Paper

Abstract

The fourth paper in the programme “The Architecture of Charitable Benefit Production”

Research question: How did Egyptian philanthropists arrange their charitable giving among the waqf (a legal-institutional arrangement in which property is dedicated to a designated purpose under a founder’s stipulations and managed by an administrator), the association, the gift and the public body? What changed in that arrangement when some vehicles became more restricted or their legal and administrative costs shifted?

Methodological design: The paper redefines the unit of analysis from “choosing a single vehicle” to “the decision to structure charitable giving institutionally”, distinguishing between the available repertoire, the active portfolio within a specified period, the institutional architecture linking more than one vehicle within a single project, and the sequential trajectory across the philanthropist’s life. The arrangement decision is explained through a layered model comprising: (1) legal opportunities, (2) the vehicle’s functional fit, (3) governance and succession, and (4) legitimation and networks.

Data and cases: The study employs a comparative case methodology grounded in contemporary sources. It includes individual portfolios before 1946, trajectories of founding and administrative regulation between 1953 and 1971, and an analytic probe after 1973. The sample is not treated as statistically representative of all philanthropists, and counts of memberships or offices are not used as substitutes for resource-transfer decisions. This limitation remains unresolved: the negative cases needed to test it are still being assembled, including philanthropists with the means to create a vehicle who did not do so in the same period, and awqāf (the plural of waqf) created after 1946 that were not included in the sample.

The qualified finding: The evidence does not support a narrative of comprehensive linear substitution of the association for the waqf. Before 1946, charitable portfolios combined vehicles according to differing functions: the long-term real-property asset was more closely associated with the waqf, flexible collective operation with the association, and the completed construction project with public handover. After 1953, private giving did not disappear, but the type of decision visible to the administration changed. The comparison does not suffice to attribute this change to time, since the post-1953 sample differs from its predecessor in the social stratum of its actors, the type of resources and the source regime. The 1980 case remains a single indication, not proof of a general pattern.

Theoretical contribution: The study offers the “philanthropist’s portfolio” as a tool for analysing charitable work as a distribution of ownership, time, control and risk. It shifts the research question from “Which form rose?” to “Which function did the actor assign to each form, and how did the state reprice the alternatives?”

Keywords: philanthropist’s portfolio; waqf; private association; institutional arrangement of giving; functional assignment; institutional hybridity; Egypt.

1 · Introduction: From the List of Associations to the Arrangement Decision

When Prince ʿUmar Ṭūsūn died in 1944, his contemporary biographer needed a full chapter to enumerate the associations and bodies he had helped to establish, then further chapters for his recurrent gifts, bonds earmarked for schools, subscriptions and awqāf. Four decades earlier, Aḥmad al-Minshāwī Pasha had brought together, around the purpose of education, an Azharī waqf, a waqf for an industrial school, a waqf upon a private association, and land assigned to the University project.

Neither scene depicts an actor who “chose the waqf” or “moved to the association” in a single, decisive, once-and-for-all act. Rather, each embodies a series of decisions linking the type of physical asset, the time-horizon of the benefit, the degree of control and the operating body through a particular legal and organisational arrangement.12

The paper asks: how did Egyptian philanthropists arrange their charity among the available vehicles? What changed when the Egyptian state reorganised the waqf, associations and public services? It is not assumed from the outset that the “waqf” and the “association” are complete substitutes, that every membership in an association constitutes a donation and a financial allocation, or that assembling an entire lifetime’s works reveals a simultaneous portfolio. Methodologically, the task is to reconstruct the operational decision itself: which resource was transferred? To which institutional holder? For what duration? With what rights of amendment and review? Was a vehicle created, an existing intermediary funded, or an asset handed over to a public body?

The central thesis: the transformation in Egypt did not take the form of “linear substitution of a modern vehicle for the waqf”, but of “repricing and reorganising the institutional repertoire”. Actors continued to distribute different functions across different arrangements; yet legal constraints, the expansion of the service-providing state and tighter bureaucratic supervision of associations changed who could create a vehicle in the first place, who administered it, and what remained under the philanthropist’s control.

The methodological qualification: this conceptual formulation keeps the strongest competing explanations in view. The association may have been chosen because of the collective nature of the service, rather than aversion to the waqf; handover to the state may have extended an earlier pattern rather than marked surrender after 1952; and later cases may reflect founders’ professional backgrounds or weak sources more than a shift in society’s preferences for private forms of organisation. The finding is therefore built not from counts of forms, but from within-case comparisons, chronological ordering and examination of cases that do not fit the thesis.

This paper follows three studies that examined the transformation from the perspectives of money and apparatus, then knowledge and accounting, then the authority to define purpose. It shifts the point of observation and measurement to the “charitable actor”: how do they act when the properties of the vehicles across which they distributed their financial giving change? It thus differs from a history of the waqf alone or of associations alone: its central subject is the decision that falls between them.3

Footnotes

  1. Qilīnī Fahmī, Al-Amīr ʿUmar Ṭūsūn: Ḥayātuh — Āthāruh — Aʿmāluh [Prince ʿUmar Ṭūsūn: His Life — His Legacy — His Works] (Cairo: c. 1944; Hindawi Foundation edition), chapters “Hibātuh al-Insāniyya wa-Mabarrātuh” [His Humanitarian Gifts and Benefactions] and “Al-Jamʿiyyāt allatī Yashtarik fīhā” [The Associations in Which He Participates]; and Zakī Fahmī, Ṣafwat al-ʿAṣr fī Tārīkh wa-Rusūm Mashāhīr Rijāl Miṣr [The Elite of the Age: Biographies and Portraits of Egypt’s Famous Men] (Cairo, 1926), the section on princes of the royal family. ↩

  2. The documents of Aḥmad al-Minshāwī in al-Manār [The Lighthouse], volume six (1903–1905), especially Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā’s biographical notice, pp. 833–839; see also Ibrāhīm al-Bayyūmī Ghānim, Al-Awqāf wa-l-siyāsa fī Miṣr [Awqāf and Politics in Egypt], and the material recorded in al-Kharāfī’s Muʿjam Tarājim Aʿlām al-Waqf [Biographical Dictionary of Notable Figures of the Waqf]. ↩

  3. Lisa Pollard, “Egyptian by Association: Charitable States and Service Societies, circa 1850–1945,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 46, no. 2 (2014): 239–257, doi:10.1017/S0020743814000099; Shaimaa Esmail El-Neklawy and Esther Möller, “Between Traditions of Aid and Political Ambitions,” Endowment Studies 6 (2022): 192–220. ↩

