1. Dedication Is the Start of an Explanation; Reaching the Benefit Is Another Question
A building may remain endowed while medicine does not reach the patient, and its income (ghalla) may reach a person without that person being the one for whom the ṣadaqa (charitable dedication) was intended. A present benefit may require an expenditure that preserving the resource calls for deferring; and jurisprudence may permit giving that expenditure priority because deferring the repair does not threaten the resource, while an opportunity for pious charity (birr) is feared to be lost. These are questions that arise within the working of waqf and its rules. If a description of waqf stops at a founder, an asset, a designated use and a nāẓir, the relationships that make these names a working institution remain unexplained.
This chapter tests a specific claim: knowing the dedicated property and the benefiting side (al-jiha al-mawqūf ʿalayhā) is not enough to understand what is established for the recipient of the benefit and how it reaches him, because rules of expenditure and entitlement, and the work of providing the service, stand between the dedicated property and the entitlement-holder’s benefit. Some of these rules determine what may be claimed, and some of the work makes it possible to reach what is claimed. Specifying the relationship between them explains a point of failure that a count of endowed properties does not reveal, and a point of protection that does not appear in the question of their ownership alone.
We approach the question through three (3) main pieces of evidence of differing function, and link them with two reports on the conditions of service and its manner. The first is a juristic text that orders upkeep and pious charity where claims compete. The second is a summary of the waqf deed of the Qaymarī bīmāristān (hospital) that names expenditures, workers and designated uses. The third is a historical description of what took place inside the bīmāristān and of what it provided to those outside it. Jurisprudence shows the ruling on the case it treats; the reported waqf deed shows what was stipulated or arranged; and the report describes one side of the work. Linking these pieces of evidence enriches the explanation as long as the rank of each is preserved.
Our earlier works already distinguished between the waqf’s resource, its service and access to its benefit, and between the breadth of a category and the strength of its members’ rights. We build on that distinction here to read a juristic conflict and a historical event. The evidence therefore does not rest on a mere reference to those works, and their earlier question is not presented as a discovery of this chapter.102
Footnotes
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Bandar, “al-Waqf bi-waṣfihi tartīban muʾassasiyyan” [Waqf as an Institutional Arrangement], the section on the forms of resource and service; “Ḥīna ittasaʿat al-fiʾa wa-ḍāqa al-ḥaqq” [When the Class Widened and the Right Narrowed], sections 4–6; and “Man yaḥrusu al-mustafīd min al-muʾassasa?” [Who Guards the Beneficiary of the Institution?], sections 6 and 10. The reference here attributes the tools of analysis to the earlier works, not to replace the sources on which the chapter rests. They are unpublished papers. ↩
2. What Does the Disposition Consist of, and What Does It Need in Order to Operate?
Chapter 1 (§§1–2) set out the pillars (arkān) of creation in al-Zarqāʾ’s analysis,103 the definition “making the principal inalienable and devoting the benefit to charitable ends” (taḥbīs al-aṣl wa-tasbīl al-manfaʿa) with its recognised conditions,104 and distinguished the creation of the dedication from the establishment of the benefit for a specified person and from the legal effect of the disposition on the holders of rights.105 This is built upon here to understand the functions of operation; those functions are not counted as additional pillars, and the waqf’s ability to fulfil its purpose is not inferred from the validity of its creation alone.
When we move from the formation of the waqf to its working, the questions widen. Who leases the asset? Who receives the rent? What is repaired with it before it is distributed? Who establishes that he falls within the designated use? Who provides the service? These are not new pillars that we have added to al-Zarqāʾ’s division; they are relationships needed to explain a working form of waqf. Some of them may be dispensable in a particular form: a waqf of a house for residence does not always need an intermediary lease to produce income with which the housing service is then bought.
Three (3) levels of description must therefore be distinguished:
| Level | What must be specified | What it does not establish on its own |
|---|---|---|
| Creating the dedication | The founder, the property, the benefiting side, the formula, and the conditions of validity and legal effect | The resource’s ability to finance the purpose at all times |
| Rights of use and disposition | What is due, to whom, on what condition, and who has the power to administer and change it | That the entitlement was carried out or that the service was well provided |
| The work that realises the benefit | Maintaining the principal and exploiting it, meeting the expenditure, providing the service and making access possible | The validity of every disposition made, or the application of a single ruling to every waqf |
These levels prevent two opposite errors: supposing that the juristic definition is deficient because it does not list all the work of a hospital, and supposing that a valid definition makes it unnecessary to examine how the hospital is financed and how it serves. The two questions are connected, and each needs its own evidence.
Footnotes
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Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf [Rulings Governing Awqāf], pp. 37–39, especially para. 34 on p. 38. The passages were collated with images of the printed edition. Counting the pillars here describes al-Zarqāʾ’s own division. ↩
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Ibn Qudāma, al-Muqniʿ [The Satisfying], with al-Sharḥ al-kabīr [The Great Commentary] and al-Inṣāf [Fairness], vol. 16, p. 361. Restricting the definition by the conditions is a view of al-Zarkashī that al-Mardāwī reports. The quotation is from the digital text; the image of the printed edition was not examined here. The definition is given without reproducing all the vowel marks of the digital copy. ↩
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Al-Zarqāʾ, Aḥkām al-awqāf, pp. 38–39, and the note on p. 38 on acceptance and rejection. In it al-Zarqāʾ interprets texts to which he refers; not all the sources of the disagreement over acceptance by the mawqūf ʿalayh (the one for whom the waqf is made) were collated. ↩
3. The Benefit of the Asset, and the Income with Which a Benefit Is Bought
Nada Moumtaz presents two forms of endowed property: an asset whose use is itself the intended form of using the benefit, and an asset that produces revenue dedicated to that form of use. She lists the mosque, water, the library and the school under the first, and under the second, properties that finance the running and maintenance of those facilities. In examining the work of the nāẓir, she separates caring for the principal, exploiting it and distributing its revenues, and mentions in a note that its repair takes priority even if the founder did not stipulate it, citing Ḥanafī jurisprudence.106
These are not chronological stages that every waqf must pass through. Using water or housing does not always presuppose turning the asset into monetary income; and maintaining the revenue-producing resource and providing the service may take place together. What this chapter takes from Nada Moumtaz’s division is the identification of the tasks and the links between them, while keeping them distinct from an order imposed by a specific ruling. The priority of upkeep is a ruling that needs its text and its conditions, whereas listing care, exploitation and distribution is a classification of tasks.
The two forms may come together in a single institution: a facility used directly to treat patients, and lands, shops and the like whose yield produces what is spent on their treatment. A breakdown in the rental resource is then different from a breakdown in the treatment room, even if both end in a shortfall in service. Repairing the first is meant to preserve the capacity to finance; repairing the second may be among the conditions for providing the treatment itself. Identifying where the fault lies comes before choosing how to fix it.
