore performs the initial act that gives rise to legal personality.

4.2 The Route of Review

The Act goes beyond external scrutiny of procedural error. Section 319 requires the Tribunal to consider the decision afresh and permits it to receive evidence that was not available to the Commission when it made its decision. Schedule 6 allows the Tribunal, where a formation application has been refused, to order the Commission to grant the application.

The legal sequence is as follows:

Application for formation and registration

↓

Refusal by the Commission

↓

Fresh judicial consideration

↓

Possible order to grant the application

↓

Mandatory registration

↓

Legal personality arising by virtue of registration

4.3 The Limited Finding

The Tribunal does not directly create the legal person. Nor does every applicant have a guaranteed right to have the application granted. Nor does fresh consideration mean that all elements of the Commission’s decision lose their relevance. What is established is narrower:

The administrative act is constitutive, but the final say does not rest with the Commission alone; the route of review may result in a binding order to grant the application, and once it is granted, registration is mandatory and legal personality follows.

This position lies between two others: it is weaker than creation by private act alone, which requires no decision by a public authority, and stronger than a challenge that can result only in annulment for a defect and remittal of the case, with the authority remaining free to refuse.

5. Egypt: Objection to an Existing Legal Effect

Under Law No. 149 of 2019 on Regulating the Exercise of Civil Work, an association acquires legal personality upon compliant notification alone. Article 9 permits the administrative authority, if it finds within the prescribed period that the association’s purposes involve prohibited activity or that the notification’s particulars and documents are incomplete, to lodge an objection before the competent court seeking a judgement dissolving the association, with the association retaining a right of challenge.

The function of this case is not to establish a new judicial remedy: the text examined does not sufficiently specify the court’s standard of review or the ultimate outcome of the proceedings. Its function concerns timing:

The administration does not refuse an application for legal personality that has yet to arise; it objects to legal personality that has arisen upon notification and asks the court to remove an existing legal effect.

This changes the initiator’s legal position. In Germany and in the CIO case, the applicant awaits the constitutive act of a public authority. In Egypt, an existing entity defends the legal effect already in place. But the fact that legal effect arises first does not allow us to infer the strength of the remedy; that requires a separate legal text, which has not been acquired.

6. Comparison

CaseWhen does legal effect arise?Role of the administrationReview and remedyFinding
German purpose foundationUpon recognitionA constitutive decision legally constrained by specified conditionsAn action to compel a legally constrained decisionEntitlement to a constitutive act of a public authority
CIOUpon registrationGrants or refuses the application on statutory groundsFresh consideration; an order to grant the application may be madeA remedial route that may lead to legal effect
Egyptian associationUpon compliant notification aloneSubsequent objection to an existing legal effectA route of challenge is established; its standard and ultimate remedy are not documented in the acquired materialsProtection of an existing legal effect; what follows is unspecified

The table does not establish a closed classification. “Creation by private act alone”, “entitlement to an act of a public authority”, “a route that may lead to legal effect” and “protection of an existing legal effect” are analytical distinctions along overlapping axes, not mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive types covering all systems.

7. The Strongest Objection

It may be argued that what the memorandum calls the “final say” is nothing more than an ordinary right of challenge, and that the administration retains the power of creation because it ultimately effects registration.

The answer is that the two descriptions do not conflict. The administration performs the initial act, but the strength of its position varies with the remedy. If the judge can only annul a decision for a procedural defect and remit the case, the substantive decision remains with the administration. But if the judge considers entitlement afresh and can order the administration to grant the application, it no longer determines the outcome alone. The difference lies not in the name of the challenge, but in its scope and effect.

8. Formation Decision Profile

The memorandum offers a concise tool to prevent the distinctions from being blurred again. Whenever a system is described as “creation upon notification”, “recognition” or “registration”, the following fields should be completed before a judgement is made:

FieldInformation required
Legal effectLegal personality, charitable status or special legal capacity?
TimingBefore, upon or after the authority’s decision?
Grounds for interventionRefusal of an application or objection to an existing legal effect?
Decision standardExhaustively specified conditions or open-ended discretion?
Standard of reviewFresh consideration or limited review of legality?
RemedyAnnulment, remittal, a mandatory order, an order to grant the application or removal of an existing legal effect?

The profile prevents two opposite errors. The first is to call every constitutive decision “discretionary licensing” simply because legal personality does not exist before it. The second is to call every notification “unrestricted creation”, even though the administration may have a short period in which to extinguish its legal effect. An empty cell also reveals the limits of the evidence: in the Egyptian case, what is missing is neither the provision on notification nor the grounds for objection, but the standard of review and the remedy. The research therefore need not begin again from the start.

9. Limits

• The memorandum does not revisit the modes of creation or the legal doctrine governing entry in a register and notification.

• It does not examine continuing supervision, amendment of purpose or dissolution after the formation period has expired.

• It does not generalise from the CIO to all charitable registration or every Commission decision.

• It does not fill the Egyptian gap with expectations about the administrative courts or courts of appeal.

• It does not use the French foundation case; the legal position on refusal of its creation and the remedy remain unresolved, and investigating them is unnecessary to the memorandum’s conclusion.

• It does not duplicate P102: the German case supplies a previously established benchmark; what is new is the account of the CIO’s remedial position and its connection to the timing of legal effect in Egypt.

10. Conclusion

The question “Who creates?” misleads us if we expect it to yield a single name. The private founder may take the initiative, the administration may perform the act that confers legal personality, and the court may issue the decision compelling the administration to confer it. Legal personality may also arise before the administration intervenes, so that the dispute concerns defence of an existing legal effect rather than an application for creation.

Every study of formation must therefore record three things separately: the timing of legal effect, the grounds for refusal or objection, and the type of remedy. The CIO establishes that a constitutive administrative decision does not mean that the administration has the final say; the Egyptian case establishes that the administration’s involvement does not necessarily precede the entity’s existence.

The finding added to P102 is limited and clear:

The actor that performs the constitutive act and the actor with the final say may differ. The strength of a formation applicant’s legal position is determined not by the name of the procedure but by the remedy available upon refusal.

Governing Sources

• The German Civil Code (BGB; Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), §§80–82, and the material on actions to compel an administrative decision acquired for P102.

• Charities Act 2011, ss. 207–210, 319, Schedule 6.

• Qānūn tanẓīm mumārasat al-ʿamal al-ahlī al-Miṣrī [Egyptian Law Regulating the Exercise of Civil Work], Law 149 of 2019, especially Articles 2 and 9, within the limits of the preserved text and the evidentiary record of the earlier work.

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