2 · From Vehicle to Architecture: Concepts and the Paper’s Place in the Literature

2.1 Three Concepts and Two Operational Descriptions That Prevent Analytical Conflation

The paper avoids using “portfolio” as a loose metaphor. The term denotes neither everything a philanthropist did in their lifetime nor merely the number of associations and bodies to which they belonged. It forms part of a conceptual apparatus with three central concepts corresponding to the three levels of analysis in section 3.1: the institutional repertoire (environment), the arrangement decision (decision), and the active portfolio (portfolio). These are followed by two operational descriptions: institutional architecture, for linking decisions within a single project, and philanthropic trajectory, for their succession across an actor’s life. The four types of decision (section 2.2) are subdivisions of the “arrangement decision”, not parallel concepts. The five units are as follows:

  1. Institutional repertoire: the set of forms and arrangements that law, custom and the state make available in a given period. It represents the field of “organisational possibility” before the actor, not their actual choices.

  2. Arrangement decision: a documented act allocating a resource, governance authority or a temporal commitment to an institutional arrangement. It does not include membership or symbolic office without a resource or commitment.

  3. Active portfolio: the set of simultaneous or overlapping institutional commitments within a specified time window, not an entire biographical record assembled into a single list.

  4. Institutional architecture: the linking of more than one vehicle or body within a single charitable project (such as a waqf upon an association, or private construction with public operation), not merely unconnected plurality.

  5. Philanthropic trajectory: the succession and transformation of an actor’s decisions across stages of life and changes in the environment, without assuming that their preferences or vehicles remain fixed.

2.2 Four Types of Decision

Not every act of giving is a “choice of vehicle” in the same sense. The unit of analysis—the decision to structure charitable giving institutionally—is therefore divided into four distinct types:

– Creating a vehicle: founding a waqf, an association or a foundation, and defining its governance rules and resources.

– Assigning a resource: allocating an asset or yield to an existing body, such as dedicating a property as a waqf upon an association or a school.

– Funding an intermediary: a gift, subscription or recurrent commitment to an existing organisation, without creating a new vehicle.

– Institutional transfer: building an asset or a service and then handing it over to a public body, or the passage of a private institution into state administration.

Chairmanship, membership and voluntary work are recorded in the “participation and governance network”, and count as elements of the portfolio only when coupled with the transfer of a material resource, a recurrent commitment or a binding responsibility. This restriction prevents the inflation of Ṭūsūn’s portfolio merely because his name appears on many lists, or the equation of a social office with a large real-property waqf.

2.3 The Literature: From Legal Form to the Actor’s Repertoire

The paper engages with four bodies of literature:

  • First, studies of “organisational repertoires”, which explain how actors use available forms and recombine them rather than inventing institutions from nothing each time. From these, the paper borrows the idea that the environment does not impose a single choice, but distributes the costs and legitimacy of forms.4

  • Second, the economics of nonprofit organisations and strategies of giving, in which legal form is read as an instrument for calibrating trust, control and time, not as a neutral wrapper.5

  • Third, studies of institutional hybridity, which matter for cases combining a perpetual waqf with associational administration, or private funding with public operation. They nevertheless warn against calling every mixture “hybridity” before establishing that two logics interlock in governance, resources and accountability.6

  • Fourth, studies of institutional response. Hirschman’s triad (exit, voice, loyalty) serves as an auxiliary lens, with the addition of “recombination”: a charitable actor may neither leave a form nor remain within it unchanged, but link it to another vehicle.7

Studies of “donor intent” and authority over charitable assets add a complementary question: which arrangement protects the purpose after the philanthropist’s death, and which permits its amendment?8 The history of the waqf and associations in Egypt has documented the early interpenetration of awqāf, associations and public service, and the state’s growing capacity to define and supervise the field of social action. Yet the philanthropist’s decision among these arrangements has not usually been made a unit of analysis.9

2.4 The Layered Explanatory Model

Arrangement decisions cannot be explained by a single factor. A declared charitable motive does not operate outside legal frameworks; a vehicle’s advantages are not equal for every financial asset; and reputation is inseparable from the founder’s network. The paper therefore disaggregates the decision from the outside inwards:

The layered explanatory model

Figure 1: The layered explanatory model. At every level, it controls for the type of wealth, the size of the resource, the actor’s stage of life, and their personal or official capacity.

Footnotes

  1. Elisabeth S. Clemens, “Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women’s Groups and the Transformation of U.S. Politics, 1890–1920,” American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 4 (1993): 755–798. ↩

  2. Henry B. Hansmann, “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,” Yale Law Journal 89, no. 5 (1980): 835–901; Peter Frumkin, Strategic Giving: The Art and Science of Philanthropy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). ↩

  3. Julie Battilana and Silvia Dorado, “Building Sustainable Hybrid Organizations,” Academy of Management Journal 53, no. 6 (2010): 1419–1440; Chris Skelcher and Steven Rathgeb Smith, “Theorizing Hybridity,” Public Administration 93, no. 2 (2015): 433–448. ↩

  4. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). The addition of “recombination” is this paper’s proposal to clarify the particular position of the charitable actor who creates vehicles or links them together. ↩

  5. Ray D. Madoff, Immortality and the Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Rob Reich, Just Giving (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018). ↩

  6. Nada Moumtaz, God’s Property: Islam, Charity, and the Modern State (Oakland: University of California Press, 2021); Ibrāhīm al-Bayyūmī Ghānim, Al-Awqāf wa-l-siyāsa fī Miṣr [Awqāf and Politics in Egypt]; Amānī Qandīl and Sarah Ben Néfissa, Al-Jamʿiyyāt al-Ahliyya fī Miṣr [Private Associations in Egypt] (Cairo, 1994). ↩

3 · Research Design: How Is a Portfolio Reconstructed from Unequal Sources?

3.1 Levels of Analysis and the Comparison Strategy

The paper works at three interrelated analytical levels. The first is the decision: why was this financial resource assigned to this institutional arrangement? The second is the active portfolio: how were the actor’s commitments distributed within a time window? The third is the environment: how did the institutional repertoire and the rules governing it change? Methodologically, no inference is drawn from one level to another without explicit acknowledgement. The existence of a successful association does not, on its own, establish a change in large landowners’ preferences, and the absence of a waqf from a biographical notice does not establish its absence in practice.