Another question is added to the two preceding ways of using the benefit: is what is dedicated the substance (raqaba) of the asset or its owned usufruct? The two forms that Moumtaz presents concern the working of the endowed asset; in the dedication of the usufruct itself, by contrast, the object of dedication is different, as set out in Chapter 1. The endowed usufruct may go to direct use or to exploitation and leasing, depending on the frame of reference and the formula; the division by object of the waqf therefore does not coincide with the division by ways of using the benefit.107
In this form the system reads together the rights of the owner of the substance, the owner of the usufruct, the person in charge of the waqf and the entitlement-holder. It asks about enabling the use, bearing the maintenance according to its basis, and the effect of the asset’s breakdown, the transfer of its ownership or the end of the term on the dedicated usufruct and on the service obligations. These follow from analysing the relationship, and the text permitting the dedication of a usufruct does not on its own answer them all. The form widens the resources available to charitable work to include owned usufructs that can be dedicated, without this possibility alone indicating that service, savings or sustainability are actually achieved.
Hence the need to distinguish between the value of the endowed properties, the income collected, what remains of it after the expenditures given priority, and the benefit that actually arrives. The amount of benefit that actually arrives cannot be inferred from the value of the endowed properties alone. Revenue may rise without the service rising, if the cost of maintenance or of a necessary expenditure rises; and a service may be provided from an asset used directly without any separate cash revenue appearing for it. These are analytical consequences of the two ways of using the benefit, not economic quantities that we have drawn from accounts that were not opened.
This changes the way the phrase “for the entitlement-holders” is read. The presence of money in the nāẓir’s hands does not mean that all of it has become available for immediate distribution to them, just as deducting an expenditure for maintaining the principal does not make every deduction lawful. What is required is to identify the reason for the priority, its amount and the holder of authority over it, and then to distinguish it from what a person has actually become entitled to. That is the question that appears clearly in the chapter of jurisprudence on upkeep.
Footnotes
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Moumtaz, God’s Property, pp. 35–36, 74 and n. 15; DOI: 10.1525/luminos.100. The text extracted from the publisher’s copy was read; the collation of the images of these pages was not repeated here. For the division of the nāẓir’s work Moumtaz refers to Ibn Nujaym, al-Baḥr al-rāʾiq, 5/243–244, and for the priority of repair to al-ʿAynī, Ramz al-ḥaqāʾiq [The Symbol of Truths], 1/346; these are Moumtaz’s references, not sources that we claim to have opened here. ↩
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Shari’ah Standard No. 60, clause 2/4/12, p. 1397 in the printed pagination (p. 13 of the digital copy). The analysis here separates the object of dedication from the way the benefit is used; this distinction is not attributed in its entirety to Nada Moumtaz’s division of endowed properties. The questions of maintenance and of the succession of rights are the study’s inference, which needs an answer from the context’s frame of reference. ↩
4. Upkeep Comes First — but Which Upkeep, and Which Competing Claims?
This section tests the order between preserving the resource and spending its benefit, and what the harm of delay and the founder’s stipulation change in it. In al-Nasafī’s Kanz al-daqāʾiq [The Treasure of Subtleties]: “From its income, one begins with its upkeep, without any stipulation.” Under this rule, preserving that from which the benefit arises does not wait for the founder to provide for it. It is followed by the ruling on a house for residence: its upkeep falls on whoever has the right of residence; if he refuses or is unable, the ḥākim (judge) carries out the upkeep from its rent. The passage brings together the principle of priority and the different ways of bearing it according to the form of use.108
The first thing the rule adds to the description of waqf is that dedication restricts the distribution of the income itself. Its effect is not confined to preventing the transfer of the asset or naming the entitlement-holders; it enters into ordering what is taken from the income before it reaches them. The detailed ruling on residence raises another question: the person who uses the asset directly may bear its preservation; if he is unable, the way of providing for upkeep changes. Even so, the wording alone does not contain the details of the duration of this arrangement, its procedures and the rights of all the residents, so we do not fill its silence with a single assumed arrangement.
But stopping at the phrase “upkeep first” hides a detail in the juristic text itself. In al-Isʿāf [Assistance] there is the case of a waqf for pious charity and alms that has received income, needs repair, and faces an opportunity for pious charity that the mutawallī fears will be lost if he spends the income on upkeep. The text mentions ransoming captives and helping a stranded fighter, and then makes giving priority to one of the two uses depend on the harm expected from delay. If deferring the repairs (maramma) involves no evident harm from which the ruin of the waqf is feared, the income is spent on the pious-charity purpose and the repairs are deferred to the next income. If the delay would be harmful in that way, the income is spent on the repairs, and what is left over is spent on pious charity.109
The rest of the wording bears on the ruling. Al-Ṭarābulusī explains the pious-charity purpose here as giving the income in charity (taṣadduq) to a class of the poor, and excludes from this case the upkeep of a mosque or ribāṭ, in which transfer of ownership (tamlīk) is inconceivable, because giving in charity, on his explanation, requires someone qualified to receive it. Whoever carries over the preference between repair and pious charity while dropping this qualification widens the permission to spend to what the text did not permit. This exception is established in a specific Ḥanafī case, and does not on its own overturn every rule on giving priority to expenditure across the schools.
The trade-off here works through three (3) determinations taken together. (1) The designated use that needs to be hastened must fall within what the form of the waqf permits; (2) the loss of the pious-charity opportunity must be a matter of recognised fear in the case; and (3) the harm of deferring the repair must be assessed. It is not enough to call the purpose urgent, or to call the spending upkeep. The phrase “the next income” brings the expectation of a subsequent resource into the order of execution, without establishing that this resource will certainly materialise or meet every need.
In this way, preserving the resource and achieving pious charity become two terms in a detailed ruling. Durability, in this case, is not a name that halts every immediate benefit, nor is urgency permission to consume what the waqf rests on. Some repairs are deferred, and some pious charity is deferred, and the answer changes as what is feared from delay changes. The useful research question is how the harm was known, who assessed it and on what evidence; the text names the mutawallī as the one who fears the loss of the pious-charity opportunity, and does not on its own provide a complete system of building expertise or for reviewing that assessment.
Before describing this conflict, what is to be repaired must be identified, as set out in §3. Upkeep may be the repair of an asset that produces the yield, or it may be the repair of a room in which treatment cannot be given until it is repaired. In the second case, preserving the facility may be the very work that makes the present benefit possible. Maintenance is therefore not always set against service, nor are the two divided mechanically between future and present. The value of this inference is that the trade-off begins by stating what the deferred expenditure would put out of action, and then determines the ruling on giving it priority, rather than inferring priority from its name alone. It is an inference from the difference in the object of expenditure, not a ruling on the hospital that we attribute to al-Isʿāf.
There remains the difference between paying for present upkeep and withholding money for future upkeep. Ibn Nujaym’s base text, in Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir [The Eyes of Insight], presents the case of a house dedicated to a mosque, with the surplus (fāḍil) beyond its upkeep going to the poor; it then distinguishes between silence on giving upkeep priority every year and stipulating it. Where the deed is silent, upkeep is given priority when needed, and nothing is saved for it when there is no need. Where priority is stipulated, an amount is saved for it and the remainder is then distributed; but if the founder restricted the priority to times of need, nothing is saved for it when it is not needed. The reserve here is thus connected with the formula by which the income is dedicated, and does not draw its legitimacy from the name of upkeep alone.110
Assessing the amount is a question that comes after establishing the reason for withholding. Al-Ḥamawī objects that what upkeep will need in future cannot be precisely determined, and then refers the assessment of the amount earmarked to what the nāẓir judges most likely to be needed. Establishing the principle of the reserve does not fix a set proportion of revenue, and the authority to assess is restricted by the need for which the money is earmarked.111 Ijtihād may therefore be exercised over the amount that must be kept, even if keeping it at all is not left to choice.