The study treats comparison within a single actor as the strongest and most controlled test: two comparable assets for which different arrangements were chosen, one purpose carried first by a waqf and then by an association, or a statement discussing two alternatives. Next comes comparison between cases close in purpose but different in vehicle, followed by comparison over time. Bare counts of the names of associations or awqāf are treated as descriptive indications, not as tests of the mechanism.

3.2 Coding Fields and the Weight of Commitment

FieldPrincipal valuesFunction in preventing error
Identity of the decisionActor; date; personal or official capacity; source.Prevents conflating a person’s acts with the acts of an office.
ResourceLand; property; cash; securities; time and expertise; recurrent commitment.Avoids equating money with time, or an asset with symbolic giving.
Type of decisionCreation; assignment of a resource; funding an intermediary; institutional transfer.Prevents calling every donation the founding of a vehicle.
Legal vehicleWaqf; association; foundation; gift or bequest; no separate vehicle.Separates form from organisation or field.
Institutional holderFamily; association board; confessional community; university; ministry; provincial directorate.Identifies who holds the powers of administration and review.
Field of benefitEducation; health; relief; welfare; culture; composite benefit.Prevents comparing a school with a waqf as if they belonged to the same type.
TimeTemporary; recurrent; perpetual; not documented.Separates the active portfolio from biographical accumulation.
ControlFounding; chairmanship; trusteeship; governance membership; funding without a position.Distinguishes a grant from the founding of an institution.
SuccessionFamily; board; public body; unspecified.Tests the durability of the philanthropist’s intent.
ImplementationAnnounced; begun; completed; handed over; stalled; unknown.Separates the decision from the effect actually realised.
Weight of commitmentNetwork-based; limited recurrent commitment; operational; founding commitment; enduring asset.Avoids equating a minor membership with a waqf asset.
Actor’s intentDirect text; contemporary account; inference from behaviour; unavailable.Prevents inferring motive from the vehicle’s properties alone.
Strength of sourceA: document/direct statement; B: independent contemporary source; C: institutional history or later study; D: unverified report.Keeps the certainty of a statement within the strongest evidence supporting it.

Table 1: The coding sheet for the decision to structure charitable giving institutionally.

3.3 The Sample and the Problem of Representativeness

The paper explicitly states that its sample is not a probability survey of all Egyptian philanthropists. Commemorative books and the historical press generally preserve accounts of elites and survivors, leaving women, people of moderate wealth, and works unattached to a famous name less directly documented. The study is therefore constructed as a theory-guided case comparison, not an estimate of the proportion of “portfolios” in society.

The material consists of three strata. The first comprises pre-1946 cases, gathered from contemporary and relatively independent sources: Ṣafwat al-ʿAṣr [The Elite of the Age], the obituaries in al-Muqtaṭaf [The Digest], al-Manār [The Lighthouse], and waqf biographical notices. The second is a structured supplement for 1953–1971, selected by founding date rather than support for the thesis; it includes Istiqlāl Rāḍī, the al-Nūr wal-Amal Association, Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn, Samuel Habib, and the trajectory of Mabarrat Muḥammad ʿAlī.10 The third is an exploratory case after 1973. These strata are not merged into a single register: the later cases examine the type of response, not its frequency.11 A portfolio of personal wealth is also distinguished from a portfolio of official authority. A bishop or cleric founding in an institutional capacity is not treated as a private owner; the case is used to show the repertoire available to a confessional community or organisation, not to infer a decision about personal wealth. Cases in which the source of funding has not been established are likewise excluded from the central findings.

Footnotes

  1. The first and second strata do not compare two periods of a single phenomenon involving comparable actors, but actors differing in class and economic position. The pre-1946 cases are biographies of elites and notables among large landowners (Aḥmad al-Minshāwī Pasha and Prince ʿUmar Ṭūsūn); their resources are awqāf, land, grants and bonds, and their sources are contemporary. The 1953–1971 cases, by contrast, concern associational and professional initiatives by women volunteers (Istiqlāl Rāḍī and her female companions), a physician (Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn) and a cleric (Samuel Habib), and an institution whose administration passed to the state (Mabarrat Muḥammad ʿAlī). Their most visible capital is expertise, volunteering and networks, and their sources are institutional histories, official websites and later studies. The samples are unequal in duration (about half a century before 1946, and eighteen years between 1953 and 1971) and in the nature of the vehicles (awqāf within portfolios before 1946, and no waqf among the post-1953 cases). Nor are they assumed equal in the scale of resources, since the material for the second period does not disclose the amount of personal money, or in beneficiary groups (students of the Aḥmadī Mosque and schools in the first, and blind women, rheumatic heart disease patients and the inhabitants of a rural village in the second). The change in the type of decision between periods may therefore result from a change in the social stratum of the actors sampled, rather than from time or the environment of state repricing. This explanation can be ruled out only with a subsequent sample matched by social stratum and source (see Methodological Appendix, B). ↩

  2. The pre-1946 stratum was constructed from Zakī Fahmī, Ṣafwat al-ʿAṣr [The Elite of the Age]; al-Muqtaṭaf [The Digest], the obituaries section; al-Manār [The Lighthouse]; and al-Kharāfī. The 1953–1971 stratum relied on official institutional dates, press sources and later studies. Its evidentiary strength was therefore downgraded, and it was not statistically merged with the first stratum. ↩

4 · 1895–1945: Institutional Plurality before It Became an “Alternative”

4.1 al-Minshāwī: One Architecture from Four Arrangements

The case of Aḥmad al-Minshāwī Pasha shows that a plurality of charitable vehicles was not a late response to the waqf crisis. Within a few years around 1903, financial resources were directed to students of the Aḥmadī Mosque, a modern industrial school, the al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqā Association, and the University project. These were not merely “four interests”: they were four arrangements for a shared purpose, education—a direct waqf, a waqf for a modern establishment, a waqf upon an associational intermediary, and the assignment of land to a collective project.12

This case permits an internal comparison. When a fixed real-property asset was the resource of continuity to be protected, the “waqf” was chosen; when the project required mobilisation, a board and a network, the “associational or university intermediary” appeared. This explanation nevertheless remains a behavioural inference: the available material contains no memorandum by al-Minshāwī comparing the alternatives. The portfolio is therefore classified as a “behaviourally reconstructed portfolio”, not an “expressly intended portfolio”.

4.2 Ṭūsūn: Separating the Participation Network from the Resource Portfolio

The case of ʿUmar Ṭūsūn requires a first methodological correction: sixty-five memberships cannot under any circumstances be counted as sixty-five gifts. The material is therefore divided into two strata: (1) the participation and governance network, comprising associations and chairmanships; and (2) the resource portfolio, comprising recurrent grants, bonds earmarked for schools, subscriptions and awqāf. With this analytical separation, institutional plurality does not disappear; it becomes measurable rather than merely a social list.

The importance of Ṭūsūn’s case lies in his having left a text comparing the institutional forms. Ṭūsūn identified the waqf’s advantage as “the soundness and survival of the corpus itself”, considered the funds of associations and companies more exposed to mismanagement, and proposed addressing entitlement-holders’ indebtedness rather than leaving the waqf system.13 This is direct evidence of intent establishing that combining waqf and association was not a contradiction: the waqf was assigned the function of protecting the corpus, and the association the functions of operation and public participation. Yet this explicit evidence does not, on its own, establish that all philanthropists of the period shared the same preference.

4.3 Build Then Hand Over: Not a Fifth Vehicle but an Institutional Sequence

The material repeatedly reveals a trajectory that the waqf–association dichotomy cannot accommodate: actors build a school or hospital with private resources, then hand the completed facility over to the provincial directorate or public body for operation and continuity. This pattern appeared in the board of the industrial-agricultural school at Sohag, in the Abū Tīj school, and in the handover condition incorporated into al-Minshāwī’s educational project.14

This trajectory is not an independent “vehicle”, but a sequential temporal architecture dividing the labour: construction capital and initiative come from private citizens, while long-term operation falls to the state. Its significance lies in preventing donations to public bodies after 1952 from being read as an absolute rupture or an unprecedented practice. The combination of private initiative and public operation has earlier historical roots, even if the balance of power and control changed after the rise of the “social state”.

4.4 Cross-Confessional Giving and the Limit of Official Capacity

Coptic cases reveal that the waqf, association and school formed a cross-confessional repertoire. Anba Tūmās founded a modern school and dedicated properties as awqāf for the bishopric and institutes, while biographical notices attribute to Coptic philanthropists facilities built personally “at their own expense”.15 The bishop’s case, however, cannot be grouped with the portfolios of al-Minshāwī and Ṭūsūn without qualification: some decisions were “decisions of official office and communal resources”, not “decisions concerning private financial wealth”. The analysis therefore uses these cases to establish the availability of institutional forms and their movement between religious and social settings, not to measure a portfolio of private wealth.

Footnotes

  1. al-Manār [The Lighthouse]: the two documents of 1903 and the extended biographical notice of al-Minshāwī in 1905; see also the footnotes to section 1 of this paper. ↩

  2. Qilīnī Fahmī, Al-Amīr ʿUmar Ṭūsūn [Prince ʿUmar Ṭūsūn], chapter “Masʾalat al-Waqf al-Ahlī” [The Question of the Family Waqf], containing Ṭūsūn’s defence of perpetuity and proposal to prohibit indebtedness and attachment of yield. (Only a short phrase from the text is used in the body.) ↩

  3. al-Muqtaṭaf [The Digest], March 1914, pp. 250–255 (the eulogy of ʿAlī Pasha Abū al-Futūḥ and his educational works in the provincial directorate of Girga); and the biographical notice of the founder of the Abū Tīj school in al-Kharāfī’s Muʿjam [Dictionary] (which requires collation against the institutional file). ↩

  4. Zakī Fahmī, Ṣafwat al-ʿAṣr [The Elite of the Age], the biographical notice of Anba Tūmās and the list of his establishments, with the distinction in the text between what was attributed to personal money and what was undertaken in an institutional capacity. ↩

5 · 1946–1952: Legal Flexibility and the Test of the Structural Explanation

Waqf Law 48 of 1946 explicitly granted living founders the right to change the objects of expenditure, amend stipulations and revoke a waqf. This was a direct legislative response to the hypothesis that perpetuity and rigidity were the principal reasons philanthropists were driven away from the waqf. If the waqf’s structure alone caused this withdrawal, flexibility would be expected to revive new foundations, or at least to serve as a basis for administering existing awqāf.16

The material currently available provides two limited indications: (1) ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Khallāf’s account of large numbers of founders revoking their awqāf after the law was issued, and (2) a decline in new waqf attestations before the Sharia Court of Cairo in the first nine months, from 97 attestations to 25 against the corresponding period.17 These indications do not suffice to establish that the law “facilitated exit” from the waqf. The evidence is limited to a single sharia court and a short period; amendments to awqāf are not distinguished from new creations; and this phase was close to major political and economic shocks affecting Egyptian society.

The two indications nevertheless serve an important critical function: they prevent the “rigidity of the form” from being presented as the sole explanation for philanthropists’ withdrawal. The explicitly acknowledged legal constraint was removed, yet no automatic revival in waqf registration appeared within this short time window. A complete empirical test remains contingent on obtaining a time series of waqf attestations and comparing it with rates of association formation and direct gifts. The paper therefore treats 1946 as a break-point in the structure of legislative opportunities, not as a natural experiment with fully established results.

Footnotes

  1. Waqf Law 48 of 1946, article 11; ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, “Al-Jadīd fī qānūn al-waqf al-jadīd” [What Is New in the New Waqf Law], Majallat al-Qānūn wa-l-Iqtiṣād [Journal of Law and Economics] (1947), transmitted from Ghānim. ↩

  2. Statistics of attestations before the Sharia Court of Cairo from Ministry of Awqāf registers, transmitted from Ghānim, Al-Awqāf wa-l-siyāsa fī Miṣr [Awqāf and Politics in Egypt], p. 433. Its limit: one court and nine months, without distinguishing types of attestation. ↩

6 · 1953–1971: From the Asset Portfolio to the Architecture of Organisation and Service

This period is not a “silent gap” in the charitable record, but it remains weaker than the pre-1946 period in the availability of documents concerning wealth and intent. The legislative and institutional environment changed at two levels simultaneously: (1) the abolition of family awqāf under Decree-Law 180 of 1952 and the reorganisation of charitable awqāf; and (2) tighter supervision of private associational activity with the enactment of the associations Law 384 of 1956, followed by Law 32 of 1964, which extended state supervision of private associations and foundations.18 The inquiry therefore does not merely seek another major waqf founder; it is directed exclusively at identifying new types of institutional decision: a specialised association, a professional initiative developing into an organisation, or a private institution whose administration is transferred to the state.