The form of priority differs in a Ḥanbalī account that al-Inṣāf [Fairness] reports from al-Ḥārithī. If the founder stipulated beginning with upkeep, upkeep is given priority. If he stipulated giving priority to the benefiting side, his stipulation is acted upon unless it leads to the waqf falling into disuse; if it does, upkeep is given priority on the view that limiting the duration of a waqf is void, whereas on the view that it is valid the text holds that the benefiting side is given priority. It treats fixing a payment to that side every month as equivalent to stipulating priority for it, referring it to the same detailed account. It reports from Ibn Taymiyya that combining upkeep with the post-holders (arbāb al-waẓāʾif) as far as possible is preferable, and may be obligatory. The stipulation, the view taken on limited duration and the possibility of combining all enter into the ruling; the name of upkeep is therefore not enough to formulate a single supplementary rule for every waqf.112
In Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwā on the waqf of a madrasa, the dispute concerned how the cost of mats and of filling the cistern was to be divided between the jurists and the post-holders. He held it correct to give priority to those who receive payment for a known task, such as the imam and the muezzin, provided that what they take does not exceed the customary fee (juʿl al-mithl), and mentioned giving priority to the wages of the collector, the worker, the craftsman and the builder. He permitted directing the cost of the mats and the water to the amount set aside for upkeep, or to another source, where possible, provided that this did not contravene a stipulation valid under the sharia. The ground of the counter-value (ʿiwaḍ) and the work performed for it thus change the order of spending; one may not extract from this case the priority of every repair debt over every right that is due.113
The income policy, in the proposal that the Dustūr adopts, requires a statement of the reason for every amount withheld, the purpose it gives priority to, who assesses the need, what the assessment rests on and when it is reviewed. A restricted reserve is money held for a purpose, not a cost paid merely because it appears in the accounts. If an amount is deducted first and the remainder is then called the net income, the right to make the deduction is not established by this accounting. The power and the need must be identified before the net is defined; the balance is then divided between what awaits payment towards an established right, what has been earmarked for permitted upkeep, and what has been shown to be surplus. With these distinctions, the decision to withhold can itself be reviewed, and then its amount and the soundness of the administration of the withheld money.
It may be said that this is merely a juristic rule on ordering interests, and so needs no adding to Dustūr al-Waqf. The objection is right if the framework does nothing but rename it. Its value here appears in identifying which relationships changed: the amount available for distribution, the time of its payment, the limit of the power to give it priority, and the kind of beneficiary to whom it may be paid. This identification makes it possible to link the fatwā with the accounts of the designated use and with the dispute over delay, while jurisprudence remains the source of the ruling in the case, not raw material that the framework trades for a ruling of its own.
Footnotes
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Abū al-Barakāt ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad al-Nasafī, Kanz al-daqāʾiq [The Treasure of Subtleties], ed. Sāʾid Bakdāsh, first edition (Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmiyya and Dār al-Sirāj, 1432 AH / 2011), p. 403, Book of Waqf. The quotation is from a digital copy; the image of the printed edition was not examined. ↩
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Al-Ṭarābulusī, al-Isʿāf fī aḥkām al-awqāf [Assistance on the Rulings Governing Awqāf], pp. 58–59. The page and its continuation were collated with the two images of the printed edition. The ruling is presented in paraphrase while keeping the qualifications of evident harm, the pious-charity purpose and transfer of ownership; the text has not been made a description of every form of balancing maintenance against service. ↩
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Al-Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir [The Eyes of Insight], vol. 2, pp. 258–259. The distinction itself comes from Ibn Nujaym’s base text, which precedes the divider marking the commentary, and its context includes a report from al-Nawāzil [The Cases]; the original of al-Nawāzil was not opened independently. The distinction includes the qualification of stipulating priority for upkeep only in times of need. ↩
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Al-Ḥamawī, Ghamz ʿuyūn al-baṣāʾir, vol. 2, p. 258. The objection that the amount of future need cannot be precisely determined, and the referral of the amount earmarked to the nāẓir’s most likely judgement, are from al-Ḥamawī’s commentary at the foot of the page. ↩
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Al-Mardāwī, al-Inṣāf fī maʿrifat al-rājiḥ min al-khilāf [Fairness in Knowing the Preponderant View among Disagreements], in the combined edition identified in n. 3, vol. 16, p. 460. The digital text was read in full, and the image of the printed edition was not examined. Assigning a monthly payment is tied to the detail on the stipulation and to the view taken on limited duration, and no unqualified ruling on the priority of an upkeep debt is to be drawn from it. ↩
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Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, vol. 31, pp. 21–22, the digital copy relied on in the book. The answer to the madrasa fatwā was read in full, keeping apart the fatwā that follows it on p. 22; the image of the printed edition was not collated. The question concerns mats, water and post-holders, not the ranking of creditors in insolvency. ↩
5. Al-Qaymarī: Why Is Not Everyone Who Receives Money an Entitlement-Holder of the Ṣadaqa?
Aḥmad ʿĪsā reproduces from Khiṭaṭ al-Shām [The Topography of Syria] a summary of the form of the waqf of the Qaymarī bīmāristān. The summary mentions treatment, electuaries and potions, and the physician’s wage, and then orders heads of expenditure for the workers, the service and the subsequent designated uses. We rely here on the image of the printed page that was collated, while keeping the nature of the evidential basis in view: this is a report of a summary of a waqf deed; we have not seen its original deed (ḥujja), and we have no record of what the waqf actually paid.114
At this same level, the summary sets out some of the tasks for which the spending is made and the amounts of the wages. It assigns to a single physician seventy (70) dirhams and half a ghirāra (a sack used as a measure of grain) of wheat a month, mentions a smaller amount for those below him, and assigns a wage to the person in charge of upkeep together with his work as gatekeeper. It mentions a tenth of the produce (mughall) and of the waqf’s yield for the nāẓir. It then mentions sums paid for the cost of cooking pots, copperware, bedding, quilts and a pillow. Finally, it dedicates the surplus to ransoming captives, and then mentions the waqf’s reverting to the poor; the summary alone does not identify what brings this reversion about.115
We do not add these amounts up into a single budget. The report is a summary, and it contains descriptions and numbers that are not enough to identify everyone entitled to wages or to convert the quantities of wheat into a cash value. The details of the list of wages differ between ʿĪsā’s report on p. 244 and the third edition of Khiṭaṭ al-Shām, vol. 6, p. 158: the first has an item for the oculist (kaḥḥāl) and another for three (3) men that do not appear in the second, and the portion of wheat for provisions (ḥawāʾij) is a quarter of a ghirāra in the first and a sixth in the second.116 The aim is to analyse the functions that the text states explicitly, not to produce an arithmetical total that looks more precise than its sources.