The cases from this period are coded on a separate track: the “organisational architecture of the initiative”, based on expertise, volunteering and collective work, rather than the “private-wealth portfolio”, based on transfers of individual ownership, on which the pre-1946 cases were constructed. The available material discloses neither the scale of the actors’ personal funds nor their financial intent. The cases of Istiqlāl Rāḍī and Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn concern association founding in which personal funding is unknown; Samuel Habib’s case is a gradual organisational trajectory; and Mabarrat Muḥammad ʿAlī is an imposed institutional transfer. These cases are therefore read as tests of the limits of the portfolio concept, not as evidence of a transformation in philanthropists’ decisions about distributing their wealth, and are not forced under its umbrella.

6.1 Istiqlāl Rāḍī (al-Nūr wal-Amal Association, 1954): From a Committee within an Intermediary to a Specialised Association

The initiative to care for blind women began as a committee within the “Red Crescent”. The “al-Nūr wal-Amal Association” was then founded in 1954 under the leadership of Istiqlāl Rāḍī and a group of women volunteers (Bahiyya Badr al-Dīn, Hidāyat Kāmil, Shahīra al-Darbī … and others), and a music institute was added in the early 1960s. This is not a portfolio of individual wealth but a case of collective founding, revealing how associational organisation came to carry education, rehabilitation, employment and culture simultaneously.19

Its analytical role is twofold. First, it provides an explicit converse case to the waqf portfolio: the purpose here requires women’s participation, volunteering, graduated services and continuous adjustment—functions well suited to an associational vehicle. Second, the initiative arose within an existing private intermediary before becoming organisationally independent: “choosing the form” was a gradual trajectory, not a momentary decision. Nothing in the available sources establishes that the founders rejected the waqf after comparing it with alternatives; the case is therefore not used as proof of aversion to it.

6.2 Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn: Professional Expertise Builds a Multi-Layered Architecture

In 1957, the physician Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn founded the “Society of Friends of Rheumatic Heart Disease Patients”, through which a specialised centre and hospital were established at al-Haram. Activities then extended to branches, programmes and cooperation with the Ministry of Health. This career brings together professional expertise, a carrying association, treatment facilities and public partnership.20

Analytically, this case is closer to a “composite institutional architecture” than to a portfolio of parallel vehicles: the association assembles resources and provides legitimacy and participation, medical expertise defines the service, and the state widens the scope of the campaign. It refutes a simple class explanation treating charitable work as an extension of landownership: the founder here is a professional actor whose most important capital is knowledge and a network. The material does not, however, permit measurement of the personal money ʿĀbidīn contributed. These decisions are therefore classified under “founding, governance and expertise”, not “an undocumented transfer of wealth”.

6.3 The Reverend Samuel Habib (1952–1960): The Initiative That Grew before Taking an Organisation’s Name

In 1952, the Reverend Samuel Habib began a literacy initiative in a rural village, then added leadership training, home economics and income-generating projects before the official recognition of the “Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services” in 1960. Institutional history is used here as a self-reported third-order source, supported by accounts from partner bodies.21

The case reveals that a field-based service trajectory may precede the formal legal vehicle: the service begins in practice, functions multiply, and legal form is established later. This runs counter to the model of “choosing the vehicle first”: the practical problem and professional network may gradually produce the organisation.

The extension of services to Christians and Muslims alike also shows that a vehicle’s confessional origins do not necessarily determine the boundaries of its beneficiary group. No general preference for associations can be inferred from this case alone; its strength lies in showing the mechanism of gradual institutional development.

6.4 Mabarrat Muḥammad ʿAlī (Transfer in 1964): The Transfer of an Institution, Not a Founder’s Choice

“Mabarrat Muḥammad ʿAlī” is a necessary counter-case. This charitable institution predated the revolution, expanded its hospital network into the early 1960s, and then passed into state administration in 1964. It would be incorrect to code this event as a “voluntary donation to the state” or a philanthropist’s decision: it was a coercive institutional transfer under a new regulatory and political environment.22

This case reveals the limits of the portfolio concept: not every movement of resources between private and public hands is a donor’s voluntary choice. The coding therefore distinguishes intended handover in pre-1952 projects from state-imposed absorption or coercive transfer. This distinction is decisive, because grouping both under “handover” would convert a change in power into a supposed charitable preference.

6.5 What Do the Four Cases Permit?

The four cases constituting this supplement permit neither an estimate of the proportion of philanthropists who left the waqf nor a financial comparison between waqf and association. They do, however, permit a narrower inference: in the new environment, visible innovation in three of the four cases centred on a specialised service organisation (al-Nūr wal-Amal Association), a professional network (Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn), and a progression from initiative to recognition (Samuel Habib), while the state became a partner or potential acquirer. The available post-1953 cases thus display a different type of decision from that predominant in the pre-1946 cases: building an organisational carrier for a service, or negotiating its relationship with the state, rather than dedicating a permanent asset. This comparison does not suffice to attribute the difference to the period, since the samples also differ in the social stratum of their actors, the type of resource and the source regime. A change in the stratum of actors sampled therefore remains a competing explanation that has not been ruled out (see section 3.3).

The limit of inference: the evidence establishes the possibility of three organisational trajectories after 1953—association founding, progression from initiative to organisation, and transfer of an existing institution to the state—but does not establish that they were society’s dominant trajectories. Measuring dominance requires a systematic register of formations and funding, not selected biographies.

Footnotes

  1. Law on Private Associations and Foundations 384 of 1956; and Law on Private Associations and Foundations 32 of 1964, issued on 12 February 1964, and its implementing regulation of 1966. See the texts published in the “Manshūrāt Qānūniyya” [Legal Publications] database. ↩

  2. The official website of the al-Nūr wal-Amal Association: founded in 1954; the National Council for Women, biographical notice of Istiqlāl Rāḍī; and Bibliotheca Alexandrina, organisations database, which records the initiative’s passage from a committee within the Red Crescent to an association under Rāḍī’s leadership. These sources are treated as institutional history requiring registration files for final verification. ↩

  3. Ahram Gate, “Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn: Umm al-Aṭibbāʾ al-Muqātila ḍidd Rūmātīzm Qalb al-Ṭifl” [Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn: Mother of Physicians, Fighter against Rheumatic Heart Disease in Children], 15 April 2020; and Khatwa Center for Documentation and Studies, “D. Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn” [Dr Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn], both recording the founding of the Society of Friends of Rheumatic Heart Disease Patients in 1957 and the facilities and programmes that followed. The amount of personal money and the association’s documents require archival verification. ↩

  4. The official history of the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services; Global Ministries, history of the partnership with the organisation: Samuel Habib’s initiative began in 1952 and was officially recognised in 1960. The source is institutional and self-reported, and is therefore not used on its own to establish motives. ↩

  5. Beth Baron, The Women’s Awakening in Egypt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), on the history of Mabarrat Muḥammad ʿAlī and women’s charitable work; see also the later literature on private medical institutions. The transfer of administration in 1964 requires the executive decision and implementation files before peer review. ↩

7 · 1972–1980: A Legal Return or Recombination?