| What the summary mentions | The function of the expenditure that the text allows us to identify | The question it adds to reading the waqf |
|---|---|---|
| The physician’s wage and the wheat that goes with it | Payment for medical work within the institution’s purpose | What work is owed for this salary, and what is the evidence that it was performed? |
| The person in charge of upkeep who “is to be gatekeeper” | Two tasks combined in one person, with a wage stated for him | Is a single wage enough to establish that both tasks were performed? |
| The nāẓir’s share of the produce and the yield | An expenditure linked in the summary to the nāẓir’s authority of administration | On what basis is it calculated, and how does it relate to his duties? |
| The cost of equipment, bedding and the like | Buying what the institution uses in its service | Is the amount paid the price of purchases, or the wage of the person who did the buying? |
| Treatment and medicines | A benefit intended for the patients | How do paying wages and buying equipment become treatment that is available? |
| Dedicating the surplus to ransoming captives, then mentioning the waqf’s reverting to the poor | A designated use for the surplus, and a phrase on the waqf’s reversion whose cause is unclear | How is the surplus established? And what event brings about the reversion mentioned? |
The rows are not equally detailed. The text establishes that upkeep and gatekeeping are combined in the person’s post, but does not establish that he was paid for each task on a separate account. Likewise, paying the cost of purchases to the person who handles the buying does not make those sums a salary for him. If every payment is turned into a single kind of “beneficiary’s right”, the difference is lost between the worker, the supplier, the person for whom the medical service is intended and the person for whom the subsequent designated use is intended.
The difference has an effect on claims and review. A question about the physician’s wage concerns entitlement to payment for work; a question about the cost of bedding concerns the purchase and delivery of a thing; and a question about a patient’s treatment concerns the service for which the institution was set up. More than one description may come together in a single person, but their coming together does not unify their grounds. This is an inference from the functions named in the summary; we do not claim by it that we hold a court case file that established all those rights and the conditions for hearing them.
“The surplus” in this text is a relationship between expenditures and designated uses, not a synonym for whatever remained in the treasury on a given day. Before ruling that it exists, one must know which obligations had fallen due, which expenditures had been given priority and what remained of the income. The summary does not explain all those details, but it rules out reading the subsequent designated use as a partner with a fixed proportion of the whole revenue. As for the phrase “and after that” at its end, we do not extract from it alone a complete system for when a designated use becomes impossible or those it is for die out.
Here, attention to the accounts adds to the juristic inquiry a question at the heart of the ruling: how is the qualifying description on which the payment depends established? If the ruling rests on the existence of a surplus, knowing the amount of income is no longer enough. If the expenditure is for two tasks, knowing the name of the person who received it is no longer enough. Accounting is thus connected with the subject matter of the ruling, while the soundness of its procedures and its historical forms still needs its own evidence.
The surplus has another form, different from the Qaymarī arrangement: turning it into a new principal. In Ibn Sumayṭ’s Mukhtaṣar Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj [Abridgement of The Gift to the Needy], in the ruling on a mosque that has not collapsed, the text says of whatever is left over from the income of what is endowed for its needs (maṣāliḥ): “real property is to be bought for it with that, and dedicated to it.” The text distinguishes between this money and what is endowed for its upkeep; the latter is saved if upkeep is expected soon, before the money is exposed to what is feared for it. When it rejects keeping cash for fear that it will be lost or taken, it mentions buying real property and bringing the designated use of its income close to the purpose of upkeep, according to need. Not keeping cash, then, does not necessarily equal distributing it to individuals.117
This detailed ruling establishes a form of growing the principal from the income while its dedication continues, and shows that buying the real property is followed by dedicating it to the mosque. The case carries no general permission to turn income due to individuals into investment, nor does it make every balance exceeding an immediate expenditure a surplus whose growth is permitted. Likewise, creating a new principal from income differs both from maintaining an existing principal and from the substitution of its asset; each act has its own subject matter and its own basis.
The income policy is therefore completed by a separate decision on whatever has been shown to be surplus: to which designated use does it pass, who has the power to decide how it is used, and is it to be paid out as benefit or used to buy a principal that remains dedicated to the purpose? The mere aim of enlarging the property does not settle this. In the accounts, the source of the increase in assets is shown, together with what dedication remains attached to them, so that a permitted purchase out of surplus is not confused with a sum withheld from the holders of an existing right. This is a detailed account of the decision to grow the surplus, not a uniform arrangement to be imposed regardless of the differing stipulations and designated uses of awqāf.
Footnotes
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ʿĪsā, Tārīkh al-bīmāristānāt [The History of Hospitals], pp. 244–245. Collated with the image of the printed edition. He gives it from Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, who says that he read the form of the waqf in a book on mosques and madrasas. The book in which Kurd ʿAlī says he read the waqf deed is not identified in the sources used, and we have not seen the original waqf deed. The chapter does not confuse the summary of the waqf deed with the building inscription or the waqf inscription. ↩
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ʿĪsā, Tārīkh al-bīmāristānāt, pp. 244–245. The physician’s amount is on p. 244, and the other expenditures specified here on p. 245. The wording of the wage covering both upkeep and gatekeeping does not establish a separate account for each task. Nor does the mention of the cost of purchases establish that these are wages for those to whom they are paid. The end of the summary states: “If anything is left over, it is spent on ransoming captives from the unbelievers, and after that it reverts as a waqf for the poor.” On collating this summary with the text of Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, Khiṭaṭ al-Shām [The Topography of Syria], third edition (Damascus: Maktabat al-Nūrī, 1403 AH / 1983), vol. 6, p. 158, in a digital copy whose pagination matches the printed edition but whose image was not examined: the two passages differ in the items and the portion referred to in the body, and it cannot yet be settled whether this is a difference of edition, an omission in the digital copy or a change by the person reporting it; the judgement concerns these two specific reports, not the establishment of the lost original of the waqf deed. ↩
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ʿĪsā, Tārīkh al-bīmāristānāt, pp. 244–245; and Kurd ʿAlī, Khiṭaṭ al-Shām, vol. 6, p. 158. ↩
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Ibn Sumayṭ, Mukhtaṣar Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj bi-sharḥ al-Minhāj [Abridgement of The Gift to the Needy in Explaining The Path], vol. 2, pp. 488–489, with the passage on buying real property and saving on p. 489. This is the abridgement that was read; the original Tuḥfat al-muḥtāj was not opened independently. The qualifications concerning the mosque’s needs, upkeep and the fear of cash being lost belong to the case of the mosque mentioned, and carry no general permission to withhold the rights of individuals. ↩
6. The Amount of a Right, the Ground of a Right and the Limits of Disposing of It
This section tests the difference between changing the amount of a right and touching the right itself, and between the right to information and the authority to administer. In setting out the ten (10) stipulations, Abū Zahra distinguishes between forms of changing entitlement, and states that he explains them on the basis of their being combined; if some of the stipulations are made alone, without the others, each is interpreted in its general sense, and if they are combined, each is confined to a limited sphere. In this context he says: “Increase and decrease concern the amount of the entitlement, not the entitlement itself.” The power to modify the amount in this case does not, by itself, give its holder the power to erase the entitlement-holder’s entitlement altogether. He also makes the founder’s increasing the share of a benefiting side conditional on his having stipulated that for himself. The account therefore yields no automatic permission for every nāẓir, nor a prohibition of all inclusion and exclusion in every form of waqf.118
On the same page he distinguishes between increasing a proportional share, which necessarily reduces other shares, and increasing a fixed salary drawn from the gross income, which may occur without reducing the other salaries. This adds to identifying the right-holder the identification of the basis on which the right is calculated. The effect of a change in revenue on a fixed sum differs from its effect on a proportional share, even if both are expressed by the one word “share” (naṣīb). This explains why it matters to keep, in the Qaymarī summary, the difference between the named monthly amounts and the share assigned out of the produce, without carrying the stipulations of Abū Zahra’s example over to that waqf deed or assuming the amount of its surplus.
This distinction helps in understanding the Qaymarī table, even though the table is not a direct application of that stipulation. Before describing the nāẓir as distributing the benefit “according to maṣlaḥa”, one must specify what he has the power to assess: does he designate the persons? Or change their amounts? Or choose the means of providing the service? Or carry out a named arrangement that he has no power to change? Combining these powers under the word “administration” widens them without evidence, just as assuming that none of them exists neglects what may have been delegated to him.
Likewise, the named benefiting side differs from the right of each individual within it. A text may specify a designated use and a category without fixing a set amount for each individual; or it may specify an amount and a condition for paying it. The mere breadth of a category does not establish that every right within it is weak, nor does the existence of a named sum establish that it can be collected without regard to its conditions and the resource from which it is paid. Working out those forms is a task that the study “Ḥīna ittasaʿat al-fiʾa wa-ḍāqa al-ḥaqq” [When the Class Widened and the Right Narrowed] has already partly carried out; what we need here is to keep ourselves from moving from the name of a category to a single ruling on the rights of its members.119
Protection of another kind appears in Kashshāf al-qināʿ [Unveiling the Mask], where al-Buhūtī gives the base text of al-Iqnāʿ [The Persuasion] and his commentary on it concerning the waqf’s people (ahl al-waqf) questioning the nāẓir about what they need to know of the affairs of their waqf, and claiming a copy of the waqf deed to serve as a document in their hands. This sits next to the bar on their objecting to the person the founder appointed, if he is trustworthy. The right to request information and the document in this passage therefore does not depend on the waqf’s people becoming the body that appoints or dismisses the nāẓir.120
This juxtaposition bears on how power within the waqf is interpreted: the limits of a person’s power over the administration do not establish the absence of every means of protecting his right. The converse is also true: establishing a right of access to information does not on its own establish an equal ability to enforce or to remedy obstruction. Each move from knowing the stipulation to objecting, and from objecting to a sanction, needs its own basis. These questions are more precise than contrasting a “strong beneficiary” with a “weak beneficiary” without specifying the right in question.
In comparative reading, we should ask about these same functions in the counterpart institution: for whom is a benefit specified? Who holds the information? Who reviews the disposition? We do not read into the juristic source that it set up a system of electoral representation, nor do we infer from the absence of such a system the absence of protection. In this way waqf can enter into dialogue with theories of the institution and of rights from its own details, without replacing a historical term with a contemporary one and then declaring the two identical.
Footnotes
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Abū Zahra, Muḥāḍarāt fī al-waqf, p. 159, para. 145 and what precedes it at the top of the page. The text was collated with the image of the printed edition. Before detailing the stipulations, Abū Zahra stated that he was speaking on the basis of their being combined, and this qualification has been kept in the body. ↩
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Bandar, “Ḥīna ittasaʿat al-fiʾa wa-ḍāqa al-ḥaqq”, sections 4–6. This attributes the earlier distinction in the analysis; the chapter’s juristic evidence rests on the sources specified in its notes. ↩
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Al-Buhūtī, Kashshāf al-qināʿ [Unveiling the Mask], Ministry of Justice edition, vol. 10, p. 76. What is between brackets in the source is the base text of al-Ḥajjāwī’s al-Iqnāʿ [The Persuasion], and the rest is al-Buhūtī’s commentary. The passage was read in the digital copy, and its wording as a whole has not been attributed to al-Buhūtī alone. ↩
7. Access to the Service: Time, Place and the Ability to Attend
Al-Qalāʾid al-jawhariyya [The Jewelled Necklaces] gives another description of the Qaymarī. It mentions places for male and female patients, a storeroom (ḥāṣil) for syrups, electuaries, eye-salves and the like, and a storeroom for distributing these to those outside the bīmāristān on Mondays and Thursdays. It then preserves a report of a change in this arrangement: “In our time it has come to be distributed there only on Thursdays, and every day to the patients in it, women and men.” At the end of the description it mentions a litter (miḥaffa) for carrying the weak, which was used in al-Ṣāliḥiyya.121
The passage begins with a reference to Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī, and in the text used the end of his words is not clear enough to settle who wrote the phrase “in our time”. We therefore attribute the report to the description preserved in Ibn Ṭūlūn’s book, and do not determine from it, with certainty, the time of the change or who stated it. But this uncertainty does not erase the difference the text states between the times of distribution outside the bīmāristān and its frequency for the patients staying in it.
The report adds to the waqf summary something that the salary lists were not enough to show. The benefit is distributed according to the pattern of service: residence and treatment inside the institution, and medicines for those who come from outside it. The report mentions the change in the times of dispensing to outpatients, and mentions daily dispensing to the resident patients at the time of the description; it does not show how often this internal dispensing took place before the change. Reducing the report to “the continuity of the bīmāristān” misses this difference, just as reducing it to “the decline of the waqf” goes beyond what it establishes, since it determines neither the reason for reducing the days of distribution nor its effect on the numbers or circumstances of the recipients of the benefit.
Even if a document provided for entitlement to medicine, that alone would not be enough to explain how it reaches a weak person who cannot attend. The description of the litter here establishes a service of carrying the weak in al-Ṣāliḥiyya, but it does not specify where they were carried to; we therefore do not treat it as conclusive evidence that patients were carried to the bīmāristān. The carrying service may form part of making treatment easier to reach, or it may be another benefit that the place provided; determining which needs another text. What the description establishes for now is that the service mentioned extended beyond wages and medicine to carrying the weak, not that it reached everyone in need or guaranteed each person’s individual right to it.
Three (3) questions thus come apart: (1) What service was organised? (2) What right was established for a person within it? (3) What was the actual ability to make use of it? The report answers part of the first, and does not on its own settle the second and the third. The lack of such settlement is not evidence that the right did not exist, or that treatment was a discretionary grant; it only identifies another source that is needed, such as an attested stipulation, a dispute or a register of beneficiaries.