The 1970s brought the “Egyptian Awqāf Authority” and the phrase “founders’ stipulations” back to the forefront of the law, while the wider economic environment changed with the opening up of economic policy. The material available up to 1980 does not, however, provide a sufficient methodological basis for speaking of a “return of the waqf” as a social pattern.

The clearest case in this window is the “waqf of Maḥmūd Khalīl al-Ḥuṣarī”: a modern charitable waqf whose affairs, according to Ibrāhīm al-Bayyūmī Ghānim’s account transmitted from Ministry of Awqāf records, are administered through an association, with annual accounting to its board as the explicit representative of the party entitled to receive the benefit.23

If the full legal description of this event is correct, the case does not restore the classical waqf system within its old boundaries, but links the permanence of the corpus with associational administration. This is the precise meaning of “recombination”: two organisational vehicles performing distinct functions within a single charitable architecture.

A single case nevertheless does not establish a general societal response, nor does it establish that the 1973 law was the direct and sole cause of its emergence. The event therefore remains an “analytic probe” opening a temporal extension beyond 1980, not the paper’s causal conclusion.

Footnotes

  1. Ibrāhīm al-Bayyūmī Ghānim, Al-Awqāf wa-l-siyāsa fī Miṣr [Awqāf and Politics in Egypt], the section on modern waqf deeds, 1952–1996, and the 1980 waqf of Maḥmūd Khalīl al-Ḥuṣarī, as transmitted from the Ministry’s registers. The full waqf deed must be consulted to settle the description of the relationship with the association. ↩

8 · Map of the Cases: What Do We Know, and What Do We Not Know?

CaseType of decisionInstitutional arrangementStrongest explanationStrength of evidence and its limit
al-Minshāwī, c. 1903Creation + assignment of a resourceTraditional waqf; waqf for a school; waqf upon an association; land for the UniversityFit of asset and purpose; education across multiple carriersA/B: contemporary documents and a biographical notice; comparative intent indirect
ʿUmar Ṭūsūn, 1900–1944Assignment + funding + governanceAwqāf; recurrent grants; bonds; subscriptions; association networkProtecting the corpus versus operation and visibilityA/B: direct statement and two sources; financial magnitude incomplete
Abū al-Futūḥ/Sohag schoolIntended institutional transferPrivate construction followed by handover to the provincial directorateSeparating capital from operationB: contemporary eulogy; requires the institutional file
Anba Tūmās, 1924Founding in an official capacity + waqfSchool and waqf upon a confessional institutionSustaining an institution and serviceC: later biographical notice; mixed source of funds
Istiqlāl Rāḍī, 1954–1961Gradual collective foundingCommittee within the Red Crescent, then an association and instituteVolunteering, employment and flexible rehabilitationB/C: official history and public sources; no documents of financial intent
Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn, from 1957Founding + service architectureAssociation; treatment centre; branches; governmental cooperationProfessional expertise and expansion of serviceB/C: al-Ahrām and institutional history; amount of personal money unknown
Samuel Habib, 1952–1960Initiative followed by foundingLiteracy; integrated programmes; recognised organisationGradual institutional development and leadership buildingC: self-reported history supported by partner bodies
Mabarrat Muḥammad ʿAlī, 1952–1964Imposed/regulated transferPrivate hospital network followed by state administrationRedistribution of power, not donor preferenceB/C: historical literature; requires the transfer decision and its files
al-Ḥuṣarī waqf, 1980Hybrid architectureCharitable waqf under associational administrationPermanence of the corpus and flexibility of administrationB/C: transmitted records; requires the full waqf deed

Table 2: The central cases classified by type of decision and strength of source. The rows do not represent equal weights or a probability sample.

Map of the cases across the four environments; point positions are approximate within the period of each case, and categories follow the type of decision.

Figure 2: Map of the cases across the four environments; point positions are approximate within the period of each case, and categories follow the type of decision.

The map shows that “functional assignment” is measured not by counting charitable vehicles, but explicitly by the fit between the properties of the resource and purpose and the chosen governance. It also shows that some listed cases do not represent “individual portfolios”: Istiqlāl Rāḍī represents a trajectory of collective founding by women; Samuel Habib a trajectory of professional development; and Mabarrat Muḥammad ʿAlī an event of institutional transfer and administrative absorption by the state. Their inclusion was deliberate, to test the limits of the concept—not to expand the portfolio until it encompasses all charitable work.

9 · Falsifiable Propositions

The following propositions are offered not as “deterministic institutional laws”, but as hypotheses and methodological expectations derived from the mechanism of institutional transformation. Each has a specified, testable form of falsifying evidence:

Proposition One — Fit of Real-Property Asset and Time:

Theoretical expectation: the more the resource takes the form of a real-property asset and the intention is to restrict disposal over the long term, the greater the likelihood of a waqf.

What would falsify or qualify it: evidence that long-term real-property assets were assigned to associations with the same frequency while the philanthropist’s control remained limited.

Proposition Two — Fit of Collective Operation:

Theoretical expectation: the more the purpose requires the mobilisation of subscriptions and volunteers and the modification of programmes, the greater the likelihood of an association.

What would falsify it: associations that neither operate nor mobilise, alongside awqāf performing the same functions in the comparison cases.

Proposition Three — Separating Construction from Operation:

Theoretical expectation: when a philanthropist possesses construction capital but does not wish to operate the service, an architecture of private construction followed by public handover emerges.

What would falsify it: comparable projects whose founders retain operation despite the availability of a public body capable of and willing to take over.

Proposition Four — Contraction of the Repertoire after 1952:

Theoretical expectation: if the scope for control over both waqf and associations narrows, private innovation shifts towards professional initiatives and service organisations linked to the state.

What would falsify it: evidence of continued creation of independent private asset portfolios on a wide scale within the same period (1953–1971).

Proposition Five — Recombination:

Theoretical expectation: when the waqf returns to the legal field while operational expertise remains in associations, hybrid forms emerge combining the two within a single architecture.

What would falsify it: a predominance of purely classical awqāf or associations without permanent assets after 1973.

Methodological Assessment of the Strength of the Five Propositions:

The paper states that the first and second propositions are the strongest in the current material, because they have internal comparisons and a statement from ʿUmar Ṭūsūn. The fourth and fifth are weaker: the former requires a systematic register of formations for 1953–1971, and the latter an extension beyond 1980. A weaker proposition cannot methodologically be elevated to the central thesis merely because it better suits the narrative of the collection.

10 · Competing Explanations and Adversarial Tests

10.1 The “Linear Substitution” Thesis

The simplest and most widespread explanation holds that the association rose because the waqf declined and contracted. This simplifying explanation does not, however, account for large landowners such as al-Minshāwī and Ṭūsūn combining the two forms before the crisis, for a waqf upon an association, or for construction followed by handover. Nevertheless, this competing explanation remains tenable at the level of general frequency if a future broad corpus establishes that the waqf’s financial weight declined continuously. The present paper lacks a numerical denominator with which to refute or establish it.

10.2 The Thesis of “The Waqf’s Repellent Structure”

It may be argued that perpetuity, the judiciary and the high cost of amendment were the real causes of philanthropists’ aversion to and withdrawal from the waqf. Two indications run counter to this explanation: Prince ʿUmar Ṭūsūn’s direct defence of the waqf, and the experience of legislative flexibility made possible by the 1946 law. These indications do not, however, necessarily represent all actors in society. A sound methodological test requires documents and decision memoranda in which philanthropists compare waqf and association before deciding, rather than merely inferring their motives from the absence of a waqf in their biographies.

10.3 “Class, Confession and Gender” as Variables

Social standing, confessional affiliation or gender may explain the choice more than the vehicle’s properties. The women volunteers in “al-Nūr wal-Amal” faced different resources and networks from those of a landowner, while a cleric acts within a formal confessional institution. Demographic differences are therefore not treated as “noise”, but tested within comparable strata where these are available. (They are not available in the comparison between periods, where they remain a competing explanation that has not been ruled out; see section 3.3.) Cross-confessional cases are used to show the availability of the organisational repertoire, not to establish identical individual motives.

10.4 The “Professionalism Rather than Wealth” Thesis

The cases of Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn and Samuel Habib may be read as part of a broader shift towards the “professional founder”, who contributes expertise and organisation more than a real-property asset. This is a strong competing explanation that the paper does not defeat; rather, it incorporates it into a revised central thesis: a change in the type of charitable capital—from an asset made inalienable to knowledge and a network brought into organisation—may explain the rise of the association as much as changes in the law.

10.5 Source Effects

Later associations are seen through their websites and self-reported histories, while older awqāf are seen through deeds and biographical notices. The resulting difference in visibility may reflect the nature of the historical source rather than the charitable actor’s behaviour. The paper therefore records the “source regime” for each historical period and does not compare raw counts between unequal archives. Nor does it interpret the absence of a philanthropist’s name from an organisation’s records as the absence of their material funding: donations may have been institutional or deliberately anonymous.

11 · Conclusion: From the Single Form to the Economy of Arrangements

The paper’s central question changed during the research. It ceased to be: did the philanthropist continue to choose the waqf or move to the association? It became: how did the actor distribute financial resources, time, control and operation among multiple arrangements? When were these arrangements simultaneous, when were they successive stages within a single trajectory, and when was the transfer imposed from outside the actor’s will?

The pre-1946 cases reveal that plurality preceded the waqf crisis: a philanthropist could make an asset inalienable, fund an association, sit on a board, and build a project before handing it over. ʿUmar Ṭūsūn’s comparison shows that waqf and association carried different functions in a single actor’s conception. The period 1953–1971 shows—without any claim to comprehensive statistical representativeness—that the centre of visible innovation shifted towards the service organisation, professional expertise, and partnership or tension with the state. “Mabarrat Muḥammad ʿAlī” is a reminder that some transformations are transfers of power, not donors’ choices.

The contribution of the “philanthropist’s portfolio” therefore operates at two levels. The first is historical: dismantling the narrative of comprehensive linear substitution and revealing composite forms and gradual trajectories. The second is theoretical: treating charitable work as a decision about the distribution of property rights, governance, time and review, not merely the choice of a generous purpose. Waqf, association, gift and state are not competing names on a ladder of modernity, but arrangements carrying different functions, risks and costs.

The limits remain explicit. Data are not currently available to estimate the statistical frequency of each arrangement; portfolios lack complete financial weights; founding documents are incomplete for some cases; there are no named negative cases; the post-1953 sample is not matched by social stratum and source to the pre-1946 sample; and there is no adequate series after 1980. Further research must therefore turn directly to registers of association and foundation formation, files on the transfer of hospitals and schools, modern waqf deeds, and the construction of time-bounded portfolios rather than accumulations of biographies. Only then can it be tested whether “recombination” is a general phenomenon or a striking case.

Within these limits, the concept opens up one contemporary question that can be tested without projecting the historical sample’s findings onto it: when an Egyptian philanthropist today combines a waqf with an association or foundation within a single project, which functions of permanence, operation and control do they assign to each vehicle, and how do the legal and administrative rules in force price these alternatives? The answer can be pursued with the paper’s own instrument: the coding fields for the arrangement decision, the active portfolio within a specified time window, and the separation of the private-wealth portfolio track from that of the organisational architecture of the initiative.

The conclusion in one sentence: the waqf did not disappear altogether when the association appeared, nor did the association become a new waqf; what changed was how actors distributed the functions of permanence, operation and control among multiple vehicles whose costs and limits the modern state had redefined.

Methodological Disclosure

This paper was prepared with the assistance of “al-Warrāq” (a digital research assistant working with a provenance-tagged Arabic textual library) in retrieving texts, building the case database, collating dates and producing the document. The design, coding rules, analytical judgements and final drafting are the author’s sole responsibility. Institutional dates drawn from organisations’ websites are reported as self-reported third-order history and cannot, on their own, establish motives or effects.

Sources and Bibliography

First: Contemporary and Legal Sources

– al-Manār [The Lighthouse] (Cairo), the documents and biographical notice of Aḥmad al-Minshāwī, 1903–1905.

– al-Muqtaṭaf [The Digest] (Cairo), the obituaries and eulogies section; especially the eulogy of ʿAlī Pasha Abū al-Futūḥ, March 1914.

– Fahmī, Zakī. Ṣafwat al-ʿAṣr fī Tārīkh wa-Rusūm Mashāhīr Rijāl Miṣr [The Elite of the Age: Biographies and Portraits of Egypt’s Famous Men]. Cairo, 1926.

– Fahmī, Qilīnī. Al-Amīr ʿUmar Ṭūsūn: Ḥayātuh — Āthāruh — Aʿmāluh [Prince ʿUmar Ṭūsūn: His Life — His Legacy — His Works]. Cairo, c. 1944.

– Waqf Law 48 of 194624.

– Law on Private Associations and Foundations 384 of 1956.

– Law on Private Associations and Foundations 32 of 1964 and its implementing regulation.

– Registers of the Egyptian Ministry of Awqāf: modern waqf deeds and statistics on waqf attestations; transmitted from Ibrāhīm al-Bayyūmī Ghānim.

– The official websites and introductory materials of the al-Nūr wal-Amal Association and the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services; used as self-reported institutional history, not as independent evidence of intent.

Second: Arabic References and Egyptian Case Studies

– al-Kharāfī, ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Jārallāh. Muʿjam Tarājim Aʿlām al-Waqf [Biographical Dictionary of Notable Figures of the Waqf]. Vol. 1, 1st ed. Kuwait: General Secretariat of Awqāf, 1435 AH / 2014 CE.

– Khallāf, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. “Al-Jadīd fī qānūn al-waqf al-jadīd” [What Is New in the New Waqf Law]. Majallat al-Qānūn wa-l-Iqtiṣād [Journal of Law and Economics], 1947.

– Ghānim, Ibrāhīm al-Bayyūmī. Al-Awqāf wa-l-siyāsa fī Miṣr [Awqāf and Politics in Egypt]. Cairo: Dār al-Shurūq, 1998.

– Qandīl, Amānī, and Sarah Ben Néfissa. Al-Jamʿiyyāt al-Ahliyya fī Miṣr [Private Associations in Egypt]. Cairo: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 1994.

– Qandīl, Amānī. Al-Mawsūʿa al-ʿarabiyya li-l-mujtamaʿ al-madanī [The Arab Encyclopaedia of Civil Society]. Cairo: Maktabat al-Usra, 2008.

– Khatwa Center for Documentation and Studies. “D. Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn” [Dr Zuhayra ʿĀbidīn]; compared with the al-Ahrām account of her career, 2020.

– The National Council for Women. “Istiqlāl Rāḍī” [Istiqlāl Rāḍī]; and the official website of the al-Nūr wal-Amal Association.

Third: Foreign References (Translated Titles with the Originals Retained)

– Beth Baron, The Women’s Awakening in Egypt: Culture, Society, and the Press, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

– Julie Battilana and Silvia Dorado, “Building Sustainable Hybrid Organizations,” Academy of Management Journal 53, no. 6 (2010): 1419–1440.

– Elisabeth S. Clemens, “Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change,” American Journal of Sociology 98, no. 4 (1993): 755–798.

– Shaimaa Esmail El-Neklawy and Esther Möller, “Between Traditions of Aid and Political Ambitions,” Endowment Studies 6 (2022): 192–220.

– Amy Fallas, “The First Duty of Charity,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 45, no. 1 (2025): 180–189.

– Peter Frumkin, Strategic Giving, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

– Henry B. Hansmann, “The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,” Yale Law Journal 89, no. 5 (1980): 835–901.

– Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970.

– Ray D. Madoff, Immortality and the Law, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010.

– Nada Moumtaz, God’s Property, Oakland: University of California Press, 2021.

– Lisa Pollard, “Egyptian by Association,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 46, no. 2 (2014): 239–257.

– Rob Reich, Just Giving, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

– Chris Skelcher and Steven Rathgeb Smith, “Theorizing Hybridity,” Public Administration 93, no. 2 (2015): 433–448.

Footnotes

  1. The law was published in al-Waqāʾiʿ al-Miṣriyya, issue 61, on 17 June 1946, according to Ibrāhīm Ḥanafī (compilation and commentary), Qānūn bi-Aḥkām al-Waqf al-Ṣādir bi-al-Qānūn Raqm 48 li-Sanat 1946 [Law on Waqf Provisions Issued as Law 48 of 1946] (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya, 1953), p. 8. The publication details given here are transmitted from this edition and have not been checked against the original issue. ↩

Methodological Appendix: Rules of Judgement and Limits of the Material

A · Rules of Judgement

– A decision enters the portfolio only if it transferred a resource, created a recurrent commitment, founded a vehicle, or placed a binding governance responsibility on the actor.

– Bare membership or chairmanship is not counted as a financial allocation; it is recorded only in the participation network.

– Motive is not inferred from the properties of the form; the actor’s statement, the researcher’s interpretation and the actual outcome are kept separate.

– The portfolio is constructed within a time window, and the life trajectory is presented separately.

– Personal money is separated from official, communal and institutional resources.

– The “private-wealth portfolio” track (transfer of individual ownership) is coded separately from the “organisational architecture of the initiative” track (expertise, volunteering and collective work); the latter is not merged into the former.

– The number of decisions does not equal their weight; an ordinal scale is used for the size and duration of the commitment.

– Transfer to the state is coded as “intended” or “regulated/imposed” according to the evidence; the two types are not merged.

– The strength of a finding does not exceed the strongest direct source supporting it, and self-reported sources are not used to establish intent without an independent indication.

B · Limits of the Material and Prospects for Completion

The paper’s judgements rest on material that remains incomplete in specified areas: the founding files, statutes and first reports of the al-Nūr wal-Amal Association and the Society of Friends of Rheumatic Heart Disease Patients; the registration records and 1950s and 1960s reports of the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services; the decision transferring the hospitals of Mabarrat Muḥammad ʿAlī and its implementation files, to distinguish legal handover from administrative absorption; the full al-Ḥuṣarī waqf deed, to determine the legal relationship between the waqf, association and board of administration; and a time series of waqf attestations (1935–1960) separating creation from revocation and amendment. Judgements based on these cases therefore remain qualified by the strength of their sources as declared in Table 2. Completion has three directions: an accumulating post-1952 sample from Ministry of Awqāf registers, including awqāf and accounts for some elites and medium-sized landowners, matched by social stratum and source to the pre-1946 sample; cases of personal wealth from 1953–1971 and counter-cases (a new waqf, an association without an individual founder, and a direct donation to the state); and extension beyond 1980 to test whether hybrid forms constituted a general trajectory or an exception.

Bandar — with the assistance of al-Warrāq