This opens a precise link with the built environment, medicine and the organisation of work. The institution’s location determines the route to it, the arrangement of its facilities separates some of the ways it is used, and the timing of dispensing medicine determines how often it can be obtained. The therapeutic effect, moreover, is determined by knowledge and practice that we cannot extract from the title of physician or syrup-maker (sharābātī). Identifying these links is not testimony that quality was achieved; it identifies where to look for it, and which document we lack in order to measure it.
In linking this report with the question of expenditure, we do not attribute the reduction in medicine days to the priority given to upkeep; we have no evidence of such causation. What can be drawn from it is a question that can be researched: was the schedule a specific obligation or an arrangement that could lawfully be changed? Who permitted the change, why, and on whom did its effect fall? The reduction may have been a permissible disposition or it may have been a breach, and the mere survival of the building or the existence of a maintenance expenditure does not settle this. A ruling requires knowing the stipulation governing the service and the basis of the change, and then knowing what happened to the recipients of the benefit.
Describing access requires distinguishing the amount of a service from the number of those who benefit from it. Ömer L. Barkan discusses the distribution of bread at the İmâret of Fatih; in this context the İmâret is the charitable public kitchen. He points out that knowing the number of loaves does not on its own determine the number of people who ate; moving from the first number to the second depends on the method of distribution, the number of meals and differences in portions. He then estimates the number of recipients of the benefit at the İmâret of Bayezid in Edirne, drawing on an assumed weight for the loaf and on information contemporary with his writing about bread-making in Istanbul. This is an estimate with stated premises, not a count of persons recorded by the historical account-keeper.122 The observation also helps in reading the medicine service: the dispensing record may register the number of times the service was given, one person may return more than once, and the quantity allotted to one person may differ from that allotted to another. The total number of dispensings is therefore not to be called a number of beneficiaries without something that links the two. Nor does a fall in the total amount establish that each recipient’s portion fell by the same proportion; the number of those the service reached may have changed, or its distribution among them, or the number of times a person obtained it. These are possibilities meant to discipline the reasoning, not an established explanation of what took place at the Qaymarī. The distinction has a practical effect: if what is sought is to know what left the store, the dispensing record answers part of the question; if what is sought is to know who was deprived of a service or whose share was reduced, we need what links the dispensing to the person, the time and the specific obligation. The total service may continue while those who benefit from it change, and the total may fall without all the obligations having been breached. Tracking the money therefore does not replace tracking the distribution, and the regularity of the latter is not established merely by the consistency of the former.
The outcome of linking these sources is that the benefit, in the form of an institution that finances a service from its income, passes through tasks none of which takes the place of another. Dedicating the yield makes it possible to finance a wage, medicine and equipment; paying these expenditures does not on its own establish that the service arrived; and the arrival of medicine does not on its own establish that the treatment succeeded. The researcher can ask about each link with material suited to it, rather than treating the waqf deed as testimony to the outcomes, or treating the absence of accounts as a reason to neglect what its rules reveal about the design of the institution.
The Manner of the Benefit and Its Intended Qualities
A benefit is sometimes defined by a quality in its performance, which attaches to the funded work just as its amount and timing do. In the stipulations of the mosque of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Zakī Pasha, which al-Ghazzī reports, a stipend is assigned to a muezzin “with a beautiful voice”. The report establishes that an aesthetic quality was required in a particular post; it does not show how the voice was assessed, who made the choice or what the listeners received.123
In the stipulations of the Shaʿbāniyya there appears: “and that a lamp be lit in the ablution place (maṭhara) all night long”, together with mention of the water-channel keeper (qanawī) who conveys the water, and of the equipment for lighting and cleaning. These clauses are not to be read only as expenditures set side by side; they fix the time of lighting and some of the work and equipment needed to use the facility. This is a reading of the relationship between the clauses, not a report that the lamp was actually lit or that the water arrived regularly.124
The first piece of evidence contains an aesthetic quality of performance, and the second a time condition on work that serves the place. It would be a mistake to reduce them to the number of posts or the amount of spending. Nor is a beautiful voice the same as merely being audible; the aesthetic quality may have an intended value in the experience itself. The question of reading extends to the form of the place where that form is a recognised quality in its purpose or its stipulation, while the beauty of the building remains different from the soundness of the service it provides.
To know what follows from this, one identifies the basis of the quality, who undertook it, and what can count as evidence of its performance or of a breach of it. The mere stipulation of a quality does not establish an individual right of claim for every recipient of the benefit; that needs its own ruling and route of protection. But it shows why the performing arts, the study of place and technical expertise enter into reading the benefit: what is required in its manner, for whom it is performed, and who bears its cost? Our series al-Jamāl wa-l-ḥawāss [Beauty and the Senses] has already separated the beauty of the document from the soundness of the service it arranged; the chapter uses this difference to identify where the obligation lies, without presenting it again as new.
Nina Ergin’s study of sixteenth-century Istanbul mosques adds a question that the table of posts does not settle: the qualities of the benefit may themselves compete. The time for which sound continues to reverberate needs balancing: lengthened to strengthen the sound and its acoustic effect, and shortened so that speech remains intelligible. The researcher also asks about what the waqf deed does not specify: where the reciters were placed, whether they performed simultaneously or in turn, and the effect of this on hearing. As for explaining the enlargement of the Atik Valide Mosque by the improvement of its sound, she put this forward as a hypothesis that needs testing.125
This analysis links the history of architecture with the study of endowed work. Choosing a cheaper means, or a technical report content with an overall rating, does not settle which qualities of the benefit may be sacrificed. Designing the system requires identifying what the stipulation, the contract or the general rule made binding, and then what remains open to trade-off, and who holds that trade-off once a specialist has assessed the effect of the alternatives. An improvement in clarity may suit one purpose, while preserving the form of the place may be required by other evidence. The evidence does not lay down a general order between the two; it reveals that beauty, safety and ease of use are qualities each of which must be linked to its basis and to whoever holds the decision on it, before they are brought together under the name of quality.
Footnotes
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Muḥammad ibn Ṭūlūn al-Ṣāliḥī, al-Qalāʾid al-jawhariyya fī tārīkh al-Ṣāliḥiyya [The Jewelled Necklaces on the History of al-Ṣāliḥiyya], ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad Duhmān, second edition (Damascus: Arabic Language Academy, n.d.), pp. 347–348. The introduction to the second edition is dated 8 November 1980; we do not take its date, on its own, as an established date of publication for the edition. The two pages were collated with their images, with attention to where the quoted passage begins and ends. Whether the phrase “in our time” is Ibn ʿAbd al-Hādī’s or Ibn Ṭūlūn’s is unresolved. ↩
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Ömer L. Barkan, “Edirne ve Civarındaki Bazı İmâret Tesislerinin Yıllık Muhasebe Bilânçoları” [The Annual Statements of Account of Some İmâret Establishments in Edirne and Its Vicinity], Belgeler: Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi [Documents: Journal of Turkish Historical Documents], Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, vol. 1, no. 2, July 1964, pp. 235–377; the passage used is p. 245, the text and notes 13 and 14. At the top of the page he discusses the unevenness of the distribution of bread at the İmâret of Fatih, and then presents his estimate for the İmâret of Bayezid in Edirne. The image of the page was examined from the publisher’s copy held on file; the reasoning relies on Barkan’s discussion and his method of estimation, and no independent collation of the original manuscript account or of the waqf deed to which he referred is claimed. This distinction was worked out earlier in: Bandar, “al-Thiqa fī idārat al-waqf: li-man yakfī hādhā al-bayān?” [Confidence in Waqf Administration: For Whom Is This Statement Enough?], Series Thirteen, an unpublished series, second instalment, section 6; this is a reference to earlier work, and the evidence itself here is Barkan’s article. Publisher’s copy. ↩
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Al-Ghazzī, Nahr al-dhahab fī tārīkh Ḥalab [The River of Gold on the History of Aleppo], the section on the mosque of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Zakī Pasha, p. 245 according to the digital copy. The edition is the one identified in n. 18; the volume number of this passage has not been verified, so the passage is identified by section and page. This is a report of the waqf’s stipulations, not an examination of its original deed or of the outcome of the performance. And Bandar, al-Silsila al-tāsiʿa: al-Jamāl wa-l-ḥawāss [Series Nine: Beauty and the Senses], third version, “Jamāl al-ḥujja wa-jamāl mā rattabathu” [The Beauty of the Deed and the Beauty of What It Arranged], an unpublished series; a reference to earlier work on the analytical distinction, which does not stand in for al-Ghazzī’s evidence. ↩
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Al-Ghazzī, Nahr al-dhahab, the section on the Shaʿbāniyya madrasa, p. 117 according to the digital copy, in the edition identified in n. 18, the volume number unverified. The wording was collated with the full digital copy; the image of the printed edition was not examined. The page also contains the arrangement for repair wages that Chapter 5, §5, draws on, without counting it as a further independent piece of evidence that the clauses were carried out. ↩
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Nina Ergin, “The Soundscape of Sixteenth-Century Istanbul Mosques: Architecture and Qur’an Recital,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 67, no. 2 (June 2008): 204–221, especially pp. 206, 213–214 and 216–217. The reading is from the article held on file, with the passages collated against its extracted text; the account of reverberation and the intelligibility of speech is drawn from her presentation, not from a measurement made by this book. The hypothesis about the enlargement of the Atik Valide Mosque is stated as not fully tested. The article was used earlier in the series al-Jamāl wa-l-ḥawāss, and the analysis here links the trade-off between qualities to the body that holds the decision. ↩
8. What Does This Linking Add to the Dialogue Between Fields?
The jurist gains from separating cases that a single word may bring together: giving priority to an expenditure is not cancelling an entitlement; modifying the amount is not abolishing the entitlement itself; the price of purchases is not the wage of the person who carries out the purchase; and the right to information is not the authority to administer. Conversely, explaining the work needs economics and accounting to identify the resource, the expenditure and the obligation; institutional history to determine what was put into practice; and the study of place and service to understand access. Each discipline here answers a question that arises from a specific relationship in the evidence; the names of disciplines are not added around waqf for ornament.
The dialogue in the chapter’s material is specific: Moumtaz reads the work of the nāẓir in Ḥanafī jurisprudence, classifies it into care, exploitation and distribution, and states the priority of repair in her note. The text of al-Isʿāf adds detail on a case of competing claims in which stating the priority is not enough: is the ruin of the principal feared from delay, will the pious-charity opportunity be lost, and does the designated use extend to it? This completes the abridged picture, and does not establish that Moumtaz denied the exception or stated the rule without qualification in all circumstances.
From this dialogue a difference in the way knowledge is produced emerges. Classification gathers scattered tasks and makes it easier to compare them; the specifics of the detailed ruling identify the point at which the ruling changes; and the historical report adds what happened in the service without revealing on its own its legal or financial cause. The researcher needs all three (3) levels: a well-made classification does not dispense with examining the detailed ruling, and reporting the detailed ruling does not dispense with evidence that it was acted upon. In this way the historical and juristic study of waqf and the study of the institution meet on a question open to shared criticism.
The chapter’s contribution to this precedent is to distinguish between the grounds on which payments are received (qabḍ), to show what the ordering of expenditures can change in the amount available to the designated uses and its timing, and then to test the limits of what the historical report allows us to establish. These distinctions bring waqf into the dialogue as a party with substance. We do not claim that the ordering of expenditure itself changed the status of the physician or the patient, or that it caused the reported change in the medicine days; establishing that waqf differs from a specific counterpart requires matching case against case. Counting posts, or using the words “durability” and “public benefit”, is not enough to establish distinctiveness.
9. What Could a Body Working in Health or Development Adopt?
This case is not enough to recommend that an international body make waqf its preferred financing model. But it offers a usable method for examining a project dedicated to a long-term purpose. The examination begins from a specific service and a specific category, and then links the source of its financing to the order of its obligations, to who has the power to modify its amount or timing, and to the route by which it reaches the recipient. This is compared with direct financing, a fund or another institution addressing the same problem, according to their actual legal forms.
The proposal the chapter draws out is a statement linking the resource to the service and its rights, which the body attaches to the instrument of dedication and the operating plan. The statement specifies the property to be preserved, what is needed to maintain it and what expenditures fall due before the surplus is distributed, and then sets out the kind of benefit, who is included in it and what may be changed in its amount or conditions. It links this to the time and place of the service and the way to request it, and to whoever reviews the gap between what was assigned and what was carried out. This is a contemporary organisational proposal drawn from the analysis, not a document that we claim the Qaymarī used or whose form jurisprudence made obligatory.
If resources fall short, the statement helps to reveal what a single heading, “cutting spending”, conceals. The cut may fall on maintenance that can be deferred, on maintenance whose deferral threatens the principal, on a fixed amount that has become due to its holder, or on the number of service sessions whose basis permits changing them. These are situations whose rulings and effects differ. What is drawn from al-Isʿāf here is the need to set out precisely the form of the conflict and its conditions, not the mechanical application of its old ruling to every health facility or developmental designated use.
To show how it would be used, suppose a contemporary proposal to drop one weekly session for dispensing medicine at a charitable facility. We are not thereby reconstructing the reason for the change at the Qaymarī; this is an example designed from the question its report raised. The person reviewing the proposal records: the basis of the session and whether it is an obligation or an operating arrangement; the body that has the power to change it; the expenditure to be saved and what it will be spent on; and the recipients who may miss their medicine and the alternative way of serving them. If any one of these is not clear to the reviewer, the absence of its statement is not made good by a general description, “the maṣlaḥa of the waqf”. The point where data are lacking becomes known, and it becomes apparent whether the disagreement is over the validity of the disposition, the assessment of its benefit or the fairness of its effect. Whether the statement succeeds in improving the decision, however, needs an independent trial.
The examination may reveal that waqf does not suit the specific need: if the cost of keeping and administering the resource weakens the service more than its dedication protects it, or if its stipulations do not allow the change that the need requires. It may also reveal where waqf is suitable, if a stable resource can be preserved together with clear rights and the capacity to deliver the benefit. Deciding between the two possibilities needs data and comparison, and the size of the property held inalienable is not on its own the measure of success. This connects directly with our earlier study of the conditions of institutional adoption (tabannī, that is, choosing a waqf arrangement in a particular context, with a justification of what it adds and a comparison with the possible alternatives); it is not a repetition of its tests, nor an attribution of acceptance to a body that has not tested the proposal.126
The civilisational and social character of waqf appears here in a question that can be checked: what relationship does the dedication create between whoever owns the property, whoever works with it, whoever needs its benefit and whoever can review it? If this question is worked out with its data, waqf can enter the discussion of public service, fairness of access and financing between generations. The trade-off between the rights and interests of these parties remains a matter for argument, not a virtue established automatically by the name of waqf.
Footnotes
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Bandar, “Ḥujjat al-tabannī: mā yuḍīfuhu niẓām al-waqf ilā ʿamal al-barnāmaj al-inmāʾī” [The Case for Institutional Adoption: What the Waqf System Adds to the Work of the Development Programme], sections 6–7, fifth version, 17 October 2026, unpublished paper. From it are taken the precedent of starting from a specific need, comparing alternatives, and distinguishing between the suitability of waqf and the establishment of its distinctiveness. The organisational proposal in this chapter has not been put to an international body and has not been tested in the field. ↩
10. The Rules and Characteristics of the Waqf System That the Chapter Reveals
The dedication of property in waqf is linked to the order in which it is spent, to rights whose grounds differ, and to work that realises the intended benefit. This link is the chapter’s finding: knowing the principal and the designated use is not enough to explain how the institution works or the position of the recipient of the benefit within it. The benefit may be the use of the asset itself, such as housing and water, or it may be realised by spending the asset’s income on a service; we therefore do not assume that every waqf passes through leasing and collection and then the purchase of a benefit. The definition “making the principal inalienable and devoting the benefit to charitable ends” identifies the two ends of the relationship, and its forms need their own conditions and rulings (§§2–3, nn. 104 and 106).
From the evidence we draw five (5) rules, each with a scope that governs how it applies to waqf:
1. The upkeep of the waqf enters into the ordering of its income even if the founder did not stipulate it, in the Ḥanafī text presented. The rule of Kanz al-daqāʾiq identifies an expenditure that takes priority over distribution, and rules out treating all the income as available to the entitlement-holders as soon as it is received. In the case of a house for residence, upkeep falls on the person with the right of residence; if he refuses or is unable, the ḥākim carries out the upkeep from its rent. The way the expenditure is borne differs with the form of use; we do not extract from the wording alone the details of the procedures of this arrangement or its duration (§4, n. 108). §4 completes this ruling with a Ḥanbalī account that al-Inṣāf reports from al-Ḥārithī on the stipulation and limited duration, and with Ibn Taymiyya’s words on post-holders and the effect of work; the Ḥanafī case therefore does not represent all the rulings on priority.
2. In the case of competing claims that al-Isʿāf sets out, the priority of upkeep is restricted by the harm of deferring it and by the fear of losing the pious-charity opportunity. If no evident harm from which the ruin of the waqf is feared is expected from deferring the repairs, the income is spent on the pious-charity purpose mentioned and the repairs are deferred to the next income; otherwise the repairs are given priority and the surplus is spent on pious charity. The designated use here is restricted by the text’s explanation of giving in charity and transfer of ownership, and is not to be generalised to every charitable construction or repair. Whether delay is possible thus enters into the ruling (§4, n. 109). To this ruling is added the chapter’s inference from the difference in what is being repaired: repairing the facility may be a condition for the present service itself.
3. The power to change the amount of an entitlement is not equal to the power to cancel the entitlement itself, in the case of combined stipulations that Abū Zahra explains. The founder’s power to increase the share of a benefiting side requires that he have stipulated it for himself; it is therefore not established for the nāẓir by virtue of his authority alone. Changing a proportional share likewise differs from changing a fixed salary drawn from the gross income. This text governs the kind of power and the basis on which the right is calculated, without making the stipulations of that case part of the Qaymarī waqf deed or barring all inclusion and exclusion elsewhere (§6, n. 118).
4. Upholding the founder’s appointment of a trustworthy nāẓir goes together with the right of the waqf’s people to question him and to request a copy of the waqf deed, in the text of al-Iqnāʿ with al-Buhūtī’s commentary. Knowing the entitlement does not entail holding the administration of the waqf. This is a link between stating the right and protecting it; accounting, litigation and the effect of a judgement are set out in the chapter on protection, and enforcement is not established by the mere right to information (§6, n. 120).
5. A stipulation may regulate the quality of performance and the timing of some of the service’s tasks. The report on the mosque of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Zakī Pasha requires a beautiful voice in the muezzin, and the report on the Shaʿbāniyya fixes the lighting of the ablution place all night long. This adds to the question of whether the service exists the question of its manner and of the timing of some of its tasks; it does not on its own establish that the worker performed, the body that evaluates him, or the standing of each recipient of the benefit to bring a claim (§7, nn. 123–124).
A basic characteristic emerges from these rules: the ordering of income is part of the organisation of rights, while delivering the benefit still requires work. A payment may be a wage for work, the price of purchases, an expenditure on treatment, or a payment to a designated use that depends on the existence of a surplus. Its coming out of the waqf’s property does not unify its ground or the conditions of entitlement to it. The Qaymarī summary reported by ʿĪsā contains examples of these differences; but it is a summary of a waqf deed, not an inscription or an account of implementation. It establishes a reported arrangement within its limits, and does not establish that the financing was sufficient or that all the obligations were met (§5, nn. 114–115).
A second characteristic appears in the link between preserving the resource and achieving the benefit, without the two being identical. The survival of the principal does not establish the stability of the service, and spending on the service does not establish that it arrived or its therapeutic effect. The report of the reduction in the days of distributing medicine to outpatients, in the description preserved in al-Qalāʾid, shows a change in one aspect of the service; it does not determine its cause, each recipient’s right in it, or the lawfulness of the change. Preserving the resource is therefore not to be read as a standing permission to defer the benefit, nor is describing the waqf as perpetual to be read as a guarantee that every service will continue; the rule of perpetuity itself was not the subject of this chapter (§§4 and 7).
These are characteristics of the working of waqf as the cases revealed it, not a claim that it is unique in having them. The source-based dialogue with Moumtaz in §8 sets her classification of the nāẓir’s work against the specifics of the juristic detailed ruling and the historical report; it is a dialogue between readings of waqf, not a test between two systems. No superiority over a trust or a purpose institution has been established here, just as the relationships between multiple awqāf have not been established. Identifying the comparative difference requires a specified counterpart, a corresponding claim or service, and evidence from both sides.
The chapter therefore brings to the Dustūr an account of four (4) relationships: preserving the resource, ordering expenditure, identifying rights, and the work that delivers the benefit with its recognised qualities. Bringing them together in a contemporary statement of the resource and the service, as §9 proposed, is a proposed tool, not a historical rule. Its value is that, when resources fall short, it shows what may be deferred, what has become due to its holder and who has the power to change things; the chapter on decision then follows, to identify the holder of this authority and the expertise needed to exercise